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VON WRIGHT, LAW, AND MORALITY

Seppo Sajama
UEF Law School
University of Eastern Finland
Joensuu, Finland
e-mail: seppo.sajama@uef.fi

Abstract:
This paper examines and defends von Wright's view of moral value, put forward in his book The Varieties of Goodness (1963). He holds that moral value is not a primary value like instrumental, technical, utilitarian, medical, or hedonic value, but a secondary or second-level one which is based on a combination of primary values. Human actions and intentions are the only bearers of moral value, and they are morally valuable because they protect and promote some set of primary values. It is argued that the same account (i) applies also to juridical value, and (ii) can be used to throw some light on the problem of defining the three competing schools of legal philosophy, viz. legal positivism, natural law theory, and legal constructivism.

Key words: Goodness, value theory, von Wright, juridical value, legal positivism.

1 The idea and its background

In this paper I will examine Georg Henrik von Wright's idea of the nature of moral value and use it to clarify the relationship between law and morality. He put forward his view of moral value in his 1963 book *The Varieties of Goodness.* To its author's apparent disappointment, the book never became as popular as its companion volume, *Norm and Action*, published the same year. It was only 38 years later that the book was translated into another language – and even then not into a big language.

In the new preface to the Finnish edition, von Wright explained why the book never carried the day. The main reason was, according to him, the zeitgeist. At the time of its publication, it was imperative to distinguish between normative ethics and metaethics. And that was precisely what von Wright did not do. He did analyze moral concepts and even put forward his views on the philosophical method, but he went on to commit what was, according to the standards of the time, the ultimate philosophical mistake: he justified some of his normative stances with factual arguments. In other words, he committed the hideous "naturalistic fallacy."[1]

In the new preface, von Wright took up only one philosophical idea from the old book. It was the idea concerning the nature of moral value. After rehearsing his old list of the "varieties of goodness" – containing, among other things, instrumental, technical, utilitarian, medical, and hedonic goodness – he makes his important theoretical point:

> Obviously, what is missing from the list above is the concept of *moral* goodness. This is due to the fact that I do not regard moral goodness as an independent variety of goodness but as a combination of several varieties, [a combination] that is different from case to case.[2]

Next, somewhat surprisingly, he says that such a combination consists of an Aristotelian eudaimonistic, a Millian utilitarian, and a Kantian deontological part.[3] I take this surprising deviation from his original 1963 list of values to be an indication that, almost forty years later, he had lost much of his erstwhile interest in the classification of individual varieties of goodness. It was only the big question about the nature of moral goodness that still fasci-

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[1] It is another question what von Wright himself thought of that sin in the 1960s.
[2] von Wright 2001, 7–8. My translation.
[3] von Wright 2001, 8.

nated him. Ethics, he argued, might become the most important field of philosophy in the 21st century, after the reign of logic in the previous century, but this new ethics should be based on "a clear understanding of the *diversity* of the concept of goodness and of related concepts."[4]

2 The "secondary" nature of moral goodness

The best statement of von Wright's idea of what he called the "secondary" nature of moral value is, however, to be found in the original book:

> My own view of the matter is roughly as follows: Moral goodness is *not* a form of the good on a level with the other forms, which we have distinguished. If it be called a form of goodness at all, it is this in a *secondary* sense. By this I mean that an account of the conceptual nature of moral goodness has to be given in terms of some other form[5] of the good.[6]

There are two potential misunderstandings about the word "secondary" that must be forestalled. First, although moral goodness is secondary in the *ontological* sense that it is founded upon other kinds of value and cannot exist without them, moral value is not secondary to any other value in any important respect. There is absolutely no contradiction in saying that moral value is dependent on primary values (or ontologically secondary), but is in fact more important than any of the primary values.

Second, it would be wrong to see the primary values (instrumental, technical, utilitarian, medical, hedonic, etc.) as *intrinsic* values and moral goodness as an *instrumental* value that only aims at the realization of the intrinsic ones. Von Wright flatly rejects the whole concept of intrinsic value. He cannot accept "the traditional classification of all good – sometimes of all value whatsoever – into *two* main types, viz. good as a means and good as an end, instrumental and terminal, extrinsic and intrinsic good. We shall make no use of these dichotomies for our present purposes."[7]

It is obvious, then, that there can be no second-level moral values without there also being some first-level *non-moral* values. Traditional value theorists typically tried to make an exhaustive list of values, but the lists of different thinkers were disappointingly different. Moreover, they took moral value to be just another value among other values. This tedious and unfruitful classificatory task seems to have lost much of its importance to von Wright, although in the sixties he expended quite a lot of energy on it.

There is, however, one important question that von Wright did not ask himself: are there other secondary or second-level values besides moral ones? I believe there are. Legal or juridical values are my candidates for the position of second-level values. In the remainder of this paper, I will try to show that moral and juridical values are in many ways so similar to moral values (and different from primary values) that there is no reason to discriminate against juridical values by denying their right to secondariness.

3 *Rechtsgüter & Moralgüter*

One reason for the general neglect of juridical values by traditional value theorists might be that, for most of them, value theory was a serene and sublime topic. They probably had little tolerance for any attempts to introduce the concept of *juridical value* (or even that of a *legally protected interest*) into their noble discipline. I have no such qualms.

The second problem has to do with language. The expression "juridical value" is used much more seldom than "moral value." Yet, the thing named need not be as rare as its name. As von Wright says, "[M]any of the varieties of goodness can be spoken about without using words that are derived from 'good.'"[8] Similarly, from the fact that an expression is rare, we cannot conclude that the thing it refers to is rare as well. It must also be remembered that it is often possible to speak about a thing without using its name. For instance, the word "justice" does not occur many times in Rousseau's *On the Social Contract,* yet the book is all about justice.

The third problem concerns the thing that has juridical value. Is that thing – also known as the bearer of juridical value – the *object* or the *means* of legal protection? For instance, criminal law certainly protects the life and limb of human beings. But what is the thing that has juridical value in the context of criminal law: is it the law itself (which is the means of protection) or is it the life and limb of people

[4] von Wright 2001, 9–10.

[5] In light of the new preface, the third-to-last word should be in the plural, "forms." This would express his idea better, since the primary values serving as the foundation of secondary moral value are different "from case to case."

[6] von Wright 1963, 119. Italics in the original.

[7] von Wright 1963, 12.

[8] von Wright 2001, 7.

(which are the objects of protection)? If there is an analogy between morality and law (and, consequently, between moral value and juridical value), and if moral value is a secondary value based on primary values, then juridical value should also be a secondary value. Therefore, an account of the conceptual nature of juridical value "has to be given in terms of some other form of the good."[9] This means that just as morality protects non-moral values, so law protects non-juridical values.

In short, if we want to maintain the analogy between morality and law and to stick to von Wright's basic insight about moral value, we must conclude that juridical value attaches to the means and not to the object of protection.

Although the objects of legal protection are not the real bearers of juridical value, it is necessary to make clear what sort of entities these objects are and how we should speak of them. The English language does not have a single word to signify these protected objects; it must use the clumsy phrase "legally protected interest," which immediately arouses the perplexity whether interests are psychological states, objects in the external world, or something in between. German lawyers, on the other hand, have coined a short, clear, and straightforward expression for the object of legal protection: *Rechtsgut.*[10] This concept[11] is based on the idea that there are some things that are worth protecting by means of the law. For instance, the German tort law mentions the following "things deserving legal protection" (*Rechtsgüter*): life, limb, health, freedom, property, and rights.[12]

Von Wright's basic insight about the nature of moral value is structurally similar to the idea from tort law: some non-moral values, which can collectively be called the "good" of a living being[13] are worth protecting by means of moral norms, i.e., norms prescribing people to do good and to refrain from doing harm. This idea could be translated into lawyers' dialect by saying that the things protected by morality (i.e., by morally good actions) are *Moralgüter.* The term *Moralgut* is not commonly used in German,[14] but I will adopt it as a convenient technical term.

Rechtsgüter are, then, objects of legal protection, and *Moralgüter* are objects of moral protection. But what concrete objects are morally protected? We already saw that life, limb, health, freedom, property, and rights are among the objects of legal protection. But what are the objects of *moral* protection? It might be tempting to say that the objects of moral protection are morally good actions, but that would be a grave mistake, for morally good actions are the means, and not the objects, of moral protection. I will return to the problem of the common area or overlap of legal and moral protection later on. At this point it is enough to say that many, but not all, objects of legal protection are also objects of moral protection, and vice versa. For instance, both morality and law disapprove of stealing, but only morality condemns marital infidelity.

There is something paradoxical in the claim that *Moralgüter* are not morally good. But that conclusion cannot be avoided if we accept (i) von Wright's idea of the nature of moral goodness and (ii) the analogy of moral and juridical value. *Moralgüter* are not morally good things, because a *thing* cannot be morally good; only human actions (and, derivatively, intentions and dispositions to perform such actions) can be morally good. And good human actions are good because they promote and protect non-morally good things, like the interests of living beings. The picture below sums up the above discussion of von Wright's view of moral goodness:



[9] This is what von Wright says about moral value in von Wright 1963, 119.

[10] Many Slavic languages have adopted it as "pravno dobro," and Finnish as "oikeushyvä." The Finnish term is rarely, if ever, used outside legal circles, probably because of its somewhat hilarious overtones.

[11] I do acknowledge the difference between a *word* and a *concept,* but hold that it is much easier to use a concept and to speak of it if it has a short and clear expression. When a concept is born, it does not at first have a fixed expression. See, e.g., Hamlyn 1961, 3-4.

[12] *Leben, Körper, Gesundheit, Freiheit, Eigentum, Rechte* are the *Rechtsgüter* mentioned in BGB § 823, *Schadensersatzpflicht.*

[13] von Wright 1963: 9, 18, 42, and ch. 5.

[14] Its plural form has been used by Schwegler (2009, 316), but in a quite different sense.

Von Wright's idea that moral values are secondary is expressed here by the fact that MORAL GOODNESS is based on NON-MORAL GOODNESS, or the good of various living beings.

If there really is an analogy between moral and juridical values, one should be able to draw a similar picture about juridical values. In fact, this is easy: just replace "moral value" with "juridical value," "human actions" with "social institutions," and "Moralgüter" with "Rechtsgüter," and you have an outline of a theory of juridical value.

The list of *Rechtsgüter* could also serve as a starting-point for a list of *Moralgüter*, because the objects of legal protection and those of moral protection overlap to a considerable extent. This common area, the area of double protection, is also the most important and least changeable one, as we will see in the next section in which I apply von Wright's idea to the problem of the demarcation of the respective spheres of law and morality.

4 The content of the overlap of law and morality

When we inquire into the frontier between law and morality, we should be clear about what we are willing to accept as an answer to our query about its properties. There are (at least) two types of answers. One type compares and contrasts the *objects* of protection (i.e., *Rechtsgüter* and *Moralgüter*), while the other compares and contrasts the *means* of protection (i.e., moral and legal norms). Because the same set of basic *Güter* can be protected with two very different sets of rules, these answers can be rather different. For instance, a religious morality can contain the same norms as a secular morality; the only difference might be the fact that the religious moral code is embellished with all sorts of fancy additions, intended to boost its credibility or authoritativeness in the eyes of its subjects. Just consider the impressive heavenly context of the giving of the Ten Commandments.

The point should not be overstated, however. The line between law and morality can be drawn by using either norms or objects of protection – and the line might still be drawn in the same place. Personally, I would like to consider the matter from the perspective of the *Schützobjekte* or *Güter,* but since my chosen authorities, Jellinek and Mill, prefer to speak about rules, I must start with norms.

German 19th century jurist Georg Jellinek defended the view of law as the "ethical minimum." In his own words, "Law is nothing but the ethical minimum. ... [L]aw is the sustaining element [of a society], and will always contain the ... norms that safeguard its continuing existence."[15]

Jellinek's view can be pictured as two circles, *M* and *L*, such that *M* contains the norms of morality, and *L* those of law, and *M* includes all of *L*. Jellinek's picture could be a true description of criminal law, but as a picture of the whole of law, it is false. It is not a correct picture because there are many legal norms that have no moral content whatever. Administrative law is full of such regulations. For instance, if an administrative rule states that a complaint must be filed within 60 days, it is hard to see what moral difference it would make if the term were 50 or 70 days instead (50 minutes or 70 years would have made a difference, though). Jellinek is, however, quite right in maintaining that the purpose of the rules of a society is to enable it to exist, but that aim does not dictate the details of the rules. Presumably, the determination is more strict in criminal law than in administrative law, where often it is enough that there is *a* rule.

John Stuart Mill has a more credible suggestion. He divides morality into two parts: justice and beneficence.[16] Justice is about not harming your neighbor, whereas beneficence means doing good to him or her. The difference between justice and beneficence corresponds to the difference between perfect and imperfect duties. If you have a perfect duty, then (i) you have it toward everybody; and (ii) everybody has the corresponding right to require you to do your duty.[17] But if you have an imperfect duty, then you are obliged to do it, but you may choose when, where, and to whom you do it. For example, we have a perfect duty not to steal, but only an imperfect duty to contribute to charities.

Taken literally, Mill does not solve our problem, because he does not tell us how these two parts of morality are related to one another: do they overlap or do they exclude each other? However, it is easy to take Mill's idea one step further by saying that "beneficence" contains the norms that belong only to *morality*, whereas "justice" contains the norms that belong to the *overlap of law and morality*. This overlap, which is the same thing as

[15] Jellinek 1973, 208–9: "Das recht ist nichts Anderes, als das ethische Minimum. … Für die Sozialethik wird also das Recht, als das erhaltende Moment, das Minimum der Normen eines bestimmten Gesellschaftszustandes bilden, d. h. diejenigen Normen umfassen, welche die unveränderte Existenz eines solchen sichern."

[16] Mill 1998, 94–95.

[17] Mill 1998, 94.

Jellinek's moral minimum, contains the norms that have both a moral and a legal backing – and therefore give their *Schützobjekte* a double protection. In addition to these two areas, there should also be the third area, that of the norms that belong to law but not morality, e.g., the norms of administrative law. Mill does not, however, seem to recognize the existence of this category.[18]

There are, then, three types of protection: (i) moral, (ii) legal, and (iii) mixed, i.e., both moral and legal.

The idea that law and morality are two circles that intersect at some *peripheral* point is wrong. Their intersection is the very center around which both morality and law grow, as in the picture below:



The items in the central region *L&M* have a double protection. Moreover, *L&M* contains a kernel, called *H5*. It contains the *Güter* that any *viable* and *sustainable* community absolutely must protect. Its name alludes to H. L. A. Hart, who argued for the existence of five facts about human nature which any society must take into account when framing its rules.[19] This quintet will play an important part in the next section.

5 Legal positivism, constructivism, and natural law theory

We are still missing one essential ingredient: a criterion that determines whether a given good thing is a *Moralgut* or a *Rechtsgut* or both of them at the same time. Because it is impossible to draw a static picture of the solution, I beg the reader to perform the following thought-experiment. Imagine a rectangle *O* that contains all possible objects of protection. Inside it, there are two circles *L* and *M* that contain all objects deemed worthy of legal and moral protection, respectively. Since different societies protect different things, these circles must be mobile: they may increase and decrease in size, move from place to place etc. In theory, each of them may cover everything in the rectangle or nothing at all. All alternatives are possible, at least in principle.

Now we can express the essential teachings of the three major schools of legal thought concerning the relationship of law and morality.

> *Natural law* theory holds that there is a fixed and unmoving circle *M* that contains a mobile waxing and waning circle, *L*. At its worst, *L* covers only a small part of *M*'s area; at its best, *L* fills the whole of *M*. But it is not possible that *L* could ever reach outside *M*, because "an immoral law is no law."
>
> *Legal positivism* is the view that both *L* and *M* are mobile and can increase and decrease in size. Sometimes they overlap, sometimes they do not. Sometimes one of them contains the other totally. Sometimes they are identical. Sometimes one or both of them disappear altogether. All logical possibilities are equally probable. There is no *a priori* reason to regard one state as "more natural" or "better" than another.
>
> *Constructivism* (or the third alternative under any name) is the view that *L* and *M* are mobile but necessarily overlap at all times. They cannot get rid of each other because the area of their intersection contains *H5*, the basic objects of protection corresponding to Hart's five facts that determine the minimum content of the law of a viable society. If *L* and *M* were to drift totally apart or totally disappear, we would not have a sustainable society but a suicide club.

6 Some final thoughts

I have argued that von Wright's view of the secondary nature of moral goodness is plausible, but added that juridical values can be seen as second-level values, too. The notion of a legally or morally protected interest (*Rechtsgut* or *Moralgut*) helps to clarify the conceptual and terminological difficulties here, and even sheds some light on what the great theories of legal philosophy disagree about.

[18] Mill does say that, outside morality, there are "the remaining provinces of Expediency and Worthiness" (1998, 94), but unfortunately he does not explain their nature at all.

[19] Hart 1994, 193–200. The facts are: (i) human vulnerability, (ii) approximate equality, (iii) limited altruism, (iv) limited resources, and (v) limited understanding and strength of will. I am not going to explain here how *facts* can determine *rules* or even delimit the set of objects worthy of double protection. I will let the reader commit that "naturalistic fallacy" alone.

Language is the main cause of difficulties here. Here is a short list of the linguistic quandaries that I have already run into:

- The expression "juridical value" is used much more rarely than "moral value," but from the fact that an expression is seldom used, we cannot infer that its referent is rare.
- The *object* and the *means* of legal (or moral) protection should be distinguished, because knowing *what* to protect does not amount to knowing *how* to protect it. However, making that distinction is only the beginning, because there are still many questions left concerning these two categories.
- What is the *object* of protection: Is it the value itself or its bearer? If it is the value, we might destroy some bearers if we thereby could increase the number of other bearers of the same value. This is how we deal with plants and animals, but not with humans.
- What are the *means* of protection: Are they human actions? Or are they norms that prescribe those actions? Probably both.

There are no simple answers to these questions, let alone "right" ones. Often it is not even necessary to choose between different possible meanings of a term, because the mere acknowledgment that there are several legitimate meanings can be helpful. For instance, it is almost impossible to find a watertight definition of *contract* in contract law books. The reason is that the word "contract" is used in different ways: it may refer to (i) the agreement of the parties or their "common intention," (ii) the document which expresses the content of the agreement, or (iii) the intended legal consequences, e.g., Smith's car becoming Jones's property and Jones's cash becoming Smith's property. These three things could be distinguished terminologically, but the gain would be dubious, since the word "contract" functions quite well in all three senses and seldom causes difficulties, because the context clarifies the sense. More difficulties would arise if those three things (or aspects) were distinguished by using three unrelated words for them.

The best we can do is to think up ways of speaking about these matters that are clear and internally consistent and do not deviate too much from ordinary usage. I have tried here to do that in following von Wright's lead.

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THE PUBLIC SPHERE AND OTHER PATTERNS OF PUBLIC LEGITIMIZATION

Plamen Makariev
Philosophical Faculty, Sofia University "St. Kl. Ohridski"
Sofia, Bulgaria
e-mail: makariev@abv.bg

Abstract:
This article aims at clarifying one critical function of the public sphere, namely the conditions which enable a public to distinguish the difference between trustworthy and manipulative public legitimization. It also seeks to answer the question of whether such conditions can be realized in pre-modern or alternatively modern social settings. The tendency in some recent historical and anthropological publications to regard all historical patterns of public legitimization as public spheres is criticized for ignoring the latter's critical function. A broader understanding of this function is offered which can be applied also to "non-Western" cultural environments.

Key words: public sphere, legitimacy, public deliberation, modernity, agency.

The point of departure for this article is the widely held view of the public sphere as a communication network which fulfills the function of public legitimization of norms and practices in a *self-correcting way*. Starting from J. Dewey's *The Public and its Problems*, this concept has been used "…to measure distortion against its ideal standard of dialogic democracy" (McGuigan 2005: 427, s. also McKee 2005: 7 and Gripsrud et al. 2010: 183). Various theories about the public sphere offer criteria for differentiating between proper and manipulative methods of public legitimization. This article will attempt to show that these criteria are relevant exclusively to modern[1] social environments. But, if this is true, what about pre-modern or alternatively modern[2] societies? Shall we declare all characteristic types of public legitimization in these societies to be manipulative because the criteria just mentioned are not applicable to them? Or should we give up on differentiating between manipulative and *bona fide* public legitimization altogether when considering public communication in pre-modern or alternatively modern social settings?

My aim here is to outline a *general* framework of reference that will provide criteria for distinguishing between honest attempts to legitimize or delegitimize certain social norms and practices from manipulative ones that deliberately mislead the addressees of public messages in order to promote the "speaker's" selfish individual or group interests. Since the criteria for making this distinction which appear in most recent theories about the public sphere apply only to *modern* social settings, they would then appear to be only one particular set of criteria among many possible ones. If we could work out, within the same frame of reference, other criteria which would be relevant to pre-modern or alternatively modern social settings, this would be quite helpful in addressing situations such as the political developments in some Arab countries after the so-called "Arab Spring."

The events in these countries demonstrated that public communication designed in the "classical" public-sphere-style does not do well in legitimizing Western-type democratic reforms in the eyes of the general public in these countries. Alternative forms of public legitimization turned out to be more successful in justifying political reforms of quite a different nature. What does this mean? Were the latter

[1] I use the term "modern" here in a broad sense, not opposing it to "postmodern," but rather as referring to contemporary "Western" societies. In this respect I follow the example of authors like Bauman, Giddens, and Beck, who prefer to characterize the situation in these societies as late-modern (Beck, Giddens, Lash 1994), or Habermas, who sees the difference between classical modernity and the modernity of our era in terms of the difference between the roles played by subject-centered vs communicative reason (Habermas 1987).

[2] If we accept Sh. Eisenstadt's conception about the multiple modernities (s. Eisenstadt 2000).

forms of convincing (or perhaps "persuading") the public mere manipulations? Do we have to dismiss indiscriminately as fabricated all instances of *de facto* political legitimacy that they produced? I would argue that we should instead try to apply a more careful analysis to such cases in these pre-modern and alternatively modern societies and try to differentiate between *bona fide* public legitimization within them on the one hand, and propaganda, brain washing, etc on the other.

* * *

It is generally acknowledged that Jürgen Habermas has made major contributions to the elaboration of a critical theory of the public sphere. Among the most important challenges that he deals with in his *Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* (published in 1962, English translation first published in 1989) and especially in his *Between Facts and Norms* (1992 and 1996, resp.) is the task to find and justify criteria which would facilitate the efforts of a public of free and equal citizens to legitimize social norms and practices as corresponding to their common interests, thus not yielding to the attempts of institutions of power, political parties, or other organizations and groups to disguise as publically acceptable norms and practices any actions which are conducive only to their private interests. Habermas outlined in his *Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* a picture of certain patterns of communication in bourgeois social circles in the late seventeenth to early nineteenth centuries which he qualified as *Öffentlichkeit* (translated into English as "*Public Sphere*", see Habermas 1991). This was, on his account, communication on issues of common concern, which was free and open. As such it had powerful legitimating (or delegitimating) effect on the norms of social life (especially on the legal ones) and on public policies.

In the critical spirit of the Frankfurt School, Habermas further claimed that in modern mass society, characterized by a welfare state and consumerist culture, the public sphere is in decline due to the influence of commercialized mass media, ideological propaganda, and public relations campaigns. Its legitimating function is being manipulated from behind the scenes and cannot be trusted any longer. Thirty years later, in his *Between Facts and Norms*, Habermas developed a more articulate set of criteria to help the public resist attempts to mislead them. Actually, the German philosopher made use of certain standards of procedurally correct communication which were being developed at that time in theories of public deliberation as a means to assess the legitimacy of decisions that are collectively made (s. Elster 1998, Bohman 2000).

Most generally, these criteria specify that a person who agrees with a collective decision (i. e. views it as legitimate) cannot agree to it because of fear, or momentary emotion, or blind trust of somebody else's opinion, etc. If the decision is made in a procedurally correct way, i.e. if it corresponds to the criteria in question, then the decision should be in the equal interest of all persons affected, as long as they have accepted the outcome of the deliberation, and have done so as responsible people who know what they are doing, and not just because they happened to agree.

Of course, some or even all of them might be wrong in accepting the decision in question. Some or all of them might have insufficient or wrong information about the situation, might be guided by assumptions and values that they would subsequently reconsider, etc. However, the procedural correctness of the decision also presupposes its revisability, should someone present ample argumentation for a change.

Agreement on these criteria is far from unanimous among theorists of public deliberation. Different "lists" are in circulation. For *Between Facts and Norms*, Habermas has appropriated the criteria proposed by J. Cohen as, in Habermas's words, a plausible characterization of the deliberative procedure (see Habermas 1996, 305). Cohen prescribes the following parameters of a legitimizing discussion: a) rationality ("argumentative form," ibid.); b) inclusivity and publicness (all who are possibly affected should have an equal chance to take part); c) freedom from external coercion; d) freedom from internal coercion (i. e. equality among the participants – their positions in the debate should yield only to "the unforced force of the better argument," ibid.); e) revisability of decisions; f) inclusivity concerning the subject matter of the deliberation (i. e. any matter can be discussed that can be regulated in the equal interest of all); g) inclusivity in regard to interpretations of needs and wants (see Habermas 1996: 306).

If we simplify the picture a little bit, we can conclude that according to the ideal of public legitimization presented in *Between Facts and Norms*, a norm or a social practice (e.g. a public policy) can be regarded as legitimate if it is positively evaluated by a public discussion which is rational, equal, open, and free from coercion. Why exactly these and not other parameters? Some authors claim (see e.g. Gripsrud 1999: 37), and I share their opinion, that the basic assumption here is that a social norm or practice is legitimate if it is worthy of approval by a person who corresponds to the *modern* ideal of a human being, i.e. someone who makes his/her decisions in an autonomous and responsible way. In other words, this understanding of public legitimization is a modernist one, a characterization that also applies to Habermas's model of the public sphere as a whole. The key term in this respect is, in the opinion of some authors, *agency* (see e.g. Muhlberger 2005). One cannot exercise his/her agency in approving or disapproving social norms and practices if s/he is doing this not according to his/her own will (because of being coerced in some way, or because s/he trusts blindly someone else's opinion on the matter under consideration), or if s/he is yielding to certain emotions, or if certain important and relevant information is being concealed from him/her.

A large portion of the discussions on the public sphere concern the instances and forms of misuse of this powerful instrument of legitimization. The discrepancy between ideal and reality in this case is being discussed not so much as a matter of the imperfection of the actual patterns of public legitimization in comparison with the ideal ones, but as an ideological issue. According to this view, the real theoretical and political challenge is not finding ways to improve public communication, but rather to find ways to expose the machinations of various representatives of the dominant classes or, more generally, the dominant economic and political circles in society.

My position is that we are facing a major theoretical task concerning the discrepancies between the modernist ideal of a public sphere and the actual ways in which public legitimization is done, and that we need to make a distinction between two kinds of discrepancies. Some of them are due to historical and cultural differences between an actual society and the modernist ideal of social life, while others are due to certain distortions in social life. We should not confuse the former with the latter, lest we incorrectly condemn as morally wrong certain forms of public legitimization which have functioned (and some which continue to function) quite unproblematically in their societies, for the sole reason that they do not correspond to the modernist understanding of legitimacy. This is not only a matter of historical justice, but also of intercultural understanding and tolerance, especially if we accept as conceptually sound and empirically corroborated the theory of multiple modernities (see Eisenstadt 2000).

By "distortions" I mean here not only deliberate manipulations which aim at legitimizing certain social norms and practices that are conductive to the realization of private interests at the expense of the common good and social fairness (i.e. ideological propaganda, brainwashing, and the like), but also distortions of public communication that are due to the general social conditions in the respective society (e.g. the commercialization of the public sphere in modern mass society, which has been a target of bitter criticism by Habermas in his *Structural Transformation*). Of course, there is no clear line of demarcation between the manipulations of public communication on the one hand, and the discrepancies between what public communication is meant (and expected) to be versus its *actual* functioning on the other, functioning which occurs in a "force field" produced by the interplay of various powerful influences in social life. Some of the distortions of public communication in the latter case, for example, are not produced intentionally, but if they happen to be beneficial to the interests of powerful "players" in this "game," then such distortions are tolerated without attempts at correction. However, the difference between these two types of distortion of public communication does, in my opinion, matter from a moral point of view.

Specialized literature nowadays offers an abundance of critiques on the quality of our contemporary public spheres, even as functioning in democratic, Western-type societies (see e.g. Greider 1992, Schiller 1996, Sandel 1996, Eisenstein 1998, Eliasoph 1998). Actual legitimizing public communication does not correspond fully to the modernist ideal of adherence to the criteria mentioned above (rationality, equality, openness, and freedom from coercion). Instead of journalists forming their own opinions on matters of common concern and expressing them freely, we have the tacit censorship through the managers of mass media, as well as the self-censorship of intellectuals who sometimes prefer to "trim" the truth from their publications so as not to jeopardize their careers. Instead of argumentative communication which aims at convincing the public, we have in many cases the brutal assault of mass media on the senses of the audience. Instead of the exchange of reasons between equal citizens, we often have careful and calculated promotion of cult figures who can influence the hearts and minds of the people in order to promote a cause, disregarding any negative effects on society as a whole. Instead of forming our opinions through open debate, we encounter "invisible" barriers created by drastic differences in the patterns of argumentation which prevent people from recognizing the validity of minority opinions.

Carl Boggs writes the following about the detrimental effects on the public sphere caused by large business corporations making huge investments in public communication: "Without doubt corporate power and wealth shape politics in the United States today more than ever – in corporations' very growing presence in the economy, their extensive lobbies and influence over legislative activity, their ownership and control of the mass media, their preponderant influence over election campaigns, their capacity to secure relief from myriad regulatory controls, their massive public relations apparatus, their general subsidies to the two major parties and the convention process, and so forth." (Boggs 2000: 9) The same author claims that "corporate behemoths," such as Time Warner, Disney/ABC, Bertelsmann, Viacom, and Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation to a large extent control the mass media, exercising huge influence on film production, TV, print journalism, and book publishing, thus establishing ideological hegemony and trumpeting "…those virtues or attributes most consonant with perpetuation of that very system of power and wealth, namely, free markets, consumerism, personal responsibility, competitive individualism, and lessened reliance on the public's input or state governance" (ibid).

Concerning the openness of the public discourses as a necessary element of the modernist ideal of legitimizing public communication, N. Fraser points out the importance of the "sociocultural means of interpretation and communication" (Fraser 1989: 164). By this term she means "the historically and culturally specific ensemble of discursive resources available to members of a given social collectivity in pressing claims against one another" (ibid). These typically are: officially recognized idioms, vocabularies, paradigms of argumentation, narrative conventions, modes of subjectifivation (ibid). On the whole, these are the patterns of argumentative communication which are recognized in a given sociocultural environment as convincing. If a certain argument is formulated and presented in a substantially different manner, it will not be regarded in this environment as valid – not because of *what* is being claimed, but because of *how* it is being claimed. Fraser insists that the means through which a debate is conducted are not indifferent to its outcome – actually they may pre-decide this outcome. Consequently, if a portion of the citizens in a given society (e.g. a social class, or an ethnic community) has established means of interpretation and communication which present its economic and political domination as hegemonic (i.e. "legitimate"), it has great chances of perpetuating this domination. If among the rest of the citizenry certain opposition against the status quo begins to take shape (in spite of the communicative hegemony in question), it has little chance of articulating claims which contest in a convincing way the domination of the said class or community, simply because the public at large does not accept as convincing arguments that do not conform to the hegemonic standards of communication.

So, it seems that even if in a given society there is no censorship, public communication may not be free and open. In such cases the norms and practices that are regarded as legitimate by the general public are not legitimate according to modern standards. From a modernist point of view they are only *de facto* legitimate, insofar as they are regarded by the greater part of the citizens to be functioning as they ought to be functioning. But they are not truly or genuinely legitimate.

Does this mean that the modern ideal of a public sphere is useless? In my opinion, not at all. As an ideal it can fulfill an important social function. It can be used as a benchmark to measure the advancement of democracy in modern (or in "late-modern," or maybe even "communicatively-modern") societies. What this *modern* ideal should not be used for, as I said above, is the evaluation of the effectiveness of the patterns of public legitimization in societies which differ in historical or cultural aspects from the modern ones. In other words, we do not have sufficient reasons to qualify as not genuinely legitimate norms and practices which are *de facto* legitimate in their societies, but which have been and are being justified by public communication which is exercised in patterns that differ historically or culturally from the modern one.

What is the difference, really, between the two cases that have just been described? Why do many authors claim that the mass media manipulations compromise the public legitimization of norms and practices in Western-type democracies, but at the same time admit that it would be a manifestation of modernist naiveté and arrogance to condemn as fictitious the legitimization of norms and practices in all non-modern societies, insofar as the public communication which justifies them is not entirely free from coercion and/or is not argumentative enough or open enough, and/or is influenced more by authority of the persons who participate in the debates than by the quality of the reasons that they use, etc.? What is the difference in terms of legitimacy between a law in a Western European country which has been justified exclusively by a lobbyist campaign in Parliament and in the mass media on the one hand, and a decree of the Sultan or King in an Islamic monarchy on the other? Why should the legitimacy of the law in the former case be undermined by the deficiencies in the public communication which has promoted it, but the criteria which are used in order to expose these deficiencies are not regarded as relevant in the latter case?

* * *

In his introduction to the Winter issue of *Daedalus*, dedicated to the conception of multiple modernities, Sh. Eisenstadt questioned the assumption underlying the "classical" theories of modernization, namely "…that the cultural program of modernity as it developed in modern Europe and the basic institutional constellations that emerged there would ultimately take over in all modernizing and modern societies; with the expansion of modernity, they would prevail throughout the world" (Eisenstadt 2000: 1). He claimed further that the modernization processes in non-Western societies have been taking place in various institutional and ideological patterns which have not been "…simple continuations in the modern era of the traditions of their respective societies" (Eisenstadt 2000: 2). Being distinctively modern, they were greatly influenced by "…specific cultural premises, traditions and historical experiences" (Ibid).

In Eisenstadt's opinion, the processes of globalization nowadays entail neither "the end of history" (in the sense of an end of ideological confrontations), nor a "clash of civilizations," i. e. confrontation between a secular West and societies which resist modernization. What is actually happening is a "…continual reinterpretation of the cultural program of modernity… attempts by various groups and movements to reappropriate and redefine the discourse of modernity in their own terms." (Eisenstadt 2000: 24)

Eisenstadt's critique against the simplistic dichotomy of "modern vs traditional" societies or cultures seems quite plausible. The predicates "modern" and "traditional" can be regarded merely as referring to certain ideal types of social organization. The contemporary world is much more complex, entailing various "hybrid" social realities. However, if we link our criteria for distinguishing between *bona fide* and manipulative public legitimizations to the distinctively modern ideal of agency, we will really have a problem when it comes to evaluating the forms of public legitimization outside the so-called "West."

There are authors who try to fill in the gap between the "modern" and the "traditional" ends of the spectrum of possible patterns of public legitimization by developing an enlarged notion of the "public sphere." If we re-conceptualize certain forms of public communication in pre-modern or alternatively modern societies as constituting – in a certain sense – public spheres, we should be able to draw a line of continuity between modern and pre-modern or alternatively modern patterns of public legitimization. In such a perspective we could regard the non-Western patterns of public legitimization in a more tolerant way and with more understanding.

Especially worth noting in this respect are the collections of articles *The Public Sphere in Muslim Societies* (edited by Hoexter, Eisenstadt and Levtzion, 2002) and *Public Islam and the Common Good* (edited by Eickelman and Salvatore, 2006). In these texts we encounter several terms which are puzzling from the viewpoint of the mainstream theory of the public sphere, e.g. "Ottoman public sphere" (Frierson 2006: 99) and the "public sphere in Seljuk Baghdad" (Ephrat 2002: 31). This discrepancy between the mainstream and an enlarged understanding of the notion of the public sphere is due mostly to the fact that the authors who subscribe to the latter (anthropologists and historians, the majority of them) studiously avoid the normative approach to this subject matter (s. for example Salvatore 2007: 3), and consequently link the public sphere's differentia specifica exclusively to its intermediate position between "...the power of bureaucratic steering and the rationality of capitalist markets" (Ibid). Put another way, they tend to ignore the critical, self-regulating, self-correcting function of this pattern of public legitimization, and as a result they qualify all patterns of public legitimization as "public spheres."

The resistance against the manipulations of the public opinion in modern "Western" societies is obviously a matter of fact. Critiques against propaganda and P.R. campaigns, led by institutions of power, political parties and the like, are abundant in the mass-media and especially on the internet. The criteria to which these critiques refer in order to expose the "machinations" in public space are of normative nature indeed. As such, they present a risk for the proper functioning of the public sphere because they may be compromised by wishful thinking, moralizations, and other dubious influences. However, if we ignore or underestimate the importance of the critical function of the public sphere, we take a much greater risk. Yes, it is true that ignoring this characteristic of the public sphere might help us find certain commonalities between the "classical" model of the public sphere and all patterns of public legitimization which we can find throughout history and in the contemporary world. But if we declare all of them to be – in one way or another – public spheres, we give up on making a distinction between public legitimizations which are trustworthy and ones which are distinctively manipulative. Such a mistake would be a mirror-image of the modernist contempt for all non-modern patterns of public legitimization, and would not be any less harmful to research and public policies in this field.

* * *

In order to avoid these two extreme positions, it would be worthwhile to develop an enlarged notion not of the *public sphere* itself, but of the frame of reference within which the *criteria* that help us distinguish between proper and manipulative public legitimizations in Western-type modern social settings make sense. As was mentioned above, according to *Between Facts and Norms* these criteria boil down to four requirements for legitimizing public communication: that it should be free, rational, equal, and open. Obviously these standards cannot be applied directly to the public communication in the Ottoman Empire even in the last decades of its existence, or to the mass-media debates in a Middle Eastern country nowadays, for example. However, if we outline a more general frame of reference, then other criteria may be worked out within it (by analogy with the specifically modern ones) which would be appropriate for "measuring" the quality of public legitimization in non-modern settings.

The fulfillment of such an ambitious task will require, of course, a serious amount of research, including empirical studies. Here I will make just a few suggestions for how this work might begin. I will start by considering a simple hypothetical case in order to make clear what I mean by "frame of reference" in this context.

Let us suppose that the government of a typical Western state makes the decision to invade another sovereign country with the aim, allegedly, to free its citizens from an authoritarian regime and help them build a democracy. Let us imagine, further, that the government in question is guided by a more substantial motivation in this respect, "nourished" by influences from economically and politically powerful informal circles, namely to establish control over some valuable natural resources which reside in the territory to be invaded. Usually in such cases a democratic government does its best to legitimize its aggressive actions. This is not done in a brutal manner, such as establishing censorship, building an unquestionable authority of a charismatic leader and the like. Most often the legitimization proceeds in subtle ways. For example, one might try to win the support of owners and managers of influential mass-media, who would, in their turn, "steer" these media' policies in the "right" direction. In addition, famous public figures might start to express their enthusiasm for the liberation of the oppressed people. Documentaries are produced which depict the suffering of the regime's victims. All in all, various means would be applied to win "the hearts and minds" of the public. And if this happens, the invasion will be justified. It will become *de facto* legitimate because it will be freely and sincerely approved by the greater part of the citizens of a democracy.

What is wrong in such a scenario from the viewpoint of a critical theory of the public sphere is that the activities just described are at odds with the criteria for procedural correctness of the legitimization. As was mentioned already several times, quite a few of them are being discussed, but four stand out – that legitimizing public communication should be free, rational, equal, and open. Obviously none of the means of influencing people's convictions and behavior which were enumerated above corresponds to these requirements. But why should this discrepancy compromise the legitimization of the hypothetical "war of liberation" that we are discussing? Why do these criteria matter so much?

In more general terms, the public legitimization of a norm or practice involves winning the support of most of the members of a public by justifying this norm/practice in the light of values that are already recognized as legitimate by these individuals and groups. However, if the addressees of the legitimizing messages have no means at their disposal to assure themselves that this norm or practice really corresponds to the values that they generally share, they can be easily deluded – which is the aim of all political manipulators. Our four criteria can help a modern public discover for itself – through public discussions which are free, rational, equal, and open – whether and to what extent the justification of the norm/practice is convincing for them with regard to their common values. And most importantly, these standards work in a more or less empirically verifiable way. Unlike *sincerity* (one of the parameters of public communication which Habermas discusses in his discourse theory, s. Habermas 2005: 89), these criteria can be assessed objectively (s. Habermas 1996: 386). In this sense the four criteria are reliable enough as instruments to help the public in our hypothetical Western country discover that the claims being used to justify the invasion through reference to their values are not legitimate. These procedural criteria, which are characteristic for modernity, would enable a modern public to assess the quality of justifications of norms and practices in regard to modern values, distinguishing in this way the difference between *bona fide* and manipulative legitimizations.

Now, what about non-modern or alternatively modern societies? If we simply take out the terms "modern" and "modernity" from the last three paragraphs of this text, we'll get the general frame of reference that I am trying to outline here. A public can function in a critical way, i.e. as constituting a public sphere, which has the capacity to de/legitimize norms and practices in a *self-correcting manner*, if it has at its disposal criteria[3] by which it can assess whether and to what extent the public communication which aims at the legitimization of a norm or a practice corresponds to the values in light of which the legitimization is taking place. If such standards are available, the public in question can distinguish between proper and manipulative public legitimization.

Whether and to what extent such criteria have been used in certain pre-modern societies should be a matter of historical and anthropological research. At this point I can claim only that the critical function of the public sphere should not be ignored, and that it would be more productive to look for its realization or possibilities for realization in non-modern or alternatively modern cultural settings, than to call indiscriminately all patterns of public legitimization "public spheres."

[3] And the results of their application should be empirically verifiable.

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ART AND ART'S DE-AESTHETICIZATION

Marin Aiftincă
Romanian Academy of Sciences, Department of Philosophy
Bucharest, Romania
e-mail: aiftinca@acad.ro

Abstract:
This paper approaches the phenomenon of art from a contemporary perspective. It discusses art as spiritual modality of expression which testifies to man's specific being-in-the-world. It also analyzes the idea of artwork in reference to its aesthetic, social, and historical determinations, while keeping in mind the problematization of the essence, content, and finality of art. In this context, the paper examines two significant aesthetic guidelines: *aestheticism* or the movement "l'art pour l'art," founded on the cult of beauty as a supreme value, and the *de-aestheticization of art*, a negativist contemporary movement that contests the aesthetic and artistic tradition. Finally, the paper holds that, contrary to Hegel's prophecy on the "death" of art, the aesthetic experience shows that contemporary art continues to assert itself and to diversify itself with an impressive energy. Based on this background, the phenomenon of de-aestheticization is a challenge which gives new impulses to the evolution of authentic art, spurring man's ability to perceive affectively and to understand reality in new ways, adding to it, as Nietzsche said, a metaphysical factor in order to transcend it.

Key words: art, aesthetic value, artwork, artistic, de-aestheticization.

Thus formulated, the title of this paper might seem, at first, paradoxical to the reader. In fact, it captures a characteristic aspect of contemporary art, a sense that something unusual is going on in this world of human creation, and in our lives intrinsically. It seems that the current products of artistic creation undermine our definition of art. This being the case, questions inevitably emerge: what *is* art? Next, is art possible outside aesthetics? Finally, what is the meaning of "de-aestheticization" of artistic work? In what follows, we shall try to seek appropriate answers to these questions.

Without doubt, art is and has remained one of the essential fields of culture. It constitutes a spiritual modality of expression which testifies to man's specific being-in-the-world. Furthermore, we are constantly surprised by its miraculous power to reveal a deeper understanding of this being-in-the-world, and especially to tell us something significant about the ourselves.[1] It is a way of expressing oneself freely and without boundaries in forms which speak especially to our more sensitive perceptions, thus differentiating itself from other utilitarian modes of expression, as well as from other cultural configurations like science, morality, religion, and philosophy, by which the spirit speaks to the world.[2] This distinction derives mainly from the fact that art, beyond many definitions which have been given to it, is an embodiment of the aesthetic value which gives it its identity and special legitimacy among all other products of human activity. Although in art's structure different values (moral, political, economic, legal, religious, etc.) co-exist which are inextricably intertwined – and which in fact constitute the substance of life which nourishes the artist – the art, or more accurately the artwork, is a self-denial.[3] It can be anything – a document, a utilitarian object, or one which comprises empirical meanings, but was itself excluded from the sphere of art. It is true that, in this regard, there are competing points of view, to which we will return later. For now we must add one other important aspect to this idea: arising from the

[1] See Marin Aiftincă, *Misterul artei şi experienţa estetică* (*Mystery of Art and Aesthetic Experience*), Bucharest, Romanian Academy Publishing House, 2007, p. 9.
[2] Cf. Idem, *Perspective filosofice* (Philosophical Perspectives), Bucharest, Romanian Academy Publishing House, 2011, p. 74.
[3] The concept of art is so general and abstract that it corresponds to it anything real. It circumscribes its content and acquires concreteness only when we associate it with the artwork.

tension between the human spirit on the one hand and external reality and the self on the other, works of art "detach themselves from the empirical world and bring forth another world, one opposed to the empirical world, as if this other world too were an autonomous entity."[4]

From a similar point of view, Tudor Vianu, arguing against Étienne Souriau – who claimed that works of art are *objects* – proposes the concept of the "areality" of art in order to highlight its character "of being abstracted and isolated from the practical plan of things."[5] He advocates for the idea that "art is not an object, but the appearance of an object" and, therefore, belongs "to the ideal region of appearances."[6] As a result, art loses its autonomy from other forms of human activity, autonomy which had claimed that any artistic creation, although heterogeneous in its content, is to be valued by what is specific to it, i.e. on the basis of aesthetic value, not by appealing to external criteria, on whose basis it may be asked to be something that it is not.

If "the universal and absolute need for art" has an explanation grounded in metaphysics – which brings to mind, among others, Hegel's argument that it "is man's rational need to lift the inner and outer world into his spiritual consciousness as an object in which he recognizes again his own self"[7] – then the phenomenalization of art seems to beg for both temporal and spatial definition. While the first dimension captures the universal and eternal character of the art in a conceptual way, the second reflects its continuous particularization, becoming, and diversification through its empirical nature. In other words, art as a form of human expression was and is, anywhere and anytime, simply *what it is*, namely art, despite any contrary opinions. Seen through the lens of time, art has objectified itself in artistic creations which have evolved in the most profound and diverse ways, both across historical ages and in relation to different cultural spaces. From ancient and medieval art to the Renaissance, classicism, and romanticism, from the changes of modernity to the feverish searches of contemporary and postmodernist revolts, from the art of the ancient Orient to the Egyptian, Hellenistic, African, and European traditions, there can be found an almost infinitely diverse kaleidoscope of artistic works, in which are mirrored the representative elements of the historical and spiritual life of all the historical ages and the cultures of the world. In other words, the mythological, philosophical, religious, and scientific visions on the world, the moral conceptions, the historical and political facts, etc., are filtered into a huge variety of artistic creations which encapsulate the society in which they were created.

Certainly, the above constitutes only one of the aspects which confirms Adorno's thesis about the double character of the art. He maintains, on the basis of a broad consensus, that art is simultaneously autonomous and *fait social*,[8] that it immediately reverberates outward from the horizon of its autonomy. There is a close relationship with *empiria*, confirmed by the fact that different cultures and the historical ages – under the influence of a definite spirituality or a certain conception on the world – understood art in their own culturally specific ways, assigning it different meanings and functions and thus shaping the taste which has guided the creation and the evaluation of artistic products.

According to Pareyson, these different aspects – the perception of art, the purposes of art, and the ideals which have guided it – together constitute the content of the "poetics" which govern "the artistic" and have a historical and active character.[9] Unlike aesthetics, which Pareyson maintains is interested in defining a philosophical "concept" of art with a speculative character, poetics "appear in order to propose artistic 'ideals' and art 'programs.'"[10] As such, they are concentrated in normative codes of creation and argued in theoretical works, 'shaping the author's style and the public's taste. Equally legitimate from an aesthetic point of view, Pareyson says that poetics "prescribe the task of art to be 'depicting' reality, as in the programs of a realistic,

[4] Theodor W. Adorno, *Teoria estetică* (*Aesthetische Theorie)*, Romanian translation from German by Andrei Cornea, Gabriel H. Decuble, Cornelia Eşianu, Piteşti, Paralela 45, 2005, p. 6.
[5] Tudor Vianu, *Estetica* (Aesthetics) Bucharest, Publishing House for Literature, 1968, p. 77.
[6] *Ibidem*.
[7] G.W.F. Hegel, *Prelegeri de estetică, vol.I* (Vorlesungen über die Aesthetik, Band I), Romanian translated by D.D. Roşca, Bucharest, Romanian Academy Publishing House, 1966, p. 37.
[8] Theodor W. Adorno, *op. cit*., p. 5. (Romanian translation, p. 11).
[9] Luigi Pareyson, *Estetica. Teoria formativităţii* (Teoria della formativita), Romanian translated by Marian Papahagi, Bucharest, Univers Publishing Hause, 1977, p. 405
[10] *Ibidem*, p. 406.

naturalistic, veristic art"[11] or to "transfigure," "deform," or "decompose" reality, aiming to create distinct finalities or simply to invent an original reality, in contrast to the reality known by experience or even opposite to it. Other poetics look for innocent spontaneity in art or instinctive immediacy in expressing feelings, insomuch as others look upon art as a scholarly effort, extraneous of any emotional signs.[12]

At least two of these aspects seem necessary to retain in the context of poetics. First, Pareyson – who argued that "art is pure formativity" – considers it of no consequence whether one is a proponent of one or another poetics. As in artistic creation, what is important is for the author to "imagine" and to "form," so that the result be authentic art. Also, it is essential that art should be interpreted not primarily in a poetic sense, but an aesthetic one, starting from a phenomenology of artistic experience.

The second aspect is that no poetics should be made absolute. No poetics should claim that it alone contains the essence of art in order to set itself up to be a false aesthetic. Some poetics or other may be recommended to artists on the basis of its conception of the world, but it must have the character of a desire; it must never turn into an imperious order, nor impose criteria for appreciation of artistic work,[13] as has happened historically. The most recent and relevant example for this discussion is the unprepossessing doctrine of socialist realism, which encompassed, among others, the "realistic novel" that reached its zenith in the 19th century. It is widely known that in acquiring its autonomy, art had respond to the call of the political, religious, educational imperative, or engaged in frivolous games in the service of decorativism, entertainment, and (more recently) commercial concerns. In these circumstances, the artist assumed the point of view of "the one who orders," thus aiming to produce some effects on the public.

It is a truth which Hegel recognizes, but does not legitimize. Apparently conciliatory, the philosopher believes that art in general "can serve other ends," assuming the role of a simple "ancillary." In such a situation, however, it acquires its character not from itself, "but from other objects and circumstances."[14] However, art has the ability to "cut itself free from this servitude in order to raise itself, in free independence, to the truth in which it fulfills itself independently and conforms with its own ends alone."[15] Therefore, when art is subject to the commands or requirements of a pre-established program, it exists not so much by itself, but according to the the way in which it honors the command. Art can, however, only fulfill its mission by pursuing its own ends. When it is created without programmatic constraints, the artwork opens itself to reflection and confirms the freedom of its creator.

From this theoretical promontory on which modernity has settled, the question concerning art's essence, content, and purpose has resumed with an energy which violates the taboos, traditions, and stiff rules arising from the context of the social and spiritual conditionings which engage new artists. The problems generated by the spiritual tensions of the time emphasize two theoretical guidelines. One is aestheticism or the movement "l'art pour l'art," founded on the cult of beauty as the supreme value. The second centers around the idea of transgressing aesthetic exclusiveness and of structuring the tensioned value areas of the extra-artistic.

The first guideline is a well-known reaction from the second half of the 19th century designed to protect art against the falsifying pressures of the modern world, caught in the whirlwind of expansion and urban planning. Promoters of aestheticism, facing a hostile social reality, "have ignited the passionate cult of beauty" and aim to reach a platonic self-perfection through "the love for visible beauty."[16] They searched for beauty as the absolute value, cultivating a perfect *form* while being less interested in ideas. Accordingly, they formulated the conception of art isolated not only from life, but also from the "insensitive" public. With its specificity, art exists in self, its purpose consisting in being beautiful.

Theorizing this aesthetic vision, Poe wrote in his essay "The philosophy of composition" that the essence of beauty lies in the "intense and pure elevation of the soul," It is an effect which must become the fundamental concern for any artist. The art of the poetry, i.e. the art of words, is "the rhythmic creation of beauty. Her only arbitrator is taste. With the intellect or consciousness it has only

[11] *Ibidem*, p. 409.
[12] *Ibidem*.
[13] *Ibidem*.
[14] G.W.F. Hegel, *op. cit.*, p. 7. (Romanian translated, p. 13).
[15] *Ibidem*.
[16] K.E. Gilbert, H. Kuhn, *Istoria esteticii* (A History of Aesthetics), Romanian translated by Sorin Mărculescu, Bucharest, Meridiane Publishing House, 1972, p. 418.

collateral relations."[17] The echo of these ideas has been heard even after the protagonists of the movement *art for art* had been gripped by delusions themselves. A leading proponent of abstractionism, Kandinsky, lived the aestheticism fever. "Everything in it was guiding toward purity," succeeded in "releasing the line and knowledge of any subjugation."[18]

Determined by certain justificatory elements, aesthetic formalism meant the focusing on one aspect of the work and neglecting the other, the content. Without doubt, the history of art attests to the fact that the two components are sometimes separated, but although their integration is a prerequisite of the aesthetic value and artistic quality[19] – somewhat obsolete today as a problem – we do not find it redundant to remember the truth that the balance and unity between aesthetic form and life content or ideational content constitute the success of an artistic creation. Imbalances in the structure of the work are detrimental to its quality and its value. According to Adorno's observation, "Art perceived strictly aesthetically is art aesthetically misperceived."[20] Therefore, the concept of "pure" art and its empirical expression in creation has provoked many vehement criticisms, down to "outright disregard and disdain for the aesthetic infatuation."[21] Aesthetic purism is thus denounced by the second oirentation – itself no less excessive than its competitor – which preaches non-art or anti-art. As a result, at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century the phenomenon of art became dominated by various themes and provocative ideas, motivations not infrequently contradictory. There are strong internal tensions from which erupt the well-known vanguardist currents that invade literature, theatre, music, and plastic arts, affirming a loud negativist reaction in the name of absolute freedom of expression and of searching for a fresher and purer language. Thus the creative exercises which are subordinated to an ideal which transcends the art are legitimized.

Without doubt these manifestations, with everything that followed them over the last erratic century, generated and maintained the process of the de-aestheticization of art, a process which has continued into the present. In fact, de-aestheticization is the opposite of aesthetic purism and is integrated into the reality designated by the terms *modern art* or *postmodern art*. It can be seen in those who contest the aesthetic character of artwork and therefore circumvent the artistic features of an aesthetic object or, more broadly, artistic creations of any kind. It is believed that the theoretical approaches which emerged in the Renaissance and Enlightenment are regarded as obsolete, having lost the "humanist-utopian" impetus and responsible for the fact that "art, amorphous and perverted, has decayed down to the level of an aesthetics of triviality" which "manifest itself as pretentious, cultivating at the same time comfort in a lack of ideas."[22] As a result of such shocking and excessive declarations, the artist's place in the "aesthetic area" and the achievement of some creations destined to delight the taste is anathematized on the grounds that they would be academist and superficial. For example, Mozart's and Schumann's music, or the music of any composer that proposes human nobility and gives prevalence to harmony, melodicity, and spiritual beauty, is sometimes dismissed in the service of exalting aleatorim, the new concrete, electronic music that addresses to us in ways which exalt the sensual experiences or abstractions which aim to present agitated technological civilization in terms of which the man is re-orientated toward his primary nature.

The facts and motivations behind the de-aestheticizanting reaction are most diverse. Often divergent, they converge in challenging and refusing the classical or widely accepted concepts and principles of art, opera, aesthetics, reception of artistic creation, etc., considering them obsolete and

[17] Apud K.E. Gilbert, H. Kuhn, *op. cit*, p. 425.

[18] Pierre Courthion, *Curente şi tendinţe în arta secolului XX* (L'Art independent), Romanian translated by Maria Carpov, Bucharest, Publishing House Meridiane, 1973, p. 187.

[19] A distinction is made between the work of art (of any kind) and the aesthetic object (concretization of the work in the aesthetic experience). This separation leads implicitly to the distinction between artistic values, which are stated in the work, and aesthetic values, which appear concretely in the aesthetic object (see Roman Ingarden, *Studii de estetică* (Problemy teorii literatury), Romanian translated by Olga Zaicik, Bucharest, Publishing House Univers, 1978, p. 223).

[20] Theodore W. Adorno, *op. cit*., p. 6. (Romanian translated), p. 13.

[21] Werner Hofmann, Fundamentele artei moderne, vol.I (Grundlagen der Modernen Kunst,Band I), Romanian translated by Elisabeth Axmann-Mocanu, Bucharest, Publishing House Meridiane, 1977, p. 40.

[22] *Ibidem*, p. 25.

effete. As a result, these concepts are re-examined. Naturally, this need to re-examine such concepts and principles is not an isolated one. These questions regarding art have been asked in many different historical contexts, so it is hardly surprising that they should arise again in the present. What *is* surprising is the vehemence with which art's own conditions of existence and roles are being contested. The impetus of de-aestheticization, of anti-art, is generated by the historical and social evolution of the culture in general, and of the art phenomenon in particular. In conflict with everything that is a copy or an outdated imitation of reality or only had value long ago, the artistic experience – guided by the principle that there is no art without freedom – is wholly subordinate to the frantic search for the new beyond any conventions. It finds refuge in reflection, claiming that genuine art is not art which is comforting for the viewer because of the pleasure it creates and its lack of any upsetting ideas, and that it is not identical with the "aesthetic reservations" of the museums, but that true art instead asks the viewer to undertake a perceptive confrontation. In the cause of generating works that are addressed "not to the bodily eye, but especially to the spiritual one" (Splengler, *The Decline of the West*), the languages and forms of artistic expression put us constantly in the face of creations which confirm the de-aestheticization phenomenon. The current literature is dominated by "texts," and less and less by compositions which legitimate their being in this horizon of art; poetry is freed from the poetic thrill through "de-lyricization." The American critic Harold Bloom said, not so long ago, that "nowadays there is an abandonment of any aesthetic and cognitive exigency, which is the hallmark of great literature. Imaginative literature, as was cultivated by Shakespeare, Cervantes, Dante, and Montaigne, yielded to the abominable misery of the best-sellers (...) and of their equivalents from Spain and other countries of the world."[23] In turn, the scenic arts tend to abandon the conventions of the realistic show, trying other unconventional means in order to generate aesthetic sensitivity in the public. Theatrical representations imbued with rudimentary elements and off-hand vulgarities in the postmodern form of performance-art, with amazing acoustic and visual effects, are protests against formal art;[24] the "open dance" or pedestrian dance in an obvious attempt to explore the everyday problems of the people. Equally striking is the phenomenon of de-aestheticization in the plastic arts, a domain in which the public are often presented with confusing artefacts, at least at first sight. Huge statues are created from bizarre combinations of material waste, "Alien King" statues representing hideous creatures or other awful sculptures – such as those created by Olivier of Sagazan – which show the human body perforated by objects of tortue, works subordinate to the slogan "one person's art is another's nightmare." Another example: the kinetic sculptures of Theo Jansen, representing great moving machines, like the skeletons of some huge animals. And yet another example from the field of painting: Austrian Wolfgang Becksteiner, whose art is conceptual, shows under the title "The Mystery of Values" (*Inner Values*) a group of works in the form of the cases of wood which serve to transport the art. Glued to the wall of the exhibition, these cases offer to eyes an outer sight and appear as paintings; located in the showroom space, they seem to be sculptures. Apart from some written information, you may not know what the cases contain. If you open them, you discover inside pictorial works which can be destroyed, being of no value. This group of works convey the author's message that "the classical work of art, and with it the classical concept of art, evaporates."[25] Overall, these examples show the tendency to belittle the cultural resonance of artistic creation.

[23] *România literară* (Romanian Literary) nr. 36, anul XLIII, 9 septembrie 2011, note in "Meridiane" page.

[24] For details see Alexa Visarion, *Spectacolul ascuns* (*The Hide Show*), Bucharest, UNATC, 2002, pp. 193-209. "Since performance art derives from the visual art to the same extent that it derives from *avant-garde* theater, the performer creates a sequence of acoustic and visual effects with the body, movements and the words which contribute to an abstract and associative collage, instead of a dramatic action. In order to expand the capacity of self-expression, the performer, without seeking to represent any character, will adopt a *persona* to exploit different genres and types of sexuality, different ethnicities and social positions. Sometimes, withal, the performers, being endowed with 'naive vitality and frankness,' execute things, like singing and dancing, which are not prepared..." (*Ibidem*, pp. 194-195).

[25] Die Sammlung JENSEITS DES SEHENS, *Kunst Verbindet Blide und Sehende*, Sammlungskatalog anlässlich ihres 10 Jährigen Bestehens and der Ausstelung, 25. März bis 26. August 2012 im Benediktinerstift Admont-Bibliotek & Museum, A-8911 Admont 1, Redaktion Michael Braunsteinet, P. Winfried Schwab, 2012 Stift Admont, p. 16.

Art communicates the outside world to us, affirming a wide range of attitudes toward empirical reality, including its repudiation. Whereas the artistic object, from the perspective of the phenomenological aesthetics, is an intentional structure,[26] modalities of artistic expression – such as those to which we have referred – can be interpreted as forms of protest against ugliness, vulgarity, lechery, turbulence, violence, and many other aspects of our civilization as also against the aesthetic and the art itself, which testifies to the dominant spirit of our times.

Intellectual products arising from these impulses violate the artistic experience and aesthetic sensitivity, working to be anything else than what we used to understand by art. Refusing aesthetics, they are objects between objects, and have the value of a sign or of a document, and thereby abandon themselves to aesthetic indifference. Adorno warns us that when art is perceived only through an aesthetic perspective, it is not correctly perceived. Yet Adorno does not hesitate to assert that "the tendency to perceive art either in extra-aesthetic or preaesthetic fashion, which to this day is undiminished by an obviously failed education, is a barbaric residue and a danger of regressive consciousness."[27] And yet, it seems to us that we must be more tolerant to present artistic experiments, accepting them as exercises for opening new horizons in art and, perhaps, for giving substance a new aesthetics. On this score, it has been suggested that we invert one of the major criteria of the art-public relationship: instead of claiming that art must be accessible to us, to answer to the desire for a comfortable, passive enjoyment, we as the receptors should instead be "accessible to art,"[28] facing the inaccessibility of an artistic object and hoping to find the joy of discovering aesthetic value beyond appearance. Of course, the experience of such joy is not offered without being spoken about, insomuch as it is not spontaneous and naive. It speaks to the need to constantly augment aesthetic culture in order for it to pervade beyond the mere structural form of the artistic work, where the truth of art dwells.

Somewhat correlative to these ideas is the idea that present artistic creation, in particular art that has arisen from anti-aesthetic tendencies and has been placed in a rationalistic framework by contemporary civilization, transcends the conditions of the current representation of art and, as such, requires *post factum* interpretation or comment by the author or by specialists for the public. The sense of the interpretative approach or of the commentary arises from the guidance of contemplator, until the point at which the artistic object reveals its intimate substance, creating a state of amazement.[29]

It is a partially valid point of view. When you are in front of artistic creations of any kind which do not hold your attention because of confusion or repulsion casued by its formal structure, then a ready-made explanatory comment or interpretation can overcome the indifference or the reticence of the contemplator. In this case, the work does not matter; it remains in the shadow of the commentator that precedes or succeeds it. Of interest are the ideas that the artist would have wanted to transmit us. But does not the interposition of such interpretations between the artistic object and receiver distort the act of reception itself, which is strictly individual? Does not the artist try to show something else than can be said of creation? Of course, the answers to such questions engage very complex issues concerning the relation between the work and reality, the reception of art, and art's sense and value. Reducing these problematizations as far as possible, we can attempt an answer within the limits of the present theme by appealing to phenomenological aesthetics.

In Roman Ingarden's conception, for example, "works of art ... are intentional creations of a special type,"[30] whose ontic ground is constituted by the appropriate physical objects. This means that the work has a formal structure which constitutes its way of being, and a number of specific properties that exceed its features as an object. Beyond the formal, physical structure of the work, there is the author's intention to give artistic significance to the object in question – significance that is proposed to the public for deciphering. So, the artwork is not the painted canvas, printed text, or musical sound. These are only the forms which mediate the idea, the message, the attitude that the artist wants to convey to others. In other words, they are the elements which release the aesthetic emotion which the artistic objects manifest and renew. Constituting an aesthetic object is a very complicated process, maintains Ingarden, "and this itself will be the object

26 See Roman Ingarten, *op. cit.*, p. 223.
27 Theodor W. Adorno, *op. cit.*, p. 6. (Romanian translated, p. 13).
28 See Werner Hofmann, *op. cit.*, p. 34.
29 See *ibidem*, p. 34, p. 48.
30 Roman Ingarten, *op. cit.*, p. 296.

of aesthetic evaluation"[31] so that we can appreciate it as "beautiful," or "ugly," or as displaying other aesthetic values.

If the physical objects do have only "physical" qualities that are given through a sensory experience and are neutral from an emotional point of view, then works of art have artistic and aesthetic qualities which reveal the aesthetic value contained in their structure. More accurately, the aesthetic value is "a qualitative synthetic special moment, or an ensemble of aesthetically valuable qualities[32] intrinsic to the aesthetic object."[33]

In this context, it is appropriate to remark that, according to the same aesthetician, aesthetic value has a dual substantiation. On the one hand, it manifests itself in aesthetically valuable qualities of the concrete material, while on the other hand it manifests itself in the aesthetic-cognitive reception of the receiving subject, which is a personal and non-arbitrary act. The first level of this substantiation allows us to deduce whether or not an artistic object has assembled qualities which create aesthetic value. When such qualities, *ab initio* contested even by the author through his poetic program, are not retrieved in the structure of the object which claims a place in the kingdom of art, how can it be valued? It seems to us that Adorno gives a possible answer when he asserts that "it is outside the purview of aesthetics today whether it is to become art's necrology; yet it must not play at delivering graveside sermons, certifying the end, savoring the past, and abdicating in favor of one sort of barbarism that is no better than the culture that has earned barbarism as recompense for its own monstrosity."[34]

Concerning the second level of the substantiation already mentioned, the aesthetic value of the artwork does not depend on the evaluation. However, on the basis of his own aesthetic experiences, the subject-receiver can correctly appreciate an artistic creation, emphasizing the aesthetic value which gives it brilliance, or conversely he can fail to appreciate it, either because he overestimates it or does not grasp it. Here the receptor's aesthetic culture comes into play, a complex theme that we cannot clarify fully in a short article such as this one. What we can say, though, is that the evolution of the aesthetic value involves the common and consonant reaction of the artistic object and of the receiver's perceptive acts.[35] Being itself reflexive, the artwork always remains "open" for the audience, challenging them to interpret and to decipher its aesthetic value, providing authentic joy and a new understanding of the truth of our existence in the world. As Heidegger says, in artwork, the truth is "the truth of being," which sets itself and *appears*, and this appearance in the work is the beauty itself.[36]

In conclusion, it can be said that art as a spiritual modality of reporting the human to the world is not equal with itself. Its permanent evolution has experienced profound tensions and overcome many crises, always recovering and re-aligning itself with its time. Within this logic the de-aestheticization of art is circumscribed – the current negativist, contesting tendency, seeking frantically for new modalities of artistic expression in a society dominated by technology, utility, efficiency, and hedonism. Therefore, we do not find Hegel's statement of 200 years ago viable, that art remains "something that belongs to the past." Artistic creation continues to assert and diversify itself with an impressive energy. Accordingly, the de-aestheticization movement we are talking about is a challenge that gives new impulses to the evolution of authentic art. It will remain with us as a form of affectively perceiving and understanding reality, adding to it, as Nietzsche said, a metaphysical factor in order to transcend it.

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[31] *Ibidem*

[32] *Ibidem*, p. 227.

[33] In Ingarden's conception, beauty is not the general category of aesthetic values, but only one of their many qualities, which, in my opinion, requires more applied discussions.

[34] Theodor W. Adorno, *op. cit*., p. 4. (Romanian translation, p. 9).

[35] Cf. Roman Ingarden, *op. cit*., p. 228.

[36] See Martin Heidegger, *Originea operei de artă (The Origin of the Work of Art),Romanian* translation form German by Thomas Kleininger and Gabriel Liiceanu, Bucharesti, Humanitas, 1995.

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ZURÜCK ZU FLECK

Dimitri Ginev
Sofia University "St. Kl. Ohridski", Sofia, Bulgaria
e-mail: dimiginev@abv.bg

Abstract:

What Ludwik Fleck has really written about is the cognitive life of communities which constitute their worlds of specific entities. Fleck's subject is intellectual history, but history seen as changing horizons of cognition projected by certain practices. His ideas have proliferated, so that some of them are attributable to the reception of his work in constructivist programs of cognitive sociology, historical epistemology, comparative historiography of science, and cultural studies of scientific research. Fleck's philosophical assumptions cover a broad range. Some are responses to debates in which he was involved; others derive from his penchant to examine theories of knowledge in the interwar period through a historical and sociological lens; still others arose from his critical attitude toward those who interpreted science through their own narrow ideology, as well as the violence toward the academic ethos in National Socialism and Soviet Communism. The present paper tries to do justice to the major interpretations of Fleck's work. It puts special emphasis on the kind of "trans-subjective hermeneutics" that is inherent in this work.

Key words: thought styles, constitution of scientific facts, trans-subjectivity.

In his book *The Problem of Style* (originally published in 1922), John M. Murry suggested an approach to the aesthetic concept of style that is still influential in literary criticism. According to Murry, style is a quality of the linguistic thinking which "communicates precisely emotions or thoughts, or a system of emotions or thoughts… Style is perfect when the communication is exactly accomplished; its position in the scale of absolute greatness, however, will depend on the comprehensiveness of the system of emotions and thoughts to which the reference is perceptible" (Murry 1960, 65). Fleck applied the same approach – albeit enriched with a peculiar transcendental flavor – to the cognitive styles of scientific research ten years after the appearance of Murry's book. By communicating "collective moods of cognition," thought styles form communities in science. It is this idea that allows transcendental arguments to mediate between comparative sociology of scientific knowledge and social epistemology.

On the one hand, a thought style imposes restrictions concerning acceptable topics of research on the members of the (scientific) community. Fleck is inclined to define this concept by putting more emphasis upon its negative, inhibiting function. A thought style serves this function, however, not in a normative-epistemological manner. It constrains the thought collective's research by integrating its members into a "mood of thought" (*Denkstimmung*) as a prerequisite for their "mental readiness" (*Denkgewohnheiten*) for producing knowledge and establishing scientific facts of a certain kind (Fleck 1986, 66). Thus considered, a thought style (starting from the stylization of observations) "makes possible" the directedness of the research process which takes place in the routine practices of a scientific community. Yet the reverse formulation is also valid: a thought collective (characterized by its inclination to stylize cognition) comes into being when researchers become immersed in practices whose routine performance is required because of a single-minded restriction on the choices or possibilities for research. (The immersion in practices warrants, as it were, the irreducibility of the communal subject to a set of individual knowing subjects.) Due to this symmetry between the trans-subjective profile of routinely interrelated scientific practices (their potential to create an irreducible communal subject) and the constraining mentality of thought collectives, these thought styles (as empirical entities manifested through the symmetry in question) allow one to compare them in several respects, thereby delineating the framework of a comparative cognitive sociology.

On the other hand, the historical evolution of thought styles in science provides the initial reference framework of developing social epistemology. The point here is that the stylization of scientific knowledge essentially informs the propagation, distribution, consumption, and legitimatization of this knowledge. Fleck begins the transition from comparative cognitive sociology to social epistemology by making a distinction between esoteric and exoteric circles of the production of scientific knowledge. He argues that the members of an esoteric circle – who have been initiated into the secrets of a domain of research – are more or less dependent upon the opinion of the relevant exoteric circle. At the same time, Fleck observes that the circulation of insights within exoteric circles facilitates transmission of the outcome of scientific research into extra-academic circles of society, guided by "public opinion" and common sense. Thus, the question he addresses in this regard is how the circulation of insights (*Denkverkehr*) within various thought collectives becomes a circulation of knowledge in exoteric academic circles and non-academic circles of "educated laymen."

Applying the concept of thought styles helps to answer this question. Fleck's construal of the concept makes it akin to the later concept of application in Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics. In both cases, application cannot be separated from the constraining interpretation. Imposing constraints interpretatively on cognition (and inquiry) is a continuation of the "communal perception" that constitutes and stabilizes scientific facts and objects of inquiry. Through "the harmony between application and thought style," thought orientations, cognitive habits, and attitudes towards other styles are put into play. A thought style never exists in itself, outside its possible range of application. Phrased differently, a thought style has no being except within interrelated practices which are entitled to appropriate possibilities of doing research. It is the practical being of a thought style that requires differentiating between a small esoteric and a larger exoteric circle of a thought collective (Fleck 1979, 104-105). The line of demarcation between the two types of circles is defined by the change of regimes of stylization due to the different application of constraints, norms, standards, etc. This change takes place when contextually produced scientific knowledge starts to take shape as a homogenized whole in specialized handbooks. If such knowledge was not read in exoteric circles, homogenization would be impossible. Moreover, scientific knowledge has to be read by the non-initiated in order to become a social force. The exoteric re-interpretation of esoterically-produced knowledge implies an inflection in its stylization: the esoteric circle's knowledge becomes re-stylized by the thought styles of various non-initiated thought collectives.

Notoriously, Fleck treats the question about the circulation of cognition by mapping the distinction between esoteric and exoteric circles to his fourfold differentiation between "journal science," "vademecum science," "textbook science," and "popular science." At issue in the socio-epistemological context is the transmission and migration of scientific knowledge from a journal to a textbook, and further, from being a possession of experts to being distributed to a wide range of non-initiated academics and educated laymen. During this process scientific knowledge becomes not only de-contextualized and re-contextualized, but also *de-stylized* and *re-stylized* as it is being read by experts with different thought styles and by laymen who represent the "public opinion." The crucial stage in the migration (and re-stylization) of scientific knowledge is its popularization, at which point laymen communicate their "specific epistemological confidence" to the experts, who find themselves unable to control the "spin" (Fleck 1986, 86). Popularization is inevitably intertwined with a politicization of scientific knowledge. Once the popularized knowledge has begun to circulate in the public sphere, it is doomed to be amenable to political application. The public use of scientific knowledge is always a political use that involves various forms of legitimatizing the practical adequacy of knowledge. "Legitimatization" here refers to the re-stylization of scientific knowledge in order to meet the expectations of its potential consumers.

Fleck is interested most of all in the stylized forms of knowledge that become constituted in his four types of science. Textbook science constitutes knowledge that is necessary for didactic initiation into science. By creating "artificial simplifications," popular science is instrumental not only in the ways in which laymen assimilate scientific knowledge, thereby furnishing the contemporary worldviews – it also supplies the specialized experts with conceptual figures, possible comparisons, and "even general viewpoints" (Fleck 1979, 112). In addition, popular science is the place where the conventional formulations of epistemological standards and norms originate. In *Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact*, Fleck tries to specify the conditions under which "specialized esoteric knowledge" gets transformed into "popular exoteric knowledge." Yet he predominantly examines the specialized forms. Expert scientific knowledge – so his argument goes – is constituted by the mutual reinforcement of journal science and handbook science. The former (though constrained by a collective thought style) is still distinguished by idiosyncrasies of the individual researchers. It also preserves indications of the particular contexts in which scientific knowledge has been produced. Journal science cannot be presented as an organic whole freed from contradictory and incongruent fragments. It is impossible to produce a handbook by compiling scientific papers that have appeared in specialized journals. The formation of a standard handbook becomes possible through the circulation of knowledge within the esoteric circle, combined with regulation of feedback from the exoteric circle. As a result of this regulated circulation, non-additive scientific reports become standardized as additive, impersonal portions of an organic whole. Handbook scientific knowledge takes the form of a "critical synopsis in an organized system" (Fleck 1979, 118). The "death of the individual author/scientist" occurs in vademecum (handbook) science. It is the strongly anonymous character of this type of science that erases not only any personal style of research, but makes possible the trans-subjective voice of scientific authority, thereby transforming science into a social force. To sum up, Fleck identifies the conditions for the possibility of impersonal (and additive as an organized system) scientific knowledge as the cooperation of intra- and inter-collective interpretation/communication of stylized (but still non-additive) fragments of knowledge.

Against the background of the general orientation of Fleck's doctrines thus described, I should like to turn now to issues of the significance of his work in present contexts. Initial reception of his work was not only a failure due to deficiencies of interpretation, but also because of the politically inappropriate context in which the work was placed, a far greater disaster in reception than any of the individual misinterpretations. In other words, the initial reception was predicated not so much on a misunderstanding, but first and foremost on an incorrect contextualization. Fleck was praised byreviewers for his efforts to develop a relativist epistemology of science that joins the "new German style of thought" (an expression coined by a reviewer) which denies the objectivist-absolutist claim for the allegedly presuppositionless character of scientific research. Some of the reviewers went on to appeal to the integration of "racial factors" in Fleck's scenarios of the origin of thought styles. Thus "enriched," the ideas from *Genesis and Development of Scientific Fact* would have become completely relevant to the task of working out a theory of knowledge for National Socialism. In fact, however, Fleck's book "offers a critique of science under National Socialism which goes beyond an evaluation by moral standards" (Borck 2004, 455). The positive reviews of the book in German medical journals of 1936, inspired partially by Nazi and racist ideology, testify to the veracity of the hermeneutic observation that temporal distance in the process of reception is *sine qua non* for a contextualization that would not distort the the received work. The temporal distance between the book's original publication and its reissue in 1979 helped to place it in appropriate contexts.

Doubtless Fleck had no illusion that the initial reception of his work placed it in the wrong context. He recognized the political misinterpretation of his ideas as early as in his debate with Tadeusz Bilikiewicz. In this debate on science's situatedness in cultural milieus and the concept of thought styles, Fleck used the opportunity to respond indirectly to positive reviews which had given the impression of a suspicious intimacy between Fleck's anti-objectivist and anti-essentialist approach to scientific research and the relativist denial of science's culturally unconditioned character, as this denial had been supported by those who looked for a "transformation" of the scientific worldview in line with Nazi ideology. In making the case that the unavoidable stylization of scientific research is by no means a precondition for political ideologization of science, Fleck countered the positive reception of his ideas. The need to prevent political distortion of the research process is a central motif in Fleck's rejoinder to Bilikiewicz. The unfolding of this motif provides the best way of undoing ideological misinterpretations that have been brought about by the dominant *Zeitgeist*.

In countering (and ridiculing) both types of "demagogical-mythical" doctrines in the midst of the 1930s – the programs of "proletarian science" as subjected to the goals of planned economics, and the ideas of scientific theories in which the "spirit of a race" gets embodied – Fleck argued that the dependence of scientific cognition on cultural-historical milieus is to be sought in the ongoing configuration of *Gestaltsehen* and the use of rhetorical figures in linguistic descriptions of phenomena (Fleck 2011, 329-331). No doubt selective perception, combined with symbolization and metaphorization of phenomena, transmits cultural values and tendencies which influence the research done by thought collectives. Once established within scientific communities, however, thought styles inform and shape entirely the research's cognitive values and orientations, as well as the regimes of constituting facts and objects of inquiry within scientific practices. The whole process of research runs within what Fleck calls the "collective mood of cognition" (*kollektive Erkenntnisstimmung*). Being implicated in practices that are entangled with this mood in complex ways, a thought collective is critical towards accepting aims and values that are imposed externally and are not inaugurated by the community's thought style. Thus, a thought style armors a scientific community with resources for resisting external ideological and political manipulations. Defending the freedom of doing research (i.e. defending the traditional academic ethos within a non-traditional epistemological framework) was Fleck's only possible response to the initial misinterpretation of his work.

Interestingly enough, Fleck's ideas became (upon their rediscovery) highly instrumental in critical studies of the bio-political ideology and policies of the Nazi regime. Thus, for instance, by complementing Fleck's concept of thought style with a concept of work style, Jean-Paul Gaudillière (2004) shows how symbiosis of racial hygiene occurred during this regime, thereby providing a discourse of justifications for natalist and racial policies. Another example in this regard is Veronika Lipphardt's (2005) Fleckian reconstruction of the roots of Nazi racial policies in the racial studies during the time of Weimar Republic. Generally, Fleck's conception proves to be especially relevant to the studies on the changing styles of thought during the so-called "molecularization of the human body" which took place in the first three decades of the last century.[1] Since this molecularization has been used for devising new eugenics policies in which an amalgam of politically and scientifically motivated thought styles has been put into play, the case studies which make use of Fleck's ideas demonstrate the critical relevance of his work. These studies adopt his concept of thought style in a peculiar way. They put emphasis upon the double status of thought styles that at once promote and are promoted by the molecularization of the human body. Because of the resilience of these styles, the transition from theoretical science to eugenics policies was accomplished quite easily, especially in Nazi Germany.[2]

Fleck's path as a theorist of thought styles can be most generally summarized as a search for a socio-epistemological alternative to "the fictitious 'human mind' as an ahistorical and asocial representative of the minds of human beings" (Fleck 1986, 80). The limits of co-understanding, the types of misunderstanding, and the ways of reaching agreement in spite of mutual non-understanding are among the themes Fleck handles on various occasions. By treating the coexistence of "physical meaning" and "figurative meaning" in a thought-style (Fleck 1986, 91), he approaches a problem that will occupy a central place in post-war philosophical hermeneutics. His close attention to the use of metaphors in scientific thinking should be mentioned here as well. The way in which Fleck spells out the

[1] The phenomenon of the "molecularization of the human body" is especially interesting with respect to the formation of thought styles within the biomedical sciences that have responded to the cultural-theoretical sex-gender distinction. It was the endeavor not to reproduce the traditional division between the social sciences and the biomedical sciences through this distinction that promulgated the new thought styles. Thus, Nelly Oudshoorn (1994, 2), a brilliant exponent of such a style, brought forward the argument that "the sex-gender distinction did not challenge the notion of a natural body. Although the concept of gender was developed to contest the naturalization of femininity, the opposite has happened." Not by accident Oudshoorn (1994, 11–13) draws on Fleck's work in exposing the myth of the natural body. Her study of the cultural constitution of the natural body is essentially inspired by the search for those proto-ideas, which play a crucial role in shaping the endocrinological theories about the "hormonal male and female bodies."

[2] The reception of Fleck's work in the historiography of medicine contributed essentially to the reorientation of the traditional history of medical ideas towards a history of medical entities. Fleck analyzed the cultural history of syphilis in accordance with changing thought styles. The investigation of how diseases have been historically experienced by various human populations belongs to the thematic scope of what today is called "medical anthropology" as a branch of historical anthropology. Medical anthropology deals, in particular, with important re-descriptions of whole types of diseases (e.g. the re-description of metabolic diseases as dependent on nutrition in endocrinological diseases which occurred in the first three decades of the 20th century). The re-descriptions took place not only because alternative etiologies have been discovered, but first and foremost because a new vision of the human body's essence has been established (see, in particular, Sinding 2004).

distinction between esoteric and exoteric thought collectives makes this distinction a hermeneutic issue. A further case in point for a hermeneutic topic is his discussion of the phenomena of propaganda, popularization, and legitimization (Fleck 1979, 85–88). His point of departure in this discussion is the assumption that "thought products" (*Gedankengebilde*) change their meanings in the the course of the repetitive interpretations they receive during social circulation, whereby the new content they acquire is produced not by individual acts, but "originates *a motu sociali*."[3]

Notoriously, Thomas Kuhn admits that Fleck's epistemology implies a transcendental subject hidden in each thought collective which is instrumental in each thought style. However, a Kantian interpretation of Fleck's epistemology would be only possible if one admits that there is an invariant kernel of rules inherent in each particular kind of styled thinking. Fleck strongly repudiates this idea, and there is no room for constitutive apriorism in his epistemology. Thought styles are predicated on a cultural genesis, and they are constantly exposed to contextually conditioned changes. Nonetheless, the spirit of searching for conditions of possibilities is palpable in all of Fleck's writings. Though his program is not to be recast in terms of Kantian epistemology, it is essentially characterized by a transcendental dimension.

It would be justified to say that Fleck attributes this dimension first and foremost to the thought styles in their flexibility and plasticity. In other words, one can assume that the thought styles are characterized by something like Foucault's "historical a priori" (the historical conditions of operation of the "enunciative function" and corresponding to "positivity of a discourse"). Indeed, Fleck stresses the strong individuality of each style as providing a specific standard for singling out the problems that deserve attention, and precludes one from appealing to a universal "unity of apperception." The transcendental for him is by no means a common denominator of all styles. Yet, like Foucault's approach to the "positivity of a discourse," Fleck regards a thought style as providing a limited space of communication in which entities of a special kind get articulated.[4] A thought style's constraints make possible this articulation that refers at once to the discursive knowledge and the objects of this knowledge. Finally, like Foucault's historical a priori of the positivity of a discourse, the thought style's constraints function as a "transformable group." Yet one should not push the analogy with Foucault too far. Fleck is not after the archaeology of thought styles, and he would not have considered a thought style (even the most global one) as epochal episteme. He does not look for the transcendental dimension in the intrinsic structure of the styles; what he is interested in is the way in which a thought style situates a thought collective in history in a manner that allows the collective to continually transcend each particular situation of cognition and knowledge production.

Fleck's concept of the transcendental is to be related to the situated transcendence of thought collectives' cognition and the trans-subjective character of their sociality.[5] Interestingly enough, the emphasis on social cognition in his approach to science avoids any hypostatization of thought collectives' mentality (and its normative structures) and again appeals to what constantly transcends the allegedly rigid structures of mentality. The formula of this approach is a "relativization of cognition without relativism," but not in the same sense in which the contemporary "standpoint epistemologies" make use of this formula. On another reading of this concept, the thought-style simultaneously reveals and conceals

[3] A special topic in Fleck's program is the hermeneutics of epistemic uncertainty and that of errors in scientific research. Fleck's "harmony of illusions" is another hermeneutic topic that should be mentioned.

[4] Foucault's (1972, 126) definition of the "positivity of a discourse" bears a strong resemblance to Fleck's historical totality of a thought style. The positivity of a discourse defines a "relatively small space of communication, since it is far from possessing the breadth of a science with all its historical development, from its most distant origin to its present stage; but a more extensive space than the play of influences that have operated from one author to another, or than the domain of explicit polemics."

[5] For Fleck (1979, 38), cognition is not "an individual process of any theoretical particular consciousness" but a product of a social activity "since the existing stock of knowledge exceeds/transcends the range available to any one individual." Yet this does not imply that cognition is produced by inter-subjective relations. Fleck focuses on sociality that transcends the individuality, including that of the epistemic subject. The way of transcending the normative-objective position of the epistemic subject in the process of cognition is another connotation of the concept of transcendence. Fleck's radicalization of cognitive sociology is based precisely on the universality of situated transcendence. As the pioneers of *Wissenssoziologie* assumed, with regard to science's objectivism there is no privileged epistemic position that can escape situated transcendence.

possibilities for doing research. This is why it has the character of a horizon.

Fleck's epistemology admits a kind of sociality in scientific research that "exceeds" the actual inter-subjectivity understood as continuous cooperation and mutual interaction among the members of a thought collective. This sociality allows the collective's members to achieve communal experience and the perfection of practices in "communal anonymity" (Fleck 1979, 78). I call it a *trans-subjective sociality*, defining it as the tendency to form thought collectives by appropriating possibilities revealed by a thought style's horizon. (Fleck admits that in most cases the very appropriation is guided by vaguely formulated and opportunistically changeable rules.)

Trans-subjective sociality is always in a certain mood of thinking. The mood is the readiness to follow the style's tendency and choosing and appropriating possibilities in the interpretative constitution of scientific facts. A certain social mood (*Stimmung als soziales Phänomen*) always accompanies each particular thought style. It contributes essentially – so Fleck's argument goes – to the reflexive integration (undertaken by a thought collective) of the thought style in an established intellectual tradition. On his account, the "collective mood" is the force which maintains the community and unites it members. Like trans-subjective sociality, this force "embraces" the community's whole cognitive life, and is not generated by the intrinsic dynamics of social relations within the collective. Changes in the collective mood provoke shifts in the possibilities of doing research. The force of this mood works on a par with the situated transcendence of the thought collective's existence. Fleck (1986, 88) writes that when "transferred to another collective, the idea undergoes various vicissitudes." What is most important to him is not the change of meaning but the lost of the original mood's aura. At stake here is the issue of the collective emotional readiness to re-interpret an idea or a scientific result that is already interpretatively shaped by the community which created it. Furthermore, this readiness is a necessary state of mind for interpretative reception in the communication between thought collectives.

The unity of the horizon-like thought styles and the trans-subjective sociality of thought collectives provides a rationale for introducing the concept of *trans-subjectivity*. Like the hermeneutic approach, this concept is omnipresent, but remains implicit in Fleck's work. Yet it brings together all of the basic features of his historic-epistemological and comparative cognitive-sociological program.

It might tentatively be said that the concept of trans-subjectivity involves the aforementioned transcendental dimension. The analysis of this dimension requires that one acknowledge the fact that the formation of trans-subjective sociality is inextricably tied up with the appropriation of possibilities for observing phenomena, seeing patterns, carrying out and repeating experiments, formalizing, conceptualizing, and theorizing. The thought style constrains this appropriation by specifying the range of possibilities that can be chosen, thereby necessarily hiding some possibilities from the thought collective. Yet the horizon of possibilities is constantly open, and accordingly always transcends the present situation of doing research. The transcendental function of the horizon of a thought style comes to the fore in the first place as an elusive standard for determining the relevant problems in a thought collective's cognitive life. I make use of the word "elusive" since the thought style indicates what should be qualified as illusory problems (*Scheinprobleme*), but it cannot draw a firm line between these problems and the genuine ones (exemplified by the line which Carnap draws between questions which are either internal and external to a linguistic framework).[6]

The place in Fleck's writings where the distinction between inter- and trans-subjectivity is perhaps most clearly palpable is in the paper "The Problem of Epistemology." In introducing the distinction between momentary and stable thought collectives, Fleck observes that the stability of the latter is due to their interactive social structure. Furthermore, it is the structured inter-subjectivity (including institutionalized statuses and roles) that enables the initiation rituals of neophytes, their education (and indoctrination) in the collective's thought style, and the transmission of this style from one generation to another (Fleck 1986, 99). Yet this picture of the inter-subjective sociality of a thought collective solely concerns the regulative aspect of the thought style (i.e. the style as a system of rules). But the style serves a heuristically normative function in the cognitive life of a thought collective by being bound up with a tradition, prejudices, "proto-ideas," moods, and beliefs.[7] All of these phenomena (to-

[6] To a great extent, Fleck's criticism of strong demarcation here anticipates Quine's criticism of Carnap.

[7] The thought-style's percepts determine the direction of research (the tendency of choosing research possibilities) and "connect it with a specific tradition" (Fleck 1979, 64).

gether with trans-subjective sociality and the horizon-like character of styled thing) together create the trans-subjectivity of cognition and knowledge production.

Fleck's debate with Izydora Dambska sheds additional light on the implicit distinction between inter- and trans-subjectivity in his epistemology. I would not say that this debate exemplifies a controversy between the position of normative (or in Dambska's case, "naturalist") inter-subjectivity and that of hermeneutic trans-subjectivity. My claim is rather that the position Fleck takes in this debate clarifies the concept of trans-subjectivity which he tacitly appeals to. According to Dambska, there is a biological (perhaps phylogenetic) basis of intersubjectivity. Due to this basis there is a set of elementary, intersubjectively shared, empirical propositions. They express the "naturally appropriate mode of human beings' ways of reacting to the surrounding world." Dambska (2011, 315-17) contrasts this view with two kinds of conventionalism which she ascribes to Poincaré and Popper on the one hand, and with Fleck's claim that all cognitive processes (including those of elementary perception) are specified by thought-styles on the other. Natural science does not need – so her argument goes – a special philosophical argumentation and justification for its inter-subjectivity (the inter-subjective validity of its results), since the latter is a continuation of something that is inherent in *conditio humana*.[8]

On Fleck's (2011, 320) counterargument, "a common basis of empirical propositions is only to be achieved/constructed by instructing and teaching people." In other words, such a basis does not precede the diversity of thought-styles. It is rather created by forging a common thought-style. A corollary of this view is that commonsense experience and its formulation in empirical propositions is by no means free of the constraints of style. It is not in agreement with the styled technical experience of a certain scientific discipline. "The 'acting people' (*die Tatmenschen*) see the world in a different manner as compared with the scientific seeing of it." (Fleck 2011, 321) However, Fleck does not dispute the translatability and communicability even between the most distant and conceptually incommensurable thought styles within science. Indeed, he never explained how this translatability/communicability is to be addressed. But his considerations make it clear that the unity of a thought collective and a thought style never forms an enclosed world. The translatability draws on an open and common horizon of possibilities. Trans-subjectivity rests on the open horizon-like character that transcends each particular thought-style. It is this translatability that paves the path to a *comparative* cognitive sociology of thought styles.

The way in which the horizon transcends each situation of a thought collective's cognitive articulation of facts allows one at once to reveal possibilities and constrain the choice and appropriation of possibilities. To reiterate, it is in this way in which the horizon serves a transcendental function. Because of its horizon-like character, the thought style never gets a closed structure with respect to the codex of its constraining rules. Accordingly, cognition guided by a thought style is at any stage of its development open to appropriate new possibilities of visualizing, experimenting, designing and making use of instruments, modeling, conceptualizing, etc. The horizon in its constant transcendence of the present situation "makes possible" the potential infinity of cognition guided by a thought style (and the potential infinity of the constitution of meaningful facts within the collective's "whole cognitive life"). Note also that this is the argument for the claim that a thought style

The tendency (the "direction of research") is the intertwined revealing and concealing of possibilities. Fleck argues that the formation of a styled tendency of research implies the integration of the thought collective in a tradition. A thought style cannot operate without being embedded in a tradition. The change of a thought style in a domain of research necessarily entails a break with a tradition. Trans-subjectivity is the thought-style as embedded in a specific tradition. Thus characterized, it forms (through constraining possibilities) an appropriate sociality that takes the form of a thought-collective – "the entirety of intellectual preparedness or readiness for one particular way seeing and acting and no other" (Fleck 1979, 64). Tradition is not something from which those who are involved in it can create epistemic distance, thereby transforming it into a pure objective presence. All objectification takes place in a tradition understood as the place where the situated transcendence becomes the effective history of constitutive interpretations. The tradition is what gets handed down as interpretative resources for the constitution of scientific entities. Among these are culturally inherited forms of *Gestaltsehen*, proto-ideas, prejudices, and established beliefs.

[8] Erich Otto Graf (2008) draws attention to the abstraction of "normal man" (whose normality is already there before any indoctrination in a certain thought style) which is behind Dambska's line of argumentation.

through its transcendence serves a transcendental function. Now, the reconstruction of Fleck's concept of thought style carried out so far is in need of a broader contextualization. As an initial step in this regard I will take into consideration his non-epistemological (hermeneutic) concept of truth.

A clearer idea of how Fleck assigns a horizon-like character to thought-styles should illuminate his approach to the "event of truth." In *Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact*, the emergence of this event is described as the outcome of two intertwined processes. On the one hand, this is the process of introducing effective rules for the selection of the best solution among a plurality of alternative solutions to a problem (or, the process of "maximizing thought constraint"). On the other hand, the event of truth is conditioned by the process of minimizing the range of possible interpretations of what is under inquiry. This second process also shows the way in which a scientific fact becomes constituted by a thought collective. The fact comes to the fore originally as "a stylized signal of resistance" sent to investigatory cognition. This resistance is the most extreme point in the correlation of maximizing of thought constraint and minimizing the range of interpretation. Furthermore, it is a resistance that takes place in the horizon enacted by a thought style. The theoretical formulation of a fact (in a domain of research) which reflects the styled signal of resistance (recast in terms of the epistemic conditions of fact's existence) is truth.

Truth as a style-dependent event is "an event in the history of thought" because it reveals something that is projected on a historical horizon. Put differently, truth is the socio-historically stabilized being of a fact. Finally, truth is the way in which the fact gets revealed, and thus meaningfully constituted. The fact is revealed because the horizon conceals possible "alternative facts" (or, possibilities of constituting such facts) that might be revealed by other thought styles and thought collectives. Furthermore, Fleck (1979, 100) argues that truth is the only "stylized solution" of a problem formulated by a given thought collective. The truth-about-a-fact is the extreme minimizing of a horizon's possibilities, thereby reducing them to only one, which is presented as the final solution. (It is another question whether the actualization of this sole possibility would open more leeway for possible interpretations of that fact. A scientific fact is never statically given, and the truth about it never becomes a pure presence at hand.)

Fleck's concept of "creative human truth" is not epistemological at all. Truth takes place in the "cognitive life of a thought collective" as a result of the interplay of revealing and concealing, and the way that this interplay is regulated by confronting the resistance. Thus considered, truth is an "event in the history of thought," and not a dynamic relation between an epistemic position and reality out there (as this relation gets devised by the proponents of "standpoint epistemologies"). Therefore, truth has nothing to do with the relativization of a cognitive product to the circumstances and conditions under which it is created. Indeed, Fleck insists that his concept of truth is a sociological one. However, the concept has such a character because it is bound up with the idea of trans-subjective sociality, and not because truth is socially constructed as events in the history of thought.[9]

Fleck's epistemology owes its potentiality to relativize (or, to situate historically and culturally) science's cognitive outcomes (without admitting cognitive relativism) to its interpretative resilience, and not to the appeal to chimerical entities like "dynamic truth" and "dynamic objectivity."[10] This resilience, insofar as it is bound up with the figure of situated transcendence, brings to naught any reading of Fleck's concept of thought style according to the

[9] In trying to answer the question of how it is possible that Fleck at once proposes a relativist interpretation of truth and denies that truth is relative, M. Seidel (2011, 224) reaches the conclusion that "Mannheim's description of his purported relationist solution is not just similar to, but in its basic idea nearly the same as Fleck's treatment of the issue." On my reading, there is a difference between the programs of Mannheim and Fleck that has to be conceived as a matter of principle: Mannheim tries to overcome cognitive relativism by means of epistemic relativization, whereas Fleck develops his argument against relativism by referring to the figure of situated transcendence.

[10] It seems to me that Fleck was fully aware of the meaninglessness of the concept of dynamic truth developed in the framework of a dynamic-relationist epistemology. (The latter was originally defended by Mannheim, and today it is represented by adherents of "standpoint epistemologies"). Being in touch with the great logicians of the Lvov-Warsaw school (or at least with Leon Chwistek), Fleck had to have known that the "relativization" in question by no means changes the semantic definition of truth, or (in case of coherentist theory of truth) its syntactic characterization. This is why he has never sought an epistemological-logical alternative to the concept of truth as established in the versions of traditional epistemology.

terms of a structural code. A thought style (qua a tendency of appropriating possibilities in which "creative truth" gets brought into being) is not amenable to a logical reconstruction just because of its plasticity as a horizon of thinking. By analyzing Fleck's debate with Tadeusz Bilikiewicz, who has been strongly influenced by the art-historical and cultural-historical concept of style, Claus Zittel (2012) convincingly points out that Fleck does not borrow Wölfflin's morphological concept of style as a general characteristic of an epoch in the history of art. Rather, he develops a dynamic concept of style that distinguishes the working everydayness of a thought collective as consisting of routinely repeatable and contextually circumscribed practices.[11] Fleck's ways of introducing and unfolding the concept have nothing to do with the search for the cognitive structures which ground worldviews. The style-constraint everydayness of a thought collective engaged with scientific research discloses the social micro-world of a domain of scientific research. Just because of its dynamic nature, Fleck's thought styles are not codified. It would be wrong to think of a thought style as a diversity of cognitive operations that is fixed with regard to some (invariant) group of rules.[12] To sum up, the distinction between the morphological concept and Fleck's concept of style is to be highlighted in terms of an opposition between cognition based on a formally invariant group of rules and cognition that constitutes meaningful (for a thought collective) facts by restricting maximally its horizon of interpretative possibilities.

Fleck's picture of science's historical dynamics is essentially informed by the implicit hermeneutics of trans-subjectivity. The rejection of the idea that history of science is characterized by an increase and an accumulation of scientific knowledge (measured by elaborated criteria for a cognitive progress) should not be disentangled from the potential infinity of thought styles' horizons. The history of science in general and of each particular scientific domain does not consist in a diversity of enclosed thought worlds (Rheinberger 2002). Being predicated on constant breaks, ruptures of the "direction of research," and shifts in the horizon of collective research work, the history of science does not give leeway to unsurmountable semantic barriers between thought styles, regardless of how deep their differences are. (This is the argument against historical relativism, which is again based on the figure of situated transcendence.)

From a global historical viewpoint, the situated transcendence of cognition and knowledge production must be extended from the transcendence of particular situations in research guided by a thought style to a transcendence of whole thought styles when a radically new direction of research (characterized by its own tendency of appropriating research possibilities) takes place. Notoriously, Fleck anticipated all the significant ideas of Kuhn's conception, with the exception of the idea of scientific revolutions as being predicated on a *Gestalt*-switch and provoking semantic incommensurability between pre- and post-revolutionary thought worlds. In Fleck's socio-historical epistemology, such revolutions are most definitely excluded. More specifically, he excludes syntactic and/or semantic incommensurability between thought styles.[13] However minimal it may be, there is always a shared horizon of understanding between two allegedly incommen-

[11] The debate with Bilikiewicz testifies to the plasticity of Fleck's concept of thought style. At the same time, however, the misinterpretation of this plasticity provoked a strange and unexpected political reception of Fleck's book in Germany. See Borck (2004).

[12] Fleck's dynamic concept of thought style invites further hermeneutic and phenomenological considerations. Patrick Heelan (1986) made an interesting use of this opportunity.

[13] From the viewpoint of epistemological relationism, this claim is untenable. Claus Zittel (2007) assumes that Fleck surmounts semantic incommensuralbility by conceding the possibility for a meta-position with respect to the conflicting positions in the history of science. It is comparative sociology that allegedly ought to contribute to the achievement of this meta-position. This assumption, however, is in conflict with Fleck's intentions. I also cannot accept Markus Seidel's (2012, 231-34) proposal that relates Fleck's overcoming of incommensurability and his anti-relativism to a kind of synthesis of thought styles achieved through David Bloor's principle of reflexivity. Fleck writes: "Scientists, philologists, theologians, or cabbalists can perfectly communicate with each other within the limits of their collectives, but the communication between a physicist and a philologist is difficult, between a physicist and a theologian very difficult, and between a physicist and a cabbalist or mystic impossible" (Fleck 1986, 81). In fact, he distinguishes between different degrees of shared horizons in the communication between thought collectives. He admits that a scientist and a non-scientist (cabbalist in this case) can fail to communicate to each other. But the communication (and the translatability of cognitive results) between communities in science is always possible due to the transcendence of the normatively styled situatedness of each community.

surable scientific thought styles. The transcendence of a whole thought style in the history of science results in the style's horizon becoming fused with other horizons. Consequently, the thought style as constraining rules may cease to exist, but the "rest of the style" in the form of possibilities that the style's horizon has revealed remain: these possibilities are re-inscribed in other styles' horizons. The remains of such lost thought styles provide proto-ideas about possible facts and entities. Proto-ideas constantly migrate into living thought styles, thereby opening other avenues for an inter-collective dialogue.

The concept of trans-subjectivity brings into play a specific type of historicity as well. Fleck's view of science's historicity and historical temporality follows from his way of overcoming epistemic and historical relativism. From his analysis of situated transcendence he draws several conclusions about the historical temporality of the "genesis and development" of scientific facts. A scientific fact (and more generally, a scientific object of inquiry) is not only "in history." Fleck lays a stronger claim: a scientific fact is intrinsically historicized, i.e. it is distinguished by its own temporality. The way in which a thought-collective constitutes a scientific fact through its thought-style brings into play the temporal regime of the scientific fact's existence. The thought-style ascribes to the constituted fact a relevant past, a procedural present identification, and a range (though extremely minimized) of future possibilities of its further interpretation, whose appropriation and actualization might change it. Recasting or re-describing this fact in a new thought-style also implies a total re-structuring of its intrinsic temporality. Fleck's epistemology is preoccupied with the temporal regimes of the constitution of scientific facts. Regarding the general idea for such a regime, the "invention" of a scientific fact proceeds to its own future of open possibilities, whose appropriation envisions past trajectories whereby the unity of future possibilities and past trajectories makes the fact present. It is not the quasi-Hegelian, unitary and eschatological historicity that makes Fleck's epistemology a historically-oriented enterprise. There is no immanent logic of science's historical development. The historicity of science consists rather in deferring regimes of temporalization of scientific facts. The transitions from one regime to another do not form a teleological process. Yet in contrast to historical relativism, Fleck does not repudiate such transitions.

The distinction between inter- and trans-subjectivity as discussed so far implies an opposition between (social) construction and (hermeneutic) constitution which is at the bottom of the divergence between social constructivism and philosophical hermeneutics. There are several arguments against the widely accepted view that Fleck is a forerunner of contemporary social constructivism in science studies. According to the most decisive among them, Fleckian epistemology is unavoidably a transcendental enterprise, whereas social constructivism in all of its versions is a radically empirical program. To be sure, Fleck does not ignore the importance of the social-cognitive processes of construction, a fact documented by the attention he often pays to intra- and inter-collective communication and interaction.[14] Nonetheless, his main concern is the meaningful constitution of scientific facts and the meaningful articulation of domains of inquiry. He analyzes the processes of cognitive construction as processes taking place in a domain that is *trans-subjectively disclosed*, with its meaningful constitution and articulation already in progress. According to his transcendental position, cognitive construction in science becomes possible only when a domain of research is disclosed and a horizon of articulation of scientific facts and entities is established. The thought style's horizon lays bare what in the subsequent research process will be meaningfully articulated as a disclosed domain of inquiry. The very disclosure determines a tendency to articulate facts and entities whose stabilization through heuristic rules becomes the thought style's regulative function.

To sum up, within a reality that is constantly evolving, scientific achievements prove to be inescapably inventions. Yet a scientific fact is an artifact, not because it is a social construction, but because it is meaningfully constituted in various contexts and (to make use of Hans-Jörg Rheinberger's expression) "spaces of representation." The argument for this claim can be seen by analyzing Fleck's criticism of logical empiricism: the formulation of "protocol-sentences" about pure facts is impossible, because facts cannot be isolated from the horizons in which they are revealed. Since each disciplinary thought style constitutes its own factuality and empirical basis within its own horizon, the search for a "united science" that presupposes the absolute presence of independent factuality is untenable. How-

[14] See Hacking (2009).

ever, this claim does not contradict the fusibility of different styles' horizons as discussed previously.

Fleck carefully avoids any hypostatization of normative structures (related either to the social production of knowledge, or to the internal methodology of inquiry) in epistemology. To this effect, he regards the factual articulation of a scientific domain as regulated by a kind of heuristic normativity. The latter is an intrinsic phenomenon in the interplay of horizonal understanding and articulating interpretation. Heuristic normativity also plays a significant role in his approach to science's cognitive autonomy and other political issues concerning academic freedom. The debate with Tadeusz Bilikiewicz illuminates Fleck's vision of heuristic normativity.[15] For Bilikiewicz (2011, 350-51), it is in principle possible to devise a methodological normativity that can guarantee the cognitive independence of scientific research. Yet he acknowledges the difficulties in coping with this task. Fleck for his part supports the thesis that the rigor of a methodological codex cannot assure the autonomy and freedom of research, but aids in the successful transformation of a milieu's impact into a heuristic strategy of reformulating the socio-pragmatic tasks intruding from outside. Accordingly, these tasks will become "inscribed" in the thought style's intrinsic horizon as research possibilities. The very reformulation may cause shifts in research topics, but it prevents the thought collective from succumbing to external-political manipulation. This is a strategy for incorporating a milieu's impact without distorting the research process as it is designed by the collective thought style. This is the only way to avoid a dangerous politicization, and a political finalization of the research process. (Fleck 2011, 329)

The heuristic strategy of reformulating external tasks (imposing political pressure upon the thought collective) to solve internal problems of a research program corresponds to a heuristic normativity, as opposed to the algorithmic normativity of a methodological codex. Fleck goes on to assert that there is no normative-methodologically justified objectivity of science. Yet the heuristic defense of science's cognitive autonomy is possible under all political circumstances and in all cultural milieus of scientific research.

Fleck's socio-historical epistemology has a clear political engagement. His final position was epitomized in the unpublished paper "Crisis in Science" from 1960. It indicates his commitment to the values of academic freedom and his advocacy of science's cognitive specificity. In opposing the tendency to transform science into a "servant of politics and industry," Fleck (1986, 153) argues that science's "cultural mission" is to make room for the autonomous search for truth, freed from the naiveté of epistemological objectivism. Scientific truth as a complex historical-mental event that is inseparably connected with investigative techniques, statistical interpretations, and manifold conventions has its locus only within the cognitive life of science's thought collectives. If the internal milieu of achieving scientific truth gets destroyed by external political pressure, modern societies would no longer have the chance to use science for their practical purposes. Only scientific research that is free of external constraints in searching for truth may produce results that could be practically applicable and instrumental in social life. Socio-historical epistemology and comparative sociology of scientific thought-styles must occupy themselves with tasks that will enhance what ethnomethodologists and sociologists of scientific knowledge call scientists' "endogenous reflexivity." Central among these tasks for Fleck is the need to integrate interpretative critiques of research's epistemic assumptions. He goes on to treat such integration as a kind of humanization of the natural sciences. The interpretative critique would facilitate the formation of scientists' evaluative attitude towards the cultural conventions and social customs that they tacitly adopt or develop in the research process. Fleck also makes the case that the diversification of thought-styles does not distort or deform the research process. On the contrary, it is *sine qua non* for science's cognitive autonomy and the academic freedom of doing research.

I would like to conclude with a short discussion of a hermeneutic issue. Formulated as a question, it reads thusly: Might the effective history of reception confirm or disconfirm the historical success of the received theoretical work? From the viewpoint of philosophical hermeneutics, there are two undisputed criteria for success here. First, the work is

[15] Ilana Löwy (2009, 81) argues that what is at stake in this debate is not the philosophical way of getting rid of relativism, but the cognitive resistance of scientific research to the impact of its cultural milieu. She describes Fleck's position as a search for science's cognitive autonomy that is not based on a normative demarcation between scientific research and its cultural milieu. Autonomy will be advocated much more successfully if scientists are committed to contextually relevant heuristic rules of investigation.

successful if the story which used as a case study can be continued in an innovative manner through new, re-contextualized interpretations. In Fleck's work, the story of the discovery of the Wasserman reaction is the case study which supposedly has to support his theoretical views. On the first criterion, a Fleckian continuation of Fleck's reconstruction of the story of the Wassermann reaction would attest to the historiographical significance of his theoretical conception. Ilana Löwy (2004b) demonstrated cogently that the very continuation (in a Fleckian manner) of Fleck's story of the discovery of the antibody test for syphilis provides an excellent example of a re-contextualized interpretation that illustrates the aforementioned criterion. Fleck ends his story about the diagnostic specificity of this particular serological test with comments on events from the mid-1920s. On Löwy's argument, the continuation of the story of how the scientific fact (presumably confirmed by the success of this test) has been constituted is to be placed in the context of legal and administrative-regulative measures, like the introduction of mass screening for syphilis via legislation. In the period of approximately fifteen years that followed the publication of Fleck's book, these measures will play a leading role in recasting the fact about the specificity of the Wassermann reaction. The latter will become a medical technology regulated by the state and incorporated in legal dispositions. At stake in Löwy's study is not the constitution (i.e. the genesis and development) of a scientific fact, but the transformation of a scientific fact into a legally and politically governed technology. The reconstruction in a Fleckian manner of the development of the regulatory devices (based more or less on the Wassermann reaction) testifies to the historical success of Fleck's research work.

The second criteria for the success of received work concerns the macro-historical significance of the work's effective reception history. If the history of re-contextualized interpretations succeeds in showing the role the work has played in a macro-historical constellation of theories, programs, approaches, ideas, etc., then the work is to be regarded as a contributing ingredient of an episteme. The studies of Fleck's works devoted to comparative analysis with the works of Kuhn (Brorson and Andersen 2001, Babich 2003, Mößner 2011), Foucault (Braunstein 2009), Metzger (Löwy 1990), Canguilhem (Sinding 2004, Sinding 2009, Löwy 2004a), Mannheim (Seidel 2011), Husserl (Rheinberger 2005, Rheinberger 2010a), and Michael Polanyi (Hagner 2012) have unveiled not a shared paradigm, but rather a macro-historical episteme. Despite all divergences, the works of these authors epitomize a historical a priori on the level of problematizing the practical constitution of scientific objects. In particular, these authors put into question the classical modern interpretation of the epistemic relationship, and conceived this relationship "no longer as analytic and contemplative, but rather as synthetic and constructive, accompanied by phenomena of emergence that would become characteristic of entire series of discoveries" (Rheinberger 2010b, 29).

Fleck approaches some claims of conventionalist epistemology by stating that the thought styles necessarily imposes conventions (theoretical claims that are saved from empirical refutation) on cognition. Like conventionalists, Fleck argues that descriptions of the same phenomena constrained by different thought styles are not always incommensurable. More specifically, Fleck addresses translation-equivalent theoretical descriptions that are incompatible because no model of the one is a model of the other.[16] Accordingly, there is room for choosing between alternative (but equally acceptable) theoretical means in conceptualizing the research's procedural experience.[17] The conventionalist thesis of underdetermination plays a prominent role in Fleck's comparative cognitive sociology. And like Poincaré's followers, Fleck subscribes to the view that the choice between different (but equivalent with respect to the observable consequences) theoretical schematizations of an empirical domain is very often a matter of convenience (but not of arbitrariness). The whole experience of a thought collective ultimately decides which one is the most convenient schematization. (To be sure, however, in this formulation the term "experience" is much broader than the same term as it is used in conventionalist epistemology.) Furthermore, in his criticism of logical empiricism Fleck makes use of conventionalist arguments against drawing a sharp distinction between theoretical and empirical ingredients of scientific experience. Nonetheless, Heelan (1986) shows that Fleck cannot be regarded as a conventionalist.

[16] See the analysis of Ben-Menahem (2006, 9-12).

[17] In this regard, Fleck is much more a conventionalist than a pre-Kuhnian philosopher of science who insists on a version of the incommensurability thesis. Following Ben-Menahem, one might say that Fleck (in a manner similar to several conventionalists) built his argument around translatability, whereas Kuhn (and Feyerabend) focused on untranslatability.

He stresses, in particular, that the consensual character of scientific inquiry is constrained not only by theoretical conventions, but also by factors that are not reachable by logical-epistemological analysis. Yet the most important difference concerns alternative approaches to truth. Fleck categorically denies any attempt at creating truth by fiat, even in the formal disciplines.

No doubt, inasmuch as Fleck's social epistemology and comparative cognitive sociology treat scientific facts as invented rather than discovered, they are to be characterized as constructivist initiatives. Fleck advocates a kind of non-relativist social constructivism informed by his views about the trans-subjective nature of science. True, he strongly opposed the doctrine that nature has joints, and accordingly, the task of scientific theories consists in providing correct accounts of pre-existing natural kinds. He is the author who for the first time foregrounds the instrumental, cognitive-intervening, performative, and material dimensions in the making of scientific facts and artifacts, thereby anticipating several developments in STS and cultural studies of science. Yet social constructivism is only a means and not the goal of Fleck's work. He clearly follows the line of reasoning that all theoretical and empirical procedures and practices of construction always take place in an interpretative medium. This is why they function as readable technologies. The enactment of constructive procedures is a meaningful event, since all elements and agents (or "actors," in Latour's sense) that get involved in these procedures are always already situated in a meaning-constituting interpretation. To sum up, because of the priority of the constitution of meaning (in particular, a meaningful domain of inquiry) over social construction of facts, it is much more germane to read Fleck's work in terms of hermeneutic phenomenology than in terms of constructivist sociology.

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THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF CHINESE YIN-YANG THINKING TO THE CONTEMPORARY DIALOGUE BETWEEN SCIENCE AND RELIGION

Fan Meijun*, Liu Xiaoting**, Wang Zhihe*
* Professor of Humanites, Harbin Institute of Technology
** Professor and director of Beijing Center for the Study of Science and Faith, Beijing Normal University
*** Director of Center for Constructive Postmodern Studies, Harbin Institute of Technology
e-mail: claremontwang@yahoo.com

Abstract:
As a non-dualistic but holistic and harmonious way of thinking, Chinese Yin-Yang Thinking can make great contributions to the contemporary dialogue between science and religion, especially in its emphasis on interdependence, mutual complementarity, and mutual transformation. It can help us understand the complex and multifaceted relationship between science and religion, and provides a middle way to move beyond the impasse between scientism and religious fundamentalism. This paper explores the following three contributions that Yin-Yang Thinking can make to the contemporary dialogue between science and religion: 1. Yin-Yang Thinking can help deconstruct the dichotomy between science and religion by showing the interpenetration between them; 2. Yin-Yang Thinking can help promote synergy between science and religion by showing how they can complement and learn from each other; 3. Yin-Yang Thinking can help establish a partnership between science and religion in order to create an ecological civilization. The paper also explores the question of why such a valuable philosophical concept has been suppressed in China for almost a century.

Key words: Yin-Yang Thinking; Chinese Philosophy; Science and religion; Taoism; Process Philosophy; Constructive postmodernism; non-dualistic thinking.

Introduction

The clash of science and religion has become a critical issue in the modern world, one which has hindered the development of both science and religion. Overcoming the conflict is at the very heart of contemporary philosophy of religion. This is because science and religion to some degree are "the two most powerful social forces in the world today" (Clayton 2012, viii). As Alfred North Whitehead pointed out, "When we consider what religion is for mankind, and what science is, it is no exaggeration to say that the future course of history depends upon the decision of this generation as to the relations between them" (Whitehead 1967, 181). Although there has been great progress in promoting dialogue between science and religion, the conflict between them is still not a thing of the past. For most people, the relation between science and religion is still conceived of "primarily as one of conflict" (Griffin 2001, 45). Religion is viewed as incompatible with science. Science and religion are seen as having nothing to do with each other. As Philip Clayton describes, in many people's eyes "it was common knowledge that science and religion were at war with one another—a warfare so bloody and of such great import that no Geneva Convention could ever regulate its battles" (Clayton 2006, 1). Dawkins' recent book, *The God Delusion,* has taken the battle to a new level. Dawkins and his supporters are quite convinced that religion can never be reconciled with science, because "Science is but one form of rationalism, while religion is the most common form of superstition" (Dawkins 2006, 67).

Likewise, influenced by Western modernity, many people in China today still believe in the incompatibility of science and religion, that religions are the enemy of science, and that the two will always clash with each other. The two are "incompatible like water and fire" (Li 2010, 125).

Why is the conflict model of science and religion still dominant in a pluralistic age? There are many reasons for this phenomenon. In our opinion, the binary thinking that has been so influential in western modernity is a key one. In this respect, Chinese Yin-Yang Thinking may be able to play a unique role in reconciling the conflict between science and religion in both China and the world.

What is Yin-Yang Thinking?

Yin-Yang Thinking as the core of Chinese culture refers to a Chinese non-dualistic, holistic and harmonious mode of thought based on the concept of Yin-Yang*,* which describes two primal opposing but complementary forces found in all things in the universe. According to *Yi Jing* or *The Book of Changes,* the number one classic of Chinese classics, also called "the origin" of Chinese culture, "Tao consists in Yin and Yang" (*Zhou Yi* 2000, 322). For Guanzi (770-476 BC), "Yin-Yang is the great principle of Heaven and Earth" (Dai 1954, 238). *The Yellow Emperor's Inner Classic* (*Huangdi Neijing*) states: "Yin-Yang is Tao (the way) of heaven and earth, the order of everything, the progenitor of change, the origin of life and death, and the domain of Spirit" (*The Yellow Emperor's Inner Classic* 1963, 31). In other words, yin and yang are universal, and they co-exist within everything in the universe. "There is nothing in which yin and yang do not participate" (Smith 1965, 71).The universe would be impossible without their interaction. The interaction between yin and yang is pictured as the ultimate force for everything's becoming-process. Yin-Yang Thinking represents "both/and" rather than "either/or" thinking. As the fundamental Chinese way of thinking, Yin-Yang Thinking penetrates all features of Chinese culture, and forms a part of all major Chinese religions, including Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism. It indicates the dynamic concrescence of opposites and "affirms the harmonious holding together of contrasts in a balanced synthesis, the integrating of divergence into a rounded whole" (Smith 1965, 70). In Chinese Yin-Yang Thinking, the task of thinkers is to synthesize and harmonize the two seeming opposites using the ideas of interrelatedness and interdependence. There are at least nine layers of meaning associated with Yin-Yang:

1. Yin-Yang differ from each other.

According to Yin-Yang thinking, everything contains the seed of its opposite. For example, the sky is Yang and the earth is Yin; man is Yang and woman is Yin; fire is Yang and water is Yin. Yin is different from Yang. Yang is different from Yin. They oppose each other.

2. Yin-Yang grow together.

Although Yin and Yang oppose each other, it is not necessary for Yin to terminate Yang, and vice versa. Yin and Yang can co-exist peacefully like different flowers growing in a single garden. Zhuang Zi, the co-founder of Taoism, used the concept of "*Bing Sheng*" to indicate co-existence, co-growth, or "growing together" (Zhuang 1983, 71).

3.Yin-Yang are equal.

Unlike the typical binary and/or hierarchy of good and evil, Yin and Yang are equally important. In the Yin-Yang *s*ymbol one finds two fish, one black (yin) and one white (yang), embracing within a circle. Each occupies half of the space. The circle symbolizes harmony. The equal division of the space symbolizes the equality between Yin and Yang.

4. Yin-Yang are dynamic

There is a fluidity to Yin and Yang. Yin-Yang are not in a static state and they are not fixed categories, but are in process. Together they constitute a dynamic, transformative process in a complex and interactive relationship. Any static interpretation represents a departure from Yin-Yang theory. The concept of yin and yang expresses "the deepest rhythm of the universe as process"(Cobb 1979, 422).

5. *Yin-Yang are interdependent*

Yin-Yang are relational polarities. They are internally related and reciprocally rely on each other. Though they are opposites, they mutually entail each other (Ames and Hall 2003, 27). The two embracing fish indicate the interdependence and interrelatedness between different things. There is no Yin without Yang, and vice versa. Each is a necessary condition of the other. They mutually "ground each other" (Zhou 2002, 3).

6. *Yin-Yang are interbeings*

Closely related to the last point, Yin-Yang contain each other and permeate each other. They are rooted in each other. In the Yin-Yang symbol, each fish has an opposite color eye: the black has a white eye, the white a black one. This special eye symbolizes the mutual containment between Yin and Yang. There is no pure Yin or pure Yang. Philosophically, there is no absolute rigid line between opposites.

7. Yin-Yang complement each other

Yin-Yang are also complementary. They are reciprocally supportive and supplementary. "Neither independent yin nor independent yang is productive" (Zhong 1996, 148). Yin and Yang are conditioned by each other; they need each other and complement each other like the colors of a rainbow. Yin and Yang complete each other by harmonizing conflicting principles and by "adding something not found in the other" (McDaniel 2005, 124).

According to Yin-Yang Thinking, Yin and Yang complementing each other is regarded as good, because the complementary way of things is the best result.

8. Yin-Yang transform each other

Transformation is part of the dynamic relationship between Yin and Yang. Yin-Yang can change into one another by interaction. For example, cold water (yin) can be boiled and eventually turn into steam (yang). Everything in the universe is the result of mutual transformation.

9. Yin-Yang aim at harmony

The circle in the Yin-Yang symbol symbolizes harmony. Although Chinese thinkers have different emphases on Yin-Yang Thinking, almost all of them recognize the primacy of harmony, which pervades the cosmic Tao. In Yin-Yang Thinking, harmony is different from sameness. Harmony is built on appreciating difference or respecting otherness. The wise prefer complex harmonies over simple sameness. This is the ideal state of all personal, social, and political interactions. According to Yin-Yang Thinking, the harmony of Yin-Yang embodies "beauty." In harmony both benefit, in war both are harmed.

The Contributions of Chinese Yin-Yang Thinking to the Contemporary Dialogue between Science and Religion

Yin-Yang Thinking can make great contributions to the contemporary dialogue between science and religion, especially in its emphasis on interdependence, mutual complementarity, and mutual transformation. Yin-Yang Thinking can not only challenge us to rethink the relationship between science and religion, but can also help us to understand science and religion in a more comprehensive way. Here we list only three of its contributions.

1. Yin-Yang Thinking can help deconstruct the dichotomy between science and religion by showing the interpenetration between them.

In typical Western either/or thinking, a thing cannot be and not be at the same time, in the same way. Truth, therefore, is essentially a matter of either/or. It is either this or not this; it cannot be both (Knitter 1985, 217). This kind of binary thinking provides philosophical support for the conflict model of science and religion. It seems that there is a Great Wall between science and religion. Science is construed as having nothing to do with religion, and vice versa. They have nothing in common, nor is there any connection between them.

However, from the perspective of Yin-Yang Thinking, there is no rigid division between science and religion, just as there is no dichotomy between Yin and Yang, heaven and earth, man and nature, being and non-being, one and many, good and evil, subject and object, or knowledge and action. "There is no complete disparity" (Brooke 2006, 294). Science and religion are relational polarities. Science and religion are what Thich Nhat Hanh calls "interbeings," or what Alfred North Whitehead calls "mutual containment."

While they differ in many ways, science and religion have things in common. Both of them require imagination. Both teach us to be humble by realizing our limits. Both appreciate the spirit of integrity and responsibility, the spirit of exploration; the spirit of creativity, and the "quest for truth" (Rudd 2006, 399). For John Haught, "science and religion, different though they may be, share a common origin in the remote and mysterious fountainhead of a simple human desire to know. Both science and religion ultimately flow out of the same 'radical' eros for truth that lies at the heart of our existence" (Haught 1995, 203).

In addition, scientists and clergy share similar personal qualities. As Pauline Rudd indicated, "The personal qualities needed to be a creative scientist are not so very different from those long recognized as being important in the monastic journey. They include a desire for truth, perseverance, detachment from material things and from self-interest, humility, and a level of austerity by which to accept criticism and to sacrifice comfort and pleasure to reach the goal" (Rudd 2006, 399).

The scientific method begins with doubt or skepticism. This may seem to be the opposite of religious faith, but it is actually similar. Living with doubt means living on the edge without closure, without answers, without intellectual security. It means being open to new possibilities. It is part of what makes science a spiritual discipline.

The early formulation of a model is the most important point of intersection between science and religion. The development of a model comes about when a scientist imagines a new pattern of relationships that is different from previous patterns of thought. This represents a spiritual breakthrough. Most often the new pattern is derived from an analogy to some ordinary experience, such as the dream that the German chemist Friedrich Kekule had of a snake eating its own tail, which gave him an idea of the ring-like structure of the benzene molecule.

Imagination always precedes evidence in science. Theories are derived from imagination and then tested through experimental evidence. If theories were derived from observations, as is widely believed, there would be no way of testing theories. There is a Yin-Yang relationship of dependency between theory and experimentation. Theory and experimentation are in constant dialogue and debate with each other. They infuse and inform each other, and are inextricably linked as Yin and Yang to each other.

On the other hand, science and religion interpenetrate each other; there is science in religion and there is religion in science.

A) There is Science in Religion

Yin-Yang Thinking shows that the apparent separation between science and religion is an illusion because there are intrinsic connections between them; there is science in religion. Take Taoism, the native Chinese religion, as an example; it already contained the seeds of a scientific outlook. Joseph Needham, the noted English biochemist, sinologist, and historian of science, made a convincing case that Taoism is essentially scientific in outlook. Taoism is famous for its love of nature. That love inspired an intense affirmation of life: health, well-being, vitality, longevity, and even immortality.

Laozi and Zhuangzi, the founders of Taoism, had reinterpreted and rationalized ancient nature worship and the esoteric arts, but the primal connection with nature remained. As Judith A. Berling points out, "Taoists were supporters both of magic and of proto-science; they were the element of Chinese culture most interested in the study of and experiments with nature" (Berling 1982, 10).

In a similar manner, Western science came into being only because the Christian tradition already contained the seeds of a scientific spirit. In the last fifty years, historians of the development of science not only have shown that "it is certainly the case that the early pioneers of science were mostly people of Christian faith, even if some of them had their problems with the religious authorities (Galileo) or with Christian orthodoxy (Newton)" (Polkinghorne 2006, 58), but also have discovered that modern science could not have come into being if there had not been a religious transformation in Europe during this period. A new religious imagination lay behind the expectation that relationships among physical and chemical events could be described in the abstract language of mathematics. The breakthrough that united experimentation with mathematics occurred because scholars had previously imagined that the world is orderly and governed by laws of nature established by divine activity. That idea came from centuries of religious discussion. It originated in debates between Franciscans and Dominicans in the 13th century, bloomed during the Protestant Reformation of the 16th century, and led to the formulation of scientific hypotheses in the 17th century based on the premise that the universe itself obeys laws. It was a remarkable and daring idea that there are invisible, but knowable, laws that govern the physical universe. Empirical investigation alone would never have led to that conclusion. Instead a religious conviction about a divinely-ordered universe was required.

B) There is religion in science

In addition to a scientific spirit being found in both Chinese and Western religion,

religion also made possible the development of science. For example, it was Chinese Taoism that made possible the development of Chinese science, because it "developed many of the most important features of the scientific attitude" (Needham 1956, 161). Joseph Needham has clearly shown, as Anderson summarizes, that "Chinese science was extremely well developed, and that much of it arose from Taoist practice. Alchemy, for instance, most certainly begat serious chemistry and some serious medical practice. Sex, longevity, and drugs of all sorts were studied in detail, often by reasonably scientific method (especially compared to the West of the same time period). Botany nested in medical writings that had Taoist associations" (Anderson 2001, 166). This means that Taoism "is of cardinal importance for the history of science in China" (Needham 1956, 161), since it laid the foundations for Chinese chemistry, mineralogy, botany, zoology, and pharmaceutics. The pity to Needham is that "The scientific or 'proto'-scientific side of Taoist thought has been very largely overlooked" by most Europeans (Needham 1956, 161).

In much the same way, Western science emerged from spiritual roots. The discoveries of Newton, Kepler, Boyle, Huygens, and the other leading thinkers of the late 17th century derived directly from their religious convictions about an orderly universe created by God. Einstein also endorsed the idea that religion is part of science: "The most beautiful thing we can experience is the mysterious. It is the source of all true art and science" (Ulam 1976, 289). Science, he argued, depends on "the religious attitude." In short, just as the scientists of Newton's era recognized a spiritual dimension in their quest for understanding, Einstein was also very conscious of science as a spiritual activity.

Thus it is clear that science and religion mutually contain each other: there is an interconnection between them. In short, it is Yin-Yang Thinking that shatters the simple dichotomy of science and religion. This will allow both science and religion to continue to develop.

2. Yin-Yang Thinking can help promote synergy between science and religion by allowing them to complement and learn from each other.

It must be noted that the emphasis on commonality between science and religion does not deny the differences between them. Many scientific ideas are not inconsistent with religious ideas, and vice versa. Also, "The methodology by which data are acquired is different and the factors that constitute 'proof' are not the same" (Handbook, 389). One uses prayer, meditation, and worship; the other the testing of hypotheses through controlled experimentation.

From the perspective of Yin- Yang Thinking, however, these differences not only present a challenge, but also an opportunity for both to develop and enrich themselves. Science and religion can approach each other with a respect for their identity-in-difference and their difference-in-identity, without thinking the other must cease to exist. This is a both/and construct that Yin-Yang Thinking promotes. That is, both have an irreplaceable role to play in human life. As Philip Clayton rightly points out, "Science has not removed the place for religious faith; rather, it has underscored just how essential that place is" (Clayton 2004, 43).

That indicates that Yin-Yang Thinking not only deconstructs the binary either/or thinking and advocates a non-binary both/and thinking, but also promotes a view of mutual complementarity. From Yin-Yang Thinking, science and religion should be seen as complementary, "not as competitors" (Watts 1998, 169). In Lik Kuen Tong's understanding, Yin-Yang Thinking tells us that "real opposites are never mutually exclusive, but are, though opposed in one sense, intrinsically interdependent and complementary—indeed internally related as roots of each other" (Tong 1979, 307). This mutual complementarity between science and religion allows for co-existence and co-growth of both.

Just as genetic diversity is crucial for the survival of a community of organisms, a diversity of human experiences or knowledge is crucial for the flowering of human society. Since both science and religion are limited, and neither gives a complete picture of reality, as Pauline Rudd points out, "science is just one window through which we view the world, and alone it is not enough. If we are to make the complex choices that confront us with good judgment, then we need to complement our scientific base with views from other windows—from art, music, literature, and the great religions of the world" (Rudd 2006, 391).

In order to seek "a deeper understanding of reality"(Bonting 2008, 228), both science and religion are needed. Therefore, the complementarity of science and religion is necessary. "Science asks about causal relationships between events, while religion asks about the meaning and purpose of our lives" (Bourbar 2000, xii). "The two kinds of inquiry offer complementary perspectives on the world" (Bourbar 2000, xii).

From the perspective of Yin-Yang Thinking, both science and religion in their modern forms still adhere to dualistic either/or thinking. Harmony is still beyond their horizon. The non-dualistic Chinese perspective can help overcome such a binary way of thinking. Like Yin and Yang, science and religion embrace each other, contain each other. Together they constitute the beauty and harmony of human knowledge.

More important, Yin-Yang Thinking emphasizes mutual nourishment, that is, Yin and Yang nurture each other and help complete each other. According to Yin-Yang thinking, "Neither Yin alone can be productive, nor Yang alone can be productive" (Cheng 1982, 73). For Zhang Jingyue (1563-1640), "The man who is good at nourishing Yang must seek Yang in Yin. With help from Yin, his vitality becomes unlimited. Likewise, the one who is good at nourishing Yin must turn to Yang, learning to find Yang in Yin. With help from Yang, his or her Yin becomes an endless resource for life" (Zhang 1959, 974). Inspired by such Yin-Yang Thinking, the scientific and religious communities need each other and are conditioned by each other. They complement each other, enrich each other, nurture each other. They complete each other by "adding something not found in the other" (McDaniel 2005, 125). Yin-Yang complementarity is like that of a rainbow with many colors, each of which adds beauty to the whole.

More and more studies have shown that science and religion can support each other rather than fighting each other. "Religion is in a very deep way supportive of the entire scientific enterprise" (Haught 1995, 21). "Religion, when carefully purged of idolatrous implications, fully endorses and even undergirds the scientific effort to make sense of the universe" (Haught 1995, 21). According to Philip Clayton, "Through the modern scientific period, religion authorities have written theologies that support the pursuit of science and the scientific method. The pity is that the contributions made by religious authorities have often gone unnoticed by scientists and the broader public" (Clayton 2012, 163). Likewise, science itself can provide a profound base for meditation, using a series of short vignettes that address questions relevant to our everyday lives (Rudd 2006, 388). Take ecology as example: scholarly investigation shows, "since the second World War, ecology increasingly influenced religion. In turn, some religions have directly invoked ecological models and concepts" (Susan 2006, 219), such as borrowing ecological language to define humanity as "one part of an elaborate and evolving community of beings, a web of life, an ecosystem"(Harvey 1997, 126).

3. Yin Yang Thinking can help establish a partnership between science and religion to create an Ecological Civilization

Taede Smedes once asked: "Why do we need an interaction between science and religion? What is the use? And for whom?" (Smedes 2008, 255). It is beyond question that there is no single answer to these questions, as Smedes already was aware. But in our opinion, ecological civilization should be one of the answers, given the severe ecological crises of pollution, global warming, and a deteriorating environment facing us today.

Take global warming as an example. In 2010, climate scientist Lonnie Thompson, winner of the National Medal of Science, wrote: "Why then are climatologists speaking out about the dangers of global warming? The answer is that virtually all of us are now convinced that global warming poses a clear and present danger to civilization" (Thompson 2010, 153). For David Griffin, although the possibility of nuclear holocaust is extremely serious, "the ecological crisis is even more serious." A nuclear winter would result only if people *do* something – if they start a nuclear war. "But the ecological crisis could bring civilization to an end without anyone needing to do *anything*: We could do civilization in by simply continuing 'business as usual'" (Griffin 2012).

Since globalization has increasingly made the world a global village, it has linked all human beings into "overlapping communities of fate" (Held 2004, 168). It has become an urgent call for both science and religion to work together to deal with the planet-wide ecological crisis by creating an ecological civilization. Science and religion can make common cause in meeting the most formidable challenge facing humanity: creating an ecological civilization. In this respect, science and religion are partners rather than opponents in terms of Yin-Yang Thinking.

As partners, as Philip Clayton argued, both science and religion have something special to offer in dealing with the ecological crisis, which "may be their most important joint effort of all" (Clayton 2012, 165). Religions cannot predict the melting rate of polar ice caps or calculate how many meters the sea level will rise as a consequence. But science can work out the precise consequences for the planet of different levels of greenhouse gases being released into the atmosphere. Scientists are good at carefully gathering and analyzing data from the past; they can then determine how much the glaciers and polar ice cap will melt as the temperatures rise. This allows them to predict the rise in sea levels around the world, and to calculate the specific effects at specific places in the world. No other area of human knowledge or belief can come close to the accuracy of science. This knowledge is a great gift to humankind.

Religious people cannot match these accurate predictions about the future of our planet, but they also have something to contribute. Science cannot motivate ordinary citizens to change their lifestyles; religion can. "For centuries, religions have played crucial roles in influencing their followers' beliefs about right and wrong and in motivating them to live differently in the world" (Clayton 2012, 165). The call from religion to compassion "could have positive effects in the various applications of science and technology" (Clayton 2012, 162).

In addition, religion is regarded as "a reservoir of ecological knowledge" (Bratton 2006, 208). As an example, it is Chinese Taoism that first clearly expressed "ecological thinking," offering "the most profound and eloquent philosophy of nature ever elaborated and the first stirrings of ecological sensitivity" (Marshall 1992, 9). Taoism has deep convergence with ecology. "Ecology" is "the science of the relationship that obtains between living things and their natural environments. At the heart of ecology, then, is an understanding of what it means to be defined relationally" (Ames 2001, 265). According to Roger Ames, the notion of relatedness is a core theme in Taoism, which reflects Taoist "ecological commitment" (Ames 2001, 280). In Baird Callicott's opinion, "the potential contribution" of Chinese Taoism to deep ecology, eco-feminism, and, more generally, to a global consciousness and conscience is "great" (Callicott 1997,85). To Mary Tucker, the organic, vital worldview of Taoism can provide balance by cultivating a new ecological perspective, thus "challenging us to radically re-examine our relations" with the environment (Tucker and Grim 1993, 152). In turn, ecology can provide scientific support for Taoist ecological consciousness, which can help people to create new ecological civilization.

When the differences between science and religion are understood in this sense, one can see that a beautiful partnership arises. If you want to know the facts and predictions, you go to science. But if you want to find strong motivation for *listening to those facts and acting appropriately*, you go to the various religions. In order to create an ecological civilization, we need both science and religion. In Pauline Rudd's words, "we need all of the information that comes from our penetrating scientific method, as well as all of the sensitivity that comes from the receptive, responding spiritual depth that lies within us" (Rudd 2006, 398). The partnership of science and religion in creating ecological civilization brings hope to humankind. As Philip Clayton points out, "If ways can be found for science and religion to work together in a complementary way and in a productive fashion, perhaps humankind will have a better chance of overcoming the momentous challenges of the twenty-first century than otherwise" (Clayton 2006, 4).

Why Ying-Yang Thinking did not work in modern China?

The arguments above show that Yin-Yang Thinking has very rich implications. A question may arise: if Yin-Yang Thinking is so helpful, why did it not play an important role in modern China, including helping China resolve the conflict of science and religion?

Many reasons can explain this dilemma. From our point of view, scientism or the hegemony of science, the philosophy of struggle, and the nihilistic attitude toward tradition are three main reasons. We will discuss them in order.

1. Scientism

Deeply influenced by Western modernity, including Marxism, scientism has been dominant in modern China. Scientism in the Chinese context refers to a movement which worships science and regards science as the only correct and valid way to know the universe, and that "science can solve all problems facing humankind" (Lin 2006). According to Li Yusheng, during the May 4th, 1919 Chinese first Enlightenment, the Chinese believers of scientism deeply believed that truth was on their side and that the progress of China totally relied on them. Most scientism believers held an arrogant attitude of mental and moral superiority toward their debate opponents (Lin 2006).

Accordingly, all other ways of knowing the universe—such as religious, artistic, intuitional, and emotional—were construed as "unscientific" and, accordingly, to be suppressed or demolished. The leading persons in both the communist and nationalist parties firmly had faith in "the omnipotence of science." For them, only science could save China. "Save the nation by science" was a most popular slogan. Correspondingly, due to the worship of science, "most people treated religion as non-scientific" (Tang 2002, 336). Religion and various Chinese traditions had become their attack targets. For Zhixin Zhu, a leading theoretician of the nationalist party, religion was "spiritual opium." To Cai Yuanpei, a noted revolutionary pioneer, science and religion are not compatible. Religion comes from ignorance and it will decline after science flourishes. Hu Shi, a well known anti-communist, was more radical on the religion issue than the communists he was so strongly against. He publicly claimed that he was an "atheist." He said: "we might not easily believe the omnipotence of God, but we believe the omnipotence of scientific method" (Hu 1998, 9). Therefore, it is understandable that Yin-Yang Thinking has been suppressed due to its "unscientific" nature.

2. Struggle Philosophy

In undertaking the political task of overturning the old regime, a philosophy of struggle was the main ideology of the Chinese communist party. Unfortunately this philosophy was carried on by the Party even after liberation in 1949,and came to a climax during the Great Cultural Revolution (1966-1976).

For Yin-Yang Thinking, there is always a middle way. But for the revolutionary thinking of the philosophy of struggle, the binary black/white model is dominant. In Mao Tse-tung, there are two winds in the world, the East Wind and the West Wind. "Either the East Wind prevails over the West Wind, or the West Wind prevails over the East Wind; on the question of the two lines there is no room for compromise" (Mao 1997, 452). Socialism treats capitalism as its rival; they are in a black/white relationship. The purity of socialism was protected with life. The following slogan embodies the philosophy of struggle embedded in binary thinking: "We would rather want socialism grass, instead of capitalism seedlings." It is clear that within this framework, there is naturally no room for Yin-Yang Thinking, which emphasizes harmonizing the opposites. Applying this philosophy of struggle to the relationship between science and religion, the two have been treated as deadly enemies. For example, in an article titled "Criticizing the Theory of Combining Religion and Science," the authors argued that science as a knowledge system based on facts is an actual, correct reflection of objective reality. Religion, to the contrary, is a distorted reflection and explanation of objective reality. Therefore, "science is the enemy of religion. Every scientific discovery is an attack on religious superstition. Science is thoroughly against religion." Accordingly, "Marxists and Leninists must fight against religious prejudice and superstitions no matter in what disguise they appear. Any words and deeds about reconciling religion and science must be resisted and criticized" (Xiong and Zhou 1964, 66).

3. The Nihilistic Attitude toward Tradition

Another important factor that has retarded Yin-Yang Thinking is the nihilistic attitude toward tradition, which has deeply influenced China since the Chinese Enlightenment in 1919. Enlightenment thinkers believed that humans must sever their relations with tradition in order to fulfill the Enlightenment. Like in Europe where the past was treated as the Dark Ages by Enlightenment thinkers, in China tradition was treated as trash which should be totally and completely abandoned. “Down with Confucianism” was the most famous slogan of that time. The radicals even proposed to “wipe out Chinese language” because “Chinese language,” in the words of Qu Qiubai, a early leader of the Chinese Communist party, “is the dirtiest, worst, and most bastard medieval latrine” (Qu 1988, 690). For Lu Xun, a leading figure of the Chinese first Enlightenment movement, "if the Chinese language is not wiped out, China will become extinct” (Lu 1981, 160).

In this process, the Chinese abandoned the excellent spiritual resources in their tradition, such as oneness of heaven and humanity, respect for heaven, awe of the Tao, harmony with difference, the golden mean, and Yin-Yang Thinking. Lacking any faith or sense of the divine, people easily worship the secular. That explains why scientism and worship of money are so popular today in China as well as in the West. In this respect, we agree with Drees’s point of view that “The loss of interest in religion” is “an impoverishment of our lives”(Drees 1996, xiii). Since Yin-Yang Thinking can be seen as a part of that tradition, it has, consequently, been suppressed in Modern China.

It is worth mentioning that some European Enlightenment thinkers should take some responsibility for the Chinese suppression of Yin-Yang Thinking. For example, in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s eyes, the Yin-Yang concept is “superficial” (Hegel 1974, 122), while it was regarded as the “foundation” of Chinese philosophy. He claimed that he could not find “one single instance of a sensuous conception of universal natural or spiritual powers” in Yin-Yang philosophy (Hegel 1974, 122).

Fortunately, the second Enlightenment is emerging in China, under which traditional Chinese culture is beginning to be revalued; a resurgence of traditional culture has appeared. Since middle of 1990’s, as China more and more opened its doors to the world, more than 2000 private traditional culture schools have emerged in China. More than 300 Confucian schools were established across the world. Many top Chinese universities like Peking University and Renmin University have established schools of traditional Chinese culture. Even the Central Party School, a school training high government officials, offers course on traditional Chinese culture. The Culture Department of China organized ministers to study *Yi Jing* (*The Book of Changes*) and *Analectic.* At its Sixth Plenary Session of the 17th CPC Central Committee held in October 2011, the Chinese Communist Party proposed to boost Chinese culture and build the common spiritual homeland for the Chinese nation. The party identifies itself as “the royal heirs and promoters of the excellent Chinese cultural tradition” (The Sixth Plenary Session of the 17th CPC Central Committee Bulletin 2011).

With the resurgence of traditional Chinese culture and as China has become more and more open, the dominant binary model of science and religion has begun to be challenged. In his well-known article titled “Marxist View of Religion Must Keep Up with the Times,” Pan Yue, a senior party official emphasized that “we should no longer view religion only from the atheist point of view. Religion is a social cultural phenomenon, a value orientation, a way to know the world and human life. We should no longer treat religion as a tool of class struggle. We should no longer treat religion and science as in simple opposition to each other. Religion belongs to value and faith, science belongs to instrumental reason. They not only conflict with each other, but also enhance each other. Both scientific truth and religious faith are products of human practice. Human social lives need both of them” (Pan 2001, 46).

A statistic from “China Knowledge Resource General Data” shows that the total number of articles on science and religion has doubled every 10 years since the1980s (Chen 2013, 92). Among 706 articles on science and religion published from 1980-2009, 59 articles were published between1980-1989, 189 articles published between 1990-1999, 458 articles between 2000-2009. (Gou 2012, 44)

More and more people have started to use Yin-Yang Thinking consciously or unconsciously to rethink the relationship between science and religion. Science and religion are regarded as two different forms of social consciousness which have their actual foundations in long-term existence. To acknowledge the differences is the premise of a dialogue between them. But that does not mean that they are in an inevitable conflict. Nor is this merely an epistemological issue and nothing to do with whose moral level is higher, atheists or theists. Both can maintain their own ideas and, at the same time, respect each other and reach a harmony in difference. Each can make its own contribution in building “a harmonious society for the common good” (Sun 2007, 30).

Although progress has been made in rethinking science and religion, many Chinese still believe that it is impossible for science and religion to be reconciled (Fang 2007), due to the long-term influence of the first Enlightenment's philosophy of struggle, scientism, and the nihilistic attitude of the two traditions. The movement of "abolishing Chinese medicine" launched by some scientism believers in 2006 in China indicates how influential the first Enlightenment is. We know that the philosophical foundation of Chinese medicine is Yin-Yang Thinking. It will still be a long time before Yin-Yang Thinking can be revalued.

However, inspired by the science and religion dialogue movement, especially process philosophy or constructive postmodernism in the West, scientism and the nihilistic attitude toward tradition are beginning to fade. As a matter of fact, recently more and more Chinese scholars have shown strong interest in Whiteheadian process philosophy and constructive postmodernism, and managed to rethink the relationship between science and religion from a process or constructive postmodern perspective. Articles such as Zhu Xuejun, "The Possibility of Integrating Science and Religion under the Framework of Process Philosophy," *Journal of Inner Mongolia Agriculture University* 1 (2011); Zhang Xiuhua, "Science and Faith from the Constructive Postmodern Perspective," *Philosophical Researches* 5 (2011); Cui Weiqi, "Science and Religion in Postmodern Context," *Academic Research* 2 (2006); Sun Xiong, "The Relationship between Science and Religion from Constructive Postmodern Perspective," *Journal of Zhejiang Provincial Party School* 6 (2003), are examples. In such a context, Chinese traditional wisdom is also being revalued and respect for otherness as the core value of the second enlightenment is becoming accepted. Eventually, Yin-Yang Thinking will be recognized: a new understanding of science and religion in terms of Yin-Yang thinking will accordingly emerge.

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SEMANTIC SUPPOSITIONS IN FREGE'S DEFINITION OF NATURAL NUMBER

Constantin Stoenescu
University of Bucharest
Romania
e-mail: noua_alianta@yahoo.com

Abstract:
Was Frege firstly a philosopher of language or a philosopher of mathematics? I try to give an answer to this question in this paper. I argue that Frege's definition of natural number is the right way to reach the answer. Frege had simultaneously two theoretical commitments: one regarding the logicist programme in the foundations of mathematics, the other regarding the conception of logic as a language. Therefore, Frege developed a formal language and tried to define arithmetical concepts in pure logical terms. He did this based on semantical suppositions, because he could not do it any other way as long as he regarded logic as a language. I will argue that Frege used semantic tools in order to solve problems related to philosophy of mathematics.

Key words: Frege, logic as a language, context principle, definition by abstraction, sense and reference, structural semantics.

A short exit from an unending debate

Was Gottlob Frege first and foremost a philosopher of language or a philosopher of mathematics? This question splits the philosophical community into two sides, each of them with strong arguments and favorite pieces from Frege's work. Michael Dummett is the champion of the thesis that Frege was the founding father of analytic philosophy and that his work in philosophy of mathematics was programmatically and explicitly connected with his pioneering work in philosophy of language. In Dummett's view, analytical philosophy was born when the so-called linguistic turn was taken, and the linguistic turn was undoubtedly taken by Frege.[1] On the contrary, Hans Sluga claims that the hierarchy of Frege's philosophical topics begins in a historical and systematic order with mathematics and with logicism as a foundationalist programme in philosophy of mathematics, continuing with epistemology, leading then into the development of the syntax of a formal language, and finishing with the problem of meaning and the philosophy of language. Therefore, Frege can "be called a theorist of meaning and philosopher of language only in a derivative sense."[2]

I think that beyond this controversy, the fact that Frege had developed his project based on a network of semantic assumptions is obvious. The two approaches sketched above both used this fact as a proof for their own thesis, changing only the theoretical emphasis so as to agree with the interpretative theoretical framework. Therefore, I think that the two approaches are complementary, and that the theoretical preference for one of the two is a problem of choice based on a previous theoretical commitment. If our aim is to discover the beginnings of the analytic tradition starting from the contemporary standpoint of analytic philosophy, then Frege's work will be judged as one of the first instances of this way of philosophizing, and if our aim is to establish historically the main intention of Frege's project, then we'll see him inevitably as a philosopher of mathematics.

Combining the two approaches, we might say that Frege's main goal was to return mathematics to the Euclidian standards of rigor, and that in order to do this he needed to use some analytical tools. Therefore, Frege proposed a new epistemological

[1] See Dummett, 1973, 1991, 1994.

[2] Sluga, 1997, p. 22.

attitude in order to solve the problems regarding the foundations of arithmetic as a whole on a logical basis, through definitions of concepts. Moreover, as a part of this attitude, Frege stripped logic from its psychological Cartesian constraints and habits, and worked with it as a language. At the same time, he didn't reduce the language to a formal calculus and represent an abstract logic in formulas, but aimed "to express a content through written signs in a more precise and clear way than it is possible to do through words."[3] In Leibniz's terms, Frege opposes a *lingua characterica* to a *calculus ratiocinator*. And this new language, although lacking the versatility of natural language, is much better if we take into account the logical criteria of clarity and sharpness.[4] As a consequence of this understanding of logic as a language, the appeal to semantics becomes a theoretical necessity. Frege followed this line of thinking to the end of his life. An enlightening testimony is given by Rudolf Carnap, who was his student from 1910 to 1914. Carnap mentioned that two topics were priorities in Frege's lectures—logical symbolism and the foundations of mathematics—and that all the references to semantics were made in these contexts.[5]

Towards a structural semantics

Unlike his predecessors, who were concerned with the semantic issues of language, Frege passed from a descriptive approach to a structural one. If prior to Frege the aim of philosophers was to identify and describe the semantic proprieties of natural language, Frege tried to abstract the core semantic structure of language and to derive from it a semantic theory, a theory of meaning based on a three-place relation in which an expression refers to an entity through a sense. This notion of sense was the difference between his semantics and earlier semantics. In Frege's terms, remembering the subtitle of his *Begriffschrift*, we might say that his aim was to sketch out a semantic theory adequate for "a formula language, modeled upon that of arithmetic, for pure reason."

Already in *Begriffschrift*, Frege began with some reflections regarding the nature of judgment. He draws a distinction between the content of a judgment and the judgment itself. The content of a judgement is a combination of ideas and and the judgment is the assertion of this content. The content may or may not be asserted by a judgment which has an affirmative or a negative form. Frege made some comments which are important for the development of his logic and, above all, his semantics. Some of them led to a semantics of propositional logic, but others have a general semantic significance.[6]

First of all, in the first chapter, when he gave the definitions for the symbols used, he claimed that the content of two judgments may differ in two ways. Either the consequences derivable from the first judgment, when it is combined with other judgments, also follow always from the second judgment when it is combined with the same judgments (and conversely), or this is not the case. The propositions "The Greeks defeated the Persians at the Plataea" and "The Persians were defeated by the Greeks at Plataea" differ in the first way. The two propositions, although they slightly differ in their meanings,

[3] *Apud* Van Heijenoort, (ed.), 1967, p. 2. Jean van Heijenoort noted that Frege's attitude to logic and language—namely, to approach logic as a language—was neglected, although it is a key aspect of his thought. Van Heijenoort wrote: "What Frege did was construct logic as a language that need not be supplemented by any intuitive reasoning" (Van Heijenoort, 1967, p. 4).

[4] In his "Preface" to *Begriffschrift*, Frege compare the relation of his iconography to ordinary language with that which the microscope has to the eye: "Because of the range of its possible uses and the versatility with which it can adapt to the most diverse circumstances, the eye is far superior to the microscope. Considered as an optical instrument, to be sure, it exhibits many imperfections, which ordinarily remain unnoticed only on account of its intimate connection with our mental life. But, as soon as scientific goals demand great sharpness of resolution, the eye proves to be insufficient. The microscope, on the other hand, is perfectly suited to precisely such goals, but that is just why it is useless for all others" (Frege, 1967, p. 6).

[5] Carnap, 1963, p. 4.

[6] Starting partly from van Heijenoort's interpretation of logic as a language, Hintikka suggests that Frege's crucial work in semantics lies in his ideas about the semantics of the elementary logic, i.e. truth-functions and quantification, rather than in his distinction between sense and reference, which has traditionally been emphasized. See Haaparanta, Hintikka, 1986, pp. 3-4.

have the same conceptual content or the same logical weight.[7]

Second, based on the distinction between conceptual content and judgment *per se* and the possibility of detaching the conceptual content, Frege makes a distinction between ordinary language and the language of logic which has important consequences for the scope of logic. The peculiarities of ordinary language—for example, the grammatical differences which result from the interaction of speaker and listener—have nothing to do with the conceptual content and with the logical form of a judgment. Therefore, they won't be preserved in the formula language proposed by Frege. Moreover, the modalities from ordinary language have no genuine logical role, because they affect only the force of an assertion and not the conceptual content: "By saying that a proposition is necessary I give a hint about the grounds for my judgment. *But, since this does not affect the conceptual content of the judgment, the form of the apodictic judgment has no significance for us.*"[8] This was for Frege a reason to let the modalities out of logic.

Third, Frege discusses the possibility of introducing into his new formula language a sign for the identity of content. It is important to mention that he notes that in this case, unlike other logical operators, it applies to names and not to contents. On this occasion Frege also discusses names and contents in relational terms. More precisely, he discusses the logical form of the relation between name and content on the one hand, and the logical form of the relation between contents on the other hand. Frege concludes thar we have to distinguish between a sign *as a name* and the content *which is named* and remarks on the possibility of two names being in relation with the same content. He gave an example which would become the paradigm for the discussion about identity, the case of a point which can be determined differently. Moreover, Frege speakes about different ways to determine the content, and separates these ways from the content itself: "the same content can be completely determined in different ways; but that in a particular case *two ways of determining it* really yield the *same result* is the content of a *judgment*."[9]

Fourth, generally speaking, Frege's thought about the semantic relations in a language has its source primarily in mathematics. The idea of a semantic structure thus springs from the mathematical idea of function, and these mathematical relations were the type of relations used as a model for the logical form of semantic relations as they are conceived by Frege. Let us suppose that the language can be analyzed in functional terms so that its expressions can be divided into two main parts, a function and its argument. Therefore, a linguistic expression—and not its conceptual content—can be broken down "into a stable component, representing the totality of relations, and the sign, regarded as replaceable by others, that denotes the object standing in these relations."[10] For example, the following linguistic expression, "The circumstance that carbon dioxide is heavier than hydrogen" and "The circumstance that carbon dioxide is heavier than oxygen" are the same function with different arguments if we regard "oxigen" and "hydrogen" as arguments; on the other hand, they are different functions of the same argument if we regard "carbon dioxide" as the argument. But if we adopt the conception that a function may have two or more arguments, then the two expressions used above can be regarded as functions of two arguments. The linguistic predicates will be regarded in the same manner.

In *The Basic Law of Arithmetic,* Frege continued to work on his logicist thesis and improve his

[7] See Frege, 1967, p. 12.

[8] Frege, 1967, p. 13.

[9] Frege, 1967, p. 21. This discussion about the identity of content is undoubtedly the source of later semantic distinctions between sense and reference. Frege's theory of judgment outlined in *Begriffschrift* leads to a theory of meaning and to structural semantics. Another enlightening fragment is this one, continuing from the previous quotation: "The judgment, however, requires for its expression a sign for identity of content, a sign that connects these two names. From this it follows that the existence of different names for the same content is not always merely an irrelevant matter of form; rather, that there are such names is the very heart of the matter if each is associated with a different way of determining the content. In that case the judgment that has the identity of content as its object is synthetic, in Kantian terms." This last sentence, although it seems to be only a historical reference to Kant, has to be kept in mind because, as I will show, it will later be revised by Frege himself.

[10] Frege, 1967, p. 22.

logical language. He introduced the notion of value-range (or courses-of-value) as a ground for the notion of the extension of a concept. The value-range is defined functionally as an ordered pair whose elements are the argument for *f* and the value of *f* for this argument. Frege already had already applied this idea in *The Foundations of Arithmetic* when he gave the definition of natural number.

Definition and context

In *The Foundations of Arithmetic* Frege tried, and in his view succeeded, in giving a definition of natural number in order to answer questions such as "What is the number one?" and "What does the symbol 1 mean?" and "What is the sense of expression '*a* means a number'?"

Frege clearly states in *The Foundations of Arithmetic* that he has kept to three fundamental principles in his enquiry:

"– always to separate sharply the psychological from the logical, the subjective from the objective;

– never to ask for the meaning of a word on isolation, but only in the context of a proposition;

– never to lose sight of the distinction between concept and object."[11]

These three principles, as they are conceived by Frege, work together as a protective network against psychologism and formalism, and they are designed to assure the success of the logicist project.

According to the first principle, Frege has always used the word *Vorstellung,* which can be translated as "idea" in a psychological sense; he has distinguished ideas from concepts and from objects. The second principle, later named the "context principle" and interpreted as a semantic principle or as a preference for contextuality against compositionaly, is aimed at preventing us from taking mental pictures or acts of individual minds as the meanings of words. Finally, the third principle is clearly directed against formalism, because in keeping the distinction between concept and object we have the guarantee that we cannot arrange concepts as objects.

The first principle states that numbers are different from both signs and ideas. On the one hand, Frege made the distinction between the sign for a number and the number itself. He highlights that the objects of arithmetic, *id est*, the numbers, cannot be perceived by the senses. The sign for a number is visible, but they have totally different properties from the numbers, so that a discourse about signs does not tell anything about numbers themselves as abstract entities which are thought and not perceived. On the other hand, against empiricsm, Frege has distinguished numbers from ideas and has suggested a new meaning of subjectivity. An empiricist disciple of John Stuart Mill will say that every person has his or her own number one because he or she associates the number with a real thing and its property to be a single object—for example, with the moon. But this is totally contrary to the sense of the word "one," because the number one is the same for everyone. Therefore, the concept of number is subjectively the same for all the subjects and this means that it differs from the ideas which people associate with a real single thing: "Whatever ideas there may be of the number one, in individual souls, they are still to be as carefully distinguished from the moon itself."[12] The same principle will be applied by Frege to the law of logic: "I understand by laws of logic not psychological laws of takings-to-be-true, but laws of truth. … If being true is thus independent of being acknowledged by somebody or other, then the laws of truth are not psychological laws: they are boundary stones set in an eternal foundation, which our thought can overflow, but never displace."[13]

Regarding the second principle, I think that we can distinguish between two interpretations of it: a weaker one related to Frege's logicist project which supposes an antipsychological attitude, and a stronger one based on Frege's own assertion that the meaning of a number is fixed only in a sentence. This second approach was detailed and amplified by Dummet, who saw here a turning point in philosophy: "The context principle is stated as an explicitly linguistic one, a principle concerning the meaning of words and their occurrence in sentences; and so an epistemological problem, with ontological overtones, is by no means converted into one about the meaning of statements." [14]

Later, in his *The Basic Laws of Arithmetic*, Frege wrote about his *The Foundations of Arithme-*

[11] Frege, 1960, p. xxii.

[12] Frege, 1964, p. 16.

[13] Frege, 1964, p. 13.

[14] Dummett, 1991, p. 111.

tic: "The most fundamental of my results I expressed there, in §46, by saying that a statement of number expresses an assertion about a concept."[15] In *The Foundations of Arithmetic*, Frege has defined numbers according to the context principle, in the context of judgements. He has given some examples[16] to clarify what we need to understand by his idea that the content of a statement of number is an assertion about a concept. For example, the concept "moon of Venus" is assigned the number zero because no moon of Venus exists. If I utter the senstence "the king's carriage is drawn by four horses," I assign the number four to the concept "horse that draws the king's carriage." The concept "inhabitant of Germany" contains a time-reference as a variable element, but although the object can change its properties, it is easy to fix the number belonging to the concept using the temporal references "inhabitants of Germany at New Year 1883, Berlin time."

In accordance with all three principles, the definition of a number will be a sentence about the relation between a concept and the objects which fall under it. For example, "the number 0 belongs to a concept, if the proposition that *a* does not fall under that concept is true universally, whatever *a* may be."[17] Similarly, "the number 1 belongs to a concept *F*, if the proposition that *a* does not fall under *F* is not true universally, whatever *a* may be, and if from the propositions

'*a* falls under *F*' and '*b* falls under *F*'

It follows universally that *a* and *b* are the same."[18]

The general definition of the step from any given number to the next will have the form: "the number (n+1) belongs to a concept *F*, if there is an object *a* falling under *F* and such that the number *n* belongs to the concept 'falling under *F*, but not *a*.'" [19]

Regarding this definition of number, two comments are necessary. First, that Frege used a new method to define the numbers, and second, that he judged the role of a definition on the basis of some semantic criteria. Frege used in his works the term "abstraction" and occasionally the phrase "definition by abstraction," but more important is the fact that he has used the method of abstraction in order to define numbers.[20] Frege defines the number as the extension of a concept, and this means that different concepts with the same extension will be numerically identical. Therefore, Frege abstracts the numerical identity as a common property of different concepts with the same extension. One of his examples was that of a waiter setting the table. Around the table therea are some chairs. First the waiter puts a plate before the seat, then a fork, a spoon, and a knife. All these concepts will be numerically identical, and a number will be abstracted The problem is to aggegate a logical judgement which can be seen as an identity. In the case of the definition of a number, we need a tool to conceive numbers as such and to recognize the same number. Therefore, we have to state a judgement of identity as "the number which belongs to the concept *F* is the same as the number which belongs to the concept *G*." Of course, the two members of this identity have to be numbers. The concept of identity assures the relation between the identicals, so that different concepts are numerically identical, and the number itself is abstracted and defined in this way. As Frege wrote, "to obtain the concept of Number, we must fix the sense of a numerical identity."[21] The same strategy was used by Peano, then by Cantor, Dedekind, and Russell when they defined the cardinal number, and later by Carnap in his *Meaning and Necessity*.

Frege has explained this strategy in the paragraph 62 of *The Foundations of Arithmetic*.[22] Since words have meanings only in the context of a proposition, the concept of number will be clarified through the sense of the proposition in which a number word occurs:

"If we are to use the symbol *a* to signify an object, we must have a criterion for deciding in all cases whether *b* is the same as *a,* even if is not always in our power to apply this criterion. In our present case, we have to define the sense of the proposition

[15] Frege, 1964, p. 5.
[16] Frege, 1960, pp. 59-60.
[17] Frege, 1960, p. 67.
[18] Frege, 1960, p. 67.
[19] Frege, 1960, p. 67.
[20] See Angelelli, 1984.
[21] Frege, 1960, p. 73.
[22] Dumment has appraised this paragraph as the linguistic turn and the beginning of analytic philosophy. See Dummett, 1973, pp. 667-669, 1991, p. 112, 1994, p. 5.

'the number which belongs to the concept *F* is the same as that which belongs to the concept *G*'

that is to say, we must reproduce the content of the proposition in other terms, avoiding the use of the expression

'the Number which belongs to the concept *F*.'

In doing this, we shall be giving a general criterion for the identity of numbers. When we have thus acquired a means of arriving at a determinate number and of recogniying it again as the same number, we can assign it a number word as its proper name."[23]

Therefore, a problem regarding numbers was converted into a discussion about the sense of a proposition about the numerical identity. This was the result of the strategy sketched at the beginning of *The Foundations of Arithmetic* by the short statement of the three principles mentioned above. Frege continued to use the same strategy in his later works, including *The Basic Laws of Arithmetic.* He introduced a supplementary notion, that of range of values or courses of values, and made a step forward in his logicist project: "In fact, I define Number itself as the extension of a concept, and extensions of concepts are by my definition courses of values."[24] He also preserved his ideas about the ontological statute of mathemathical entities, stating that numbers cannot be created by definition, just as the geographer does not create a sea when he draws boundary lines.[25] Numbers are self-subsistent objects acknowledged by somebody with the help of the definition described above.

Sense and reference

In *The Basic Laws of Arithmetic*, Frege has introduced a new axiom to those stated in the *Begriffschrift*, using the notion of value range or courses of value. This axiom, the fifth, says that the value range of *f* is identical with value range of *g*, if and only if the two functions, *f* and *g*, have the same values for the same arguments. This axiom was represented in formal language as follows:

$$\grave{e}f(e) = \grave{a}g(a) = (x)(f(x)) = g(x)$$

[23] Frege, 1960, p. 73.
[24] Frege, 1964, p. 5.
[25] Frege, 1964, p. 11.

But the problem is that this Basic Law V as an identity statement must be considered, according to Frege's account of identity in *Begriffeschrift,* as a synthetic truth. Therefore, he had to change something in his initial semantic theory in order to fulfill two requirements: [26]

(1) to focus on sentences as a whole, since the two main formulas of the Basic Law V were sentence schemas;

(2) to redraw the distinction between logically true and empirically true or between analytically true and synthetically true identity sentences of the form $p=q$ so that the Basic Law V could be turned into a logical truth.

The problem was solved by a improved semantic theory based on the distinction between sense and reference.[27] An identity sentence will be logically true if p and q have the same sense and empirically true if they have the same reference. Therefore, because the two main formulas of Basic Law V have the same sense or are intuitively considered synonymous, Basic Law V was considered "a law of pure logic."[28]

Another approach is based on some comments from the article *Function and Concept*,[29] written in the year 1891, in which Frege discusses about the relation between the notion of sense and Basic Law V. He stated that the expressions flanking the main identity sign of Basic Law V have the same sense. This view of Basic Law V explains why Frege has introduced the notion of sense. One answer is that Frege had to solve two problems.[30] First, he saw that the explanation of the identity in *Begriffeschrift* is incompatible with the assumption that Basic Law V is a primitive logical law. Second, Frege had to draw a distinction between logically primitive identity statements and derivable ones. The notion of sense was necessary to solve these problems. Frege reinterpreted the identity relation and, as a consequence,

[26] Sluga, 1997, pp. 28-29.
[27] The translation of Frege's term "Bedeutung" is controversial. Frege already used the terms *Bedeutung* and *Sense* in his *The Foundations of Arithmetic,* but according to Austin, who translated this book, he didn't yet attach a special significance to these words. See Frege, 1960, p. xiii.
[28] Frege, 1964, p. 4.
[29] See Frege, 1984.
[30] See Alnes, 1999.

Basic Law V was considered self-evidently true, a non-reducible logical truth.

However, regardless of the two alternative approaches proposed by Sluga and Anes, it remains a fact that in *Sense and Reference,* Frege had drawn the distinction between sense and reference starting from identity statements. His examples about the identity of two sentences about two pairs of lines intersected in the same point, or of two sentences from natural language which refer to the planet Venus as "the morning star" and as "the evening star" are well known. The referents of the expressions "the point of intersection *a* and *b*" and "the point of intersection of *b* and *c*" would be the same, but not their senses. Similarly, the referents of the expression "the morning star" and "evening star" would be the same, but not the sense. [31]

Sluga[32] argued that the problem regarding the status of arithmetical truth was for Frege the main reason to use the notion of sense. Starting from arithmetical identity statements, Frege tried to explain the difference between trivially true identity statements and informatively true identity statements in the framework of a theory of meaning. Frege's presupposition is that a satisfactory theory of meaning must be able to perform this task.

In fact, the distinction mentioned above is equivalent to the difference between *semantically* trivial identity statements and *semantically* informative identity statements, for example, "Aristotle is Aristotle" and "Aristotle was the teacher of Alexander the Great." In this case, the notion of semantic content, specifiable in referential and syntactic terms alone, will be all we need in order to describe the difference between two different expressions which have the same reference. But this means that a dyadic relation, as in Russell's theory of meaning, will be enough for a task which in Frege's view could be performed only by a semantic theory based on a three-place relation.

Frege added the notion of sense in order to describe linguistic expressions which have the same reference, but are different in linguistic or grammatical form. Sluga shows that this idea was common for all those who contemplated the identity of two mathematical functions.[33]

Frege was probably guided by his mathematical thought and tried to solve problems of ordinary language by beginning from statements of identity conceived functionally. But again the notion of semantic content is sufficient to accomplish this task. Sluga[34] offers the following example. Suppose the two mathematical functions, f and g, which we explain as

$$f(x) = x + 7$$

$$g(x) = 12 - y$$

We form the true equation

$$f(2) = g(3)$$

It is obvious that the two functional expressions have the same reference, the number 9, but they are different forms. Frege solve the problem with the help of his notion of sense. The two functions have the same reference, but different senses. But we can describe this difference without the notion of sense, using only the notion of reference and the way in which the functional terms and the number terms are combined syntactically into a complete functional expression. In Sluga's terms, we will speak about the semantic content.

Then, if the three-place relation is reducible to a two-place relation, then this means that Frege doubled the semantic entities which are associated with an expression. In Frege's terms, the cognitive significance of an expression is divided in two, the sense and the reference.

In a letter to Hilbert, Frege wrote about the relation between a definition and the reference of an expression: "Every definition contains a sign (expression, word) which previously has had no reference and which is given a reference only through this definition. Once this has happened, one can make out of this definition a self-evident proposition which is then to be used like an axiom. But we must adhere to the tenet that in a definition nothing is asserted: rather, something is stipulated. Therefore what requires a proof or some other reasoning to

[31] Frege, 1948, p. 210.
[32] Sluga, 1986, pp. 47-64.

[33] Hermann Lotze is the example given by Sluga. See, Sluga, 1986, pp. 55-57.
[34] Sluga, 1986, p. 49.

establish its truth ought never to be presented as a definition."[35]

If we apply this requirement to Frege's work in mathematics, then we are quickly aware of a problem: had "zero" any reference before being defined by Frege? The best answer, according with the evolution of Frege's thought, is that Frege himself has given different meanings to the notion of reference and, moreover, he has used this in a very peculiar way. So, the notion of reference used in "On Sense and Reference" is different from the notion of reference used in this letter to Husserl.

I think that Weiner is right when he claims that the latter notion of reference was a response to tensions between *Grundlagen-Bedeutung* and *Grundlagen*-definition.[36] Frege asserts in *The Foundation of Arithmetic* that a definition fixes the *Bedeutung* of a word, and that in order to do this we have to fix the meaning of the propositions in which the word appears, according to the contextuality principle. Therefore, fixing the *Bedeutung* of the number one through a definition entails fixing the sense of the linguistic expression "zero is less than one," and outside this definitional context the expression "zero is less than one" had no meaning before Frege's definition in *The Foundation of Arithmetic*. We need to fix the *Bedeutung* of the number one in a mathematical definition, because our ordinary language is unable to meet the criteria of a good definition. If we use some mathematical expressions, even the expression "zero is less than one" in our ordinary language, we will do so inaccurately, because our common language is full of vagueness and ambiguities.

But how can we use Frege's distinction between sense and reference in such a way as to understand clearly the differences between our ordinary language and a mathematical language? The notion of sense has an intuitive role created through our uses of words in ordinary language. I think that we could say that some expressions—for example, those referring to the concept of baldness—have a sense in our ordinary language, although they will be meaningless in a technical language based on the criteria of sharpness because it is easy to find a person who is neither clearly bald nor clearly non-bald. Anyway, our ordinary sentences about a bald person will be meaningful and we will understand each other. On the other hand, according with Frege's project, we need to establish some constraints if we want to use a mathematical language which meets logical criteria of accuracy. The notion of reference plays this technical role: "To have reference, then, is to be either primitive or used in a way which determines a definition, in Frege's strict sense, from primitive terms. Thus, given the vagueness of our ordinary language, most non-primitive terms will have reference only if an explicit Fregean-style definition has been given."[37] Therefore, regarding the expression "zero is less than one," we will say that it had a sense and was meaningful in ordinary language, but it has no reference before Frege. He also fixed in this way the reference of the number one in a definition logically constructed from primitive elements.[38] Only after Frege gave the definition and fixed the reference in his work did this expression add a technical reference to its ordinary sense, so that it was meaningful according to the technical criteria proposed by Frege. Only in this technical sense does an expression meet the condition of semantic completeness and have truth-value in the sentences in which it appears.[39]

Frege distinguishes between two components of a declarative sentence: first, the acknowledgement of a truth, and second, the content that is acknowledged to be true. As a consequence of the distinction between sense and denotation, Frege split the "possible content of judgment" in "thought" and "truth-value."

[35] Frege, 1971, p. 7.
[36] Weiner, 1986, p. 19.

[37] Weiner, 1986, p. 20.
[38] Frege underlined that a definition is equivalent with an analysis or a concept and it assures the logical connection between the concept and the theoretical system: "The real importance of a definition lies in its logical construction out of primitive elements. And for that reason we should not do without it, not even in a case like this. The insight it permits into the logical structure is a condition for insight into the logical linkage of truths. A definition is a constituent of the system of science." (Frege, 1971, p. 60).
[39] I think that Frege stated this condition of semantic completeness: a sentence has a truth – value if and only if it has a sense and a reference. Therefore, the concept of truth is understood by Frege in a technical way and not in an intuitive one.

The sense of a sentence is a thought and the reference is a truth-value. [40]

Short conclusion

As I have argued above, Frege's work in the field of philosophy of mathematics was strongly guided by his belief that logic has to be conceived as a language. He developed a philosophical project concerning the basis of arithmetic starting from a new formal language. Therefore, he developed a semantics for this language and, at the same time, he used different semantic tools and suppositions in his research regarding the foundamentals of mathematics.

Historically, Frege's legacy was a source of new developments in philosophy of mathematics and in philosophy of language. His semantic theory and, above all, his distinction between sense and reference was continued and developed by Rudolf Carnap. From 1910-1914 Carnap was Frege's student and too many notes, most of them about the distinction between sense and reference. Carnap wrote in his autobigraphy that he was guided in his own research by Frege's semantic theory.[41] New research on the Carnap's manuscripts revealed that many of his notes were later integrated in his *Meaning and Necessity*.[42] Frege himself was aware of the importance of his semantic theory, and he did not use it only as a ladder that can be discarded after the climb.

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[40] Frege, 1964, p. 5.
[41] See Carnap, 1963, pp. 4, 13.
[42] Gabriel, 2004, pp. 11-12.

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SERBIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH IN KOSOVO AND METOHIJA: BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE*

Zorica Kuburić

Philosophical Faculty
University of Novi Sad, Serbia
e-mail: zoricakuburic@gmail.com

Abstract:
The Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo and Metohija has a long history that is rich in detail, so it is difficult to grasp it in its entirety. Therefore, only a few key points are presented in this paper, points which will hopefully lend insight into current events and future prospects. In this paper, the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo and Metohija is observed through discussion about Orthodox belief, the priesthood and monasticism, and places of worship. The research was conducted in 2012, when we visited Kosovo and Metohija and interviewed bishops, monks, priests, lay believers, and pilgrims. Places mentioned in the paper are: Gazimestan, Gračanica, Prizren, Dečani, Patriarchate of Peć, and Kosovska Mitrovica.

Key words: Serbian Orthodox Church, Kosovo and Metohija, religiosity, pilgrimage, territory, suffering.

Introduction

I started this research on the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo and Metohija first by estimating the number of citizens and believers in Kosovo and Metohija, and then estimating the number of registered cultural properties and religious architecture. The second step was to visit the library of the Patriarchate of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Belgrade, where I was told that a lot had been written about Kosovo, and that the literature was so numerous and various that it was doubtful that there was anything left to be written on the subject.

I looked through some recently published books (e.g. Jokić, 2004) that were printed in color, so that fire and ruins can be easily seen. The message was clear: Kosovo always evokes an association with suffering and resistance. From the perspective of the Serbian Orthodox Church, this suffering is also presented in the book *Crucifies Kosovo* (1999), the preface to to which was written by the then Serbian Patriarch, Mr. Pavle. The introduction is illustrated with the picture of the Patriarch in front of a cross, which identifies the Church with the crucifixion and suffering of Christ.

My next step was to better inform myself about current events in Kosovo through the Church dignitaries. The most frequent answer was: “Come and see for yourself, don’t write a book sitting in your office.” Others said: “What kind of life is this that you don’t have freedom of movement?” Professor Radovan Bigovic[1] told me that the Earth belonged to God, not to us, and that the issue of Kosovo should be approached from that perspective. The image of Kosovo and Metohija is covered with many veils and, like a casualty, it is waiting for the future.

Dimitrije Bogdanović writes that the meaning of the past is based on artistic monuments of medieval Kosovo; it is written that such monuments cannot be erected in a foreign land, amidst people speaking another language, such as the Albanian people. “These monuments were not erected on other people’s land that would later be populated by one’s own people, so that only afterwards favorable and safe conditions would be created around them, on the contrary, they were built where peace could be provided for relics of sainted kings and archbishops, but also for monks who had to live there and fight for their spiritual world” (Bogdanović, 1986, 47).

In the preface to the Serbian edition of *Religion and the Politics of Identity in Kosovo*, Ger Duijzings begins with these words: “This book was published five years ago for the first time. In the meantime, the situation in Kosovo has changed drastically, which means that most of the chapters could appear 'out-

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[1] Interview with Radovan Bigovic in Zemun, 6. May 2012.

dated,' i.e. like a reminder of the long-gone days. Many people described in the book – Croats, Serbs, Montenegrins – are not there anymore, or they remain in a very small number; many described locations have changed so much that they are unrecognizabe, and the political situation is essentially different from what it was at the time I published this research" (Duijzings, 2005, 5).

However, the value of such studies remains, because they are already historical documents about past realities. Since the 1990s, changes have gone from cultural complexity and duality to a process of homogenization. Ethnic divisions within the Islamic community disappeared almost entirely. "Violence, the war, and international intervention have finally destroyed the heterogeneous and multicultural Kosovo, and today, this province is almost entirely populated by Albanians" (Duijzings, 2005, 6).

In this context, Kosovo is seen as a border region where two parallel societies – Islamic and Christian – exist, with frequent conflicts and parallel lives. Ever since the Battle of Kosovo in 1389 between Ottoman Turkish and Balkan Christian forces, there have been established ethnic and religious borders that are now also territorial. Tension in religious life was the very subject of Duijzings' research, along with a pilgrimage to Kosovo (Gračanica, Zočište, and Letnica).

It seems the key words to start with when writing about Kosovo and Metohija are: time stopped when it was turned into a sacred land. The history of the Serbian Orthodox Church is found more in places of worship than in people, probably because the human life span is too short, and man is a fragile creature. However, in this paper the past, whether distant or recent, is mentioned no more than is needed to mark the context of the present moment.

Religious affiliation, religiosity, and places of worship in Kosovo and Metohija

Statistical data (Kuburić, 2002; Kuburić, 2006; Kuburić, 2010) for the territory of Kosovo and Metohija is not totally reliable, because censuses have faced resistance and boycott. According to the estimation made in 1991, only 359,346 persons were counted in the census from a total of 1,956,196. The religious composition of the counted population in 1991 was as follows: Orthodox – 216,742 (60.32%); Muslims – 126,577 (35.22%); Catholics – 9,990 (2.78%); atheists – 1,036 (0.29%); unknown – 4,417 (1.23%). Since that time, the number of Serbs has been decreasing in Kosovo and Metohija, and so has the number of Orthodox believers.

According to the Office for Statistics in Kosovo and Metohija,[2] the number of Serbs has decreased from 11% in 1991 to 7% in 2001, and finally to only 5% in 2007. Their minority status in a hostile environment is one of the reasons for their emigration, other reasons being the lack of tolerable conditions for living, working, and obtaining education.

When asked whether religion was an important part of their everyday life, 66% answered affirmatively in Kosovo and Metohija (Kuburić, 2009). According to a study conducted in Kosovska Mitrovica on a sample of 89 adolescent respondents, 94% of Orthodox believers in Kosovo and Metohija believe in God and observe *slava*. Other indicators of religiosity are as follows: 16% fast regularly, 28% go to church regularly, 34% pray at home regularly, 33% regularly follow advice from a priest. An important question among those concerning dogmatic issues was belief in Jesus Christ. The vast majority of young people – 97% of them – believe that Jesus existed; 89% of the respondents believe that Jesus Christ was the Son of God; 53% believe in life after death; 35% believe in resurrection. A particularly interesting question was "What is more important to you: belonging to a nation or to a religion?" 44% answered that belonging to a religion was more important. Concerning their attitude toward other religions, an important question was: would you marry a person of a different religion? The adolescents were divided: 52% would not marry a person of a different religion, 25% probably would, and 24% definitely would (Aritonović, 2009).

Statistical data about registered immovable cultural heritage was gathered in 1994, when the list of all such properties in the territory of the SR Yugoslavia was made (Radovanović et al., 1996). Among those buildings that have not been moved or destroyed, Orthodox religious architecture is the most numerous in Central Serbia, immediately followed by Kosovo and Metohija. It is those buildings that act as embassies today – not only embassies of God, but national embassies as well – and it is in those churches and monasteries of the Serbian Orthodox Church that Orthodox life in Kosovo and Metohija takes place.

It took a long time to build these sacred places, and they have lasted even longer, like symbols of

[2] http://www.srbija.gov.rs/vesti/sekcija.php?id=244 (accessed on 15.10.2012)

eternity. In evil times, however, destructive forces proved their power in short bursts of anger. One of those moments was recorded in the book *Crucified Kosovo*. "This modest publication is but an echo of our laments, an appeal to the Christian and civilized world. It is painful to know that in the year of the greatest Christian jubilee, at the end of the first 2,000 years of Christianity, Christian churches are being destroyed in Europe, and that is happening not in times of war, but in times of peace, guaranteed by the international community" (Crucified Kosovo, 1999, 5). Ljiljana Dugalić wrote: "Someone has peeled off frescoes, someone has recast iconostases, someone has ripped the temple off its foundation, and someone has watched all that in silence" (Crucified Kosovo, 1999, 13).

Another cry for protection, with proofs of recorded violence, is found in a monograph published by the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Serbia and the Museum in Pristina. It is a book written in Serbian and English, titled *March Pogrom in Kosovo and Methohija, March 17–19, 2004.* There are pictures in the book showing burned down buildings, as well as pictures of violence (Jokić, 2004). Atanasije Jeftić (1987) was the editor of a book about the legacy of Kosovo, and the monuments and bearings of Serbian people.

Diocese of Raška and Prizren

The website of the Diocese of Raška and Prizeren is updated almost daily with news about events in churches and monasteries, but there is also historical information about the Diocese. Events that are important for the Serbian Orthodox Church happened during the reign of Stefan Nemanja, founder of the Serbian state, and during his conquest of Prizren in 1189. The conclusion is that the Diocese of Raška and Prizren has almost a thousand years of history, and that in this diocese which has always been a bulwark against those of different faiths, non-Slavs, and non-Serbs, it is impossible to separate the history of the Church from the history of the nation. It was at its peak during the time of the Nemanjićs, while its fall happened during the Ottoman reign.[3]

The Orthodox Diocese of Raška and Prizren encompasses the territories of Kosovo and Metohija and Raška. It is one of the oldest dioceses within the Serbian Orthodox Church; its seat is located in Gračanica Monastery. The head of the Diocese was bishop Artemije until his retirement in 2010, when Bishop Teodosije took his place.

Bishop Artemije (Rdosavljević) was born 1935 in Lelić near Valjevo; he graduated from the Faculty of Theology in Belgrade, and earned a Ph.D. in Athens. He held the position of diocesan bishop from 1991 to 2010. The Serbian Orthodox Church stripped him of his rank as bishop at the November session of the Holy Assembly of Bishops in 2010, due to his attempts to take over the Diocese of Raška and Prizren with violence, and because of other uncanonical activities.[4] Activities of the group that supports the former bishop Artemije can be followed on their website.[5] I wrote more about the theological grounds and the attitudes of the priests in Serbia about this issue in my book *Religious Communities in Serbia and Religious Distance* (Kuburić, 2010).

I had an opportunity to attend a press conference which was organized by this group in the Media Center in Belgrade on 20 April 2012. The group has also started a journal—*The Orthodox Voice*. The former bishop Artemije says: "As a bishop, I lived in Kosovo and Metohija for 19 years, and I saw, experienced, and overcame all kinds of terror that happened to this Serbian Jerusalem, a cradle of Serbian spirituality, Serbian culture, and the Serbian state. Our roots are in Kosovo and Metohija; the spiritual identity of the Serbian nation has been created there. There are numerous holy places (1,300 churches and monasteries) that have been built and erected for almost the entire millennium; and today, because of NATO activities, there is a threat, in that holy land of Kosovo and Metohija, that all the last traces of our thousand-year existence may disappear" (Artemije, 2011, 9).

Bishop Teodosije[6] (secular name Živko Šibalić) was born in Čačak on 29 Jun 1963. He graduated from the Faculty of Theology in Belgrade. On 6 January 1978 he decided to become a novice in the monastery of Crna Reka near Novi Pazar, and he continued his spiritual life under the guidance of the

[3] http://www.eparhija-prizren.com/sr (accessed on 12 October 2012).

[4] The news was put on the official website of the Diocese of Raška and Prizren on 27 Febriary 2011: http://www.eparhija-prizren.com/sr/vesti/uzicki-protojerej-milic-dragovic-o-sekti-m-artemija-radosavljevica-lav-tv (accessed on 14 October 2012)

[5] http://www.eparhija-prizren.org/ (accessed on 14 October 2012)

[6] http://www.eparhija-prizren.com/sr/episkop-rasko-prizrenski-i-kosovsko-metohijski-g-teodosije (accessed on 14 October 2012)

then hegumen and future bishop Artemije of Raška and Prizren. In March 1992, he went with several monks to the monastery of Visoki Dečani, where he became a head of the monastery and was ordained a hegumen. In 2004, hegumen Teodosije was chosen as the bishop of Lipljan, vicar of Raška and Prizren, with a seat in the monastery of Visoki Dečani. By the decision of the Synod of Bishops, Teodosije became the Bishop of Raška and Prizren and Kosovo and Metohija in 2010.

The diocese has six episcopal governorships: Prizren, Priština, Peć, Gnjilane, Kosovska Mitrovica, and Novi Pazar. According to what is necessary (and what is possible), there are 31 church communities, with 42 priests (and the same number of parishes) and 3 deacons. The information about the priests shows that most of them come from Kosovo and Metohija, and that most have graduated from the Prizren Seminary. Of those who did not graduate from Prizren, one graduated from Cetinje Seminary, two from Karlovac Seminary, four the Faculty of Theology in Belgrade, and one from the Faculty of Theology in Libertyville. There are 11 male monasteries with 120 monks, and 5 female monasteries with 53 nuns – in total 16 monasteries with 173 ascetics. Each of the monasteries provides regular monastic life for its fraternity or sorority (Pregled, 2006, 370–376).

Having attended liturgies and talked with ascetics in Gračanica and Visoki Dečani, I am going to present some information about these monasteries. There are 24 nuns in the Gračanica monastery. In Pregled (2006, 380, 381) there are given names, years of births, and years of joining the monastery. The oldest nun was born in 1915, the second-oldest in 1923, then 1928, 1935, and 1940; the youngest one was born in 1984, and she has been in the monastery for 12 years. The longest stay in the monastery is 63 years (two nuns), then 57 years, 54 and so on up to the shortest stay of 7 years (two nuns). There are 32 monks and novices in the monastery of Visoki Dečani. The oldest was born in 1921, the second-oldest in 1931, and the youngest monks were born in 1983 and 1982. They have been in the monastery since 2002 (Pregled, 2006, 376–381).

Pilgrimage

Monasteries in Kosovo and Metohija are pilgrimage sites for Orthodox Christians, but also places that are visited by members of other religions, as well as tourists from all over the world. I am going to describe a pilgrimage that I have made with a group of pilgrims of the Serbian Orthodox Church, organized by the Independent Students Association. Our visit to Kosovo and Metohija happened from 8 to 10 June 2012, with the blessing of His Holiness Serbian Patriarch Irinej; during the visit, we brought humanitarian aid to believers in Kosovo and Metohija.

Gazimestan

We began our trip from Belgrade, from the Cathedral of Saint Sava on Friday evening (8 June 2012). From the moment we entered into the territory of Kosovo and Metohija, we had a police escort – two cars, one in front of our bus, the other behind. On Saturday morning (9 June) we came to Gazimestan. All travelers went toward the monument – Remembrance of the year 1389.

There are whole libraries of studies, books, and articles written about this event. One of them is dedicated to six centuries from Vidovdan 1389 (Jeftić, 1987). It is the central point of the Serbian folk tradition, and Vidovdan is a state holiday. During this visit, dignitaries of the Serbian Orthodox Church urged people not to sell their properties and not to leave Kosovo. Father Sava stressed that Vidovdan, the one ahead and every future one, had to be a lesson to sober us up to realize who we are, what we are and where we are, what our role is here and now. The head of the Serbian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Irinej, came to visit Gračanica the day before Vidovdan. Greeting those present, Patriarch Irinej said: “Vidovdan has to sanctify, enlighten, and inspire by the Holy Spirit the spirit of Saint Prince Lazar and of those innumerous great-martyrs who gave their lives and shed blood as the holiest sacrifice a man can offer.”[7]

Gračanica

The pilgrimage route brought us to the Gračanica monastery, where we attended the liturgy celebrated by Bishop Teodosije, and then we went to the Fortress of Prilepac. The trip took us further to Lipljan, Staro Gracko, Prizren and Bogorodica Ljeviška, Zočište and Dečanska Vinica in Velika Hoča. We had supper and stayed overnight in Velika Hoča and Orahovac, where we could also socialize with locals.

I spoke with Bishop Teodosije in the Gračanica monastery. I asked the Bishop to record our conver-

[7] http://www.vesti-online.com/Vesti/Srbija/235347/Ne-selite-se-s-KiM-i-ne-prodajte-imanja (accessed on 10 October 2012).

sation. He said he was not prepared to be recorded, but I could find a lot of material on the website of the Diocese of Raška and Prizren, including his press statements and interviews.

My question to Bishop Teodosije was: “How does it feel to be here?” He replied with a smile: “As you can see, it feels fine.” I can single out, from my memory, several observations from the conversation that we had in an upstairs room of the monastery residential building. The bishop was honest and open, ready to hear every single voice out of many, and to answer to everyone. He was quick in noticing details and never failed to reply directly and promptly. There was a monk named Nikolaj in our group, so the bishop told us immediately that the monk did not have permission to teach or give out his books – the Church had enforced such prohibition because he had spread fear among people, foretelling future suffering.

Our time is a period of difficult social problems, but also of attempts to discover truth. Truth is undoubtedly subjective, and spread through particular cases of real experiences of facing life. My research is primarily aimed at reading and searching for written testimonials and opinions, while in the second part I write down my personal feelings while meeting with the Church in Kosovo and Metohija, attending services, talking to people, and directly observing events in Kosovo and Metohija in June 2012. I recorded all that happened – from the liturgy to interviews – with my digital camera.

I talked to a member of the Serbian Orthodox Church, who lives in Priština but came to Gračanica to buy newspapers and talk with people. “It is hard, they do all kinds of things to us: they turned off the television, the radio, they stopped transport, they want to close a doctor’s office.” I asked her: “Are you scared to go to their doctors?” She said: “Their doctors – no way! Where are their doctors? All the good ones have gone. They can live anywhere – in Novi Sad, in Belgrade – only we are not allowed to leave… Once, I used to go on foot to anywhere I needed to go. Now, we get on a bus with them. They look at me as if I am some kind of wild beast, a black sheep.” I asked her again if she was afraid. “Of course I am, many things happen here. Many of them came from primitive villages.” Answering my question about the number of Serbs living in Priština, she said there were 50 of them, scattered around the city.

“Where do you go to church?” – I asked.

“They destroyed our church, but they have rebuilt it now. We go twice a year without fail, on important holidays, or once a week. We have two holidays – Saint Nicholas of Winter and Saint Nicholas of May. There is the Church of Holy Savior (Crkva Svetog Spasa). They tried to destroy it once or twice. Once they planted five kilos of explosives, but, believe you me, we felt nothing. The power of God! But we do not know about the future. And look how beautiful it is here, you’re a witness. You know, no one dared to enter into the church until 1963; there were only nuns here, and they had to sleep in a stable. So, in 1963 the nuns made a decision and went to Tito. The Church and Communism don’t go together, but we cannot sleep in stables anymore, we want our residential buildings back, we left our youth there. They didn’t want to give up, and they just waited in front of the office; when it became obvious that they would stay and even sleep there, Tito gave in – they spent only four hours there, and they got their residential buildings; and at the place where they had slept before, where stables had been, they built an apiary. That’s how it was, just so you know, but you have to come on Vidovdan. You know what it’s like when people come to Gazimestan in caravans, on foot, a million people come.”

We can learn a lot from this confession, primarily about interpersonal relations and life in Priština, about divisions, about the struggle of people to stay and survive in someone else’s land. Their backbone is the Church, where they cherish fellowship, speak their language, and control their fear.

During this pilgrimage, we had an opportunity to visit Velika Hoča. We were received by a local priest, who gave a speech and reminded us about the Christian faith and its fundamental teachings. He especially pointed out the community of the living and the dead in this territory: each church has its graveyard. The priest said that there were 700 of them on the ground, but many more lay beneath. We could conclude from his words that it was the ancestors and their graves that urged the living not to desert them.

Dečani

On early Sunday morning, we were already in the liturgy in the Dečani monastery. After the police patrols and protective walls, it was an overwhelming feeling finally to find ourselves inside the monastery space. Every detail had its story to tell, even lilies on windows of monastic cells. The monks appeared powerful, strong, with long groomed hair and beards, and with calm looks. Around thirty monks and novices filled the liturgical message with their voices. Intense sunlight, coming through monastery windows, shone upon the altar and made this moment truly special. The pilgrims approached the service very seriously, each and every one of them, even a little boy, the youngest among us, who, after being noticed by the monks during the liturgy, was given a chair to sit on.

After the liturgy, one of the monks addressed us. He spoke about the history of the monastery and its current affairs. Having expressed the difficult of including seven centuries of the monastery's history into a single presentation, he urged anyone interested to ask him a question. What I would like to mention as typical for the Orthodox Church, and also for this place in particular, are the miraculous healings on the grave of "the holy king," founder of the church in Dečani. The church was finished in 1335; everything that existed then is still preserved, even the frescoes. It took five years to build, and another ten years to paint the church. There were several groups of painters working on the church, which can be seen through the style of the frescoes. Around 1,000 frescoes are still preserved – all details from the New Testament and the history of the Church. It is painted in accordance with Orthodox canons, but the exterior resembles Romanesque cathedrals, which was not strange during the Nemanjić dynasty. This is an example of the so-called Rascian architectural school, a style only found in Serbian monasteries. Everything is made of expensive materials, which made it durable. Experts from Belgrade are engaged in cleaning and conservation of the frescoes, and the exterior is maintained by the Italians, who are responsible for the cleaning and conservation of the statues and the façade. There used to be a lot of gold and silver, but only several pieces have survived frequent robberies.

The Dečani church has the second largest treasury next to the Hilandar monastery. People bring gifts in gratitude for miraculous healings and births. There are many liturgical books and old icons. At first there used to be hundreds of monks, but the number decreased with time. After World War II, about 800 hectares of the land was taken from the monastery, and the monastery itself was treated like a museum (it used to have only 3 monks). After the 1990s, the monastic life was revived, and a younger brotherhood came. They continued the monastery traditions of wood carving, icon painting, and calligraphy. They also revived the monastery's economy: they breed sheep, cows, goats, and keep bees – the monastery is completely economically independent. They ask for financial support from the state only for major construction projects.

After this presentation on the church and the monastery, I asked the monk to describe the healings, and whether they happen on their own or as a result of some ritual. He said that there was no rule:

> "Someone says a prayer before the holy king, someone passes three times under it, and to someone a prayer is read. I write down everything, with the date and the disease. A group of Serbs came yesterday, and a woman told me that she had been here in 1972; she hadn't been living according to the Church back then, but a voice had told her in her dreams to come here and to bring her son, and her son had been cured of asthma. Last week an Albanian woman, a travel guide, came and told me – she used to pray for her sister on her every visit. Her sister had been suffering from venous congestion of the brain; she had had a stroke, which had left her blind. This sister of hers used to pray every time before the holy king, and the sister had been treated in Greece, she had been married there to a Greek man. Doctors were amazed when she completely recovered – her hematoma disappeared, and she could see again."

Does one feel the presence of God here; do you feel it too, even if you are here all the time?

"Not only do we feel it, but tourists feel it too, when they come for the first time. On some occasions, there were women who couldn't stop their tears."

Do groups come frequently?

"Yes, they do. For example, there have been ten buses of Japanese tourists since the beginning of this year. It is an opportunity to get to know the Orthodoxy and the Serbian culture."

Do you like it when people come?

"Yes, we do. On one hand, it is important for the current political situation that they can see that we are guarded by Italians, it is important when we can tell them that, since the war, the monastery has been attacked with grenades four times. It is good that it becomes clear to them. On the other hand, they make contact with the Orthodoxy, with the true Christianity.”

Are there Albanians who are attached to the monastery, who love it, who show respect to the holy king?

“There are Orthodox Albanians from Albany, who are our people. Even their facial features look different when they enter the monastery.”

Patriarchate of Peć

The Patriarchate of Peć[8] consists of four buildings from the 13th and 14th century. After World War II, the Patriarchate of Peć has been turned into a female monastery. Although this monastery does not officially belong to the Diocese of Raška and Prizren, its history is closely connected to the history of other monasteries in this Diocese. As a stavropegial monastery, the Patriarchate of Peć is under direct jurisdiction of the Serbian Orthodox Patriarch in Belgrade, where the seat of the Patriarchate is located.

Today the monastery of the Peć Patriarchate remains an important spiritual center, with a sorority of 25 nuns. The sorority is engaged in humanitarian work, and it maintains the economy of the monastery. Budisavci Metochion belongs to the monastery, and two nuns stay there under the protection of Kosovo Force (KFOR).

We arrived in the Peć Patriarchate during lunch time. Two nuns came out to open the door and to sell things at the counter in the entrance. Among the first pilgrim women who entered the church was a woman wearing a Pioneer uniform, with the Titovka on her head, and the flag of Yugoslavia with the five-pointed star. A young nun noticed instantly this unusual sight and asked the women who she was. She asked her immediately to take the flag out, because the five-pointed star had no place in the church: “The time of the five-pointed star is gone, now it is the time of the cross.”

There was a girl from our group who caught our eye in the Patriarchate of Peć – a tall, pretty student at the Military Academy in Belgrade. Her openness and behavior implied she was one of the organizers of this trip. A conversation began spontaneously after a man from the group asked a nun for permission to film inside the church. The girl got involved and said that filming was forbidden. The man did not give up: he was born in Kosovo, he spent his working years in Slovenia, and now, being retired, he filmed Serbian monasteries. When the nun went to ask the hegumenia for permission, the girl told me that the year before, precisely on 23 April 2011, she had been christened there where we stood at that moment, and that it had not been allowed for them to film. She told me she had been born in Obilić, near Kosovo Polje and Gazimestan; but she lived in Belgrade at the moment. Her parents had never been married. She said:

“I realized I had to take care of myself, and I found godparents, sent by God, and so I was born again, spiritually. It all came spontaneously: not being christened, I was ashamed to go to church – I felt like a foreigner among other believers. While I was laying on my deathbed, I had a premonition, and I realized that He really exists. I saw for myself that miracles were possible, that God exists. I know I have my guardian angel. And I got these rosaries that I carry for my first communion. I didn’t think about that, either – I went to Prizren on Đurđevdan (St. George’s Day) a week after the christening, and I took my first communion there, and this Rosary is a memory of that day. I used to come alone here while visiting my family, but I have relatives here as well, there in the Serbian territory. It was only once that I passed the border crossing at Merdare, by Albanian bus. They tried to kidnap me then. They know our faces, as we do theirs. I needed to use a toilet, but I knew I was in danger. Others were also frightened for me; a Shqiptar followed me, and when a car came after him, people just drew me into the bus. It was all strange to me, but I was so happy to go there on Đurđevdan that I didn’t realize they wanted to kidnap me. Maybe it is good that I have experienced that, because now I know what can happen and how to avoid it. I come here with all my heart, this is my country, and they can never take that from me. That is what makes me strong and not afraid. One has to be brave, but those who say you can go freely around here, they lie. Any moment something bad can happen.”

Kosovska Mitrovica

According to a report of Draško Đenović (2012), on Wednesday, 13 Jun 2012, a monk from the monastery of Crna Reka, father Mitrofan (secular name Milorad Bulajić) was beaten up in the

[8] The Peć Patriarchate/Patriarkana e Pejës is designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site. In April 2012, the Serbian monasteries in Kosovo were listed among the five most important holy sites of the Mediterranean along with Jerusalem, Mt. Athos, Mecca, and Vatican. http://www.transconflict.com/2012/10/kosovo-time-for-reconciliation-110/

southern part of Kosovska Mitorvica, which is mainly populated by ethnic Albanians. Father Mitrofan, who was born in Kosovska Mitrovica in 1955, where he also grew up, went to the town hall to deal with administrative matters regarding the recent death of his father Jovan, one of the few Serbs who still lived in the southern part of the city after 1999. Monk Mitrofan had been living in the monastery since 1997. Bishop Teodosije visited the attacked monk, and afterwards sent a written statement to leading diplomats and KFOR officials in Priština, in which he said that the attack showed that the priests and monks of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo and Metohija still lived under constant threat and without freedom of movement.

I spoke with Petar Jeknić,[9] a psychologist and former journalist, about life in Kosovo and Metohija. He said:

> "When I came to Priština in the summer of 1999, it wasn't difficult to see that different rules applied in this territory. Kosovo was ruled by paradoxes and illusions, no matter how much effort the officials put into proving otherwise. That was discussed reluctantly, because that practically meant admitting the impossibility of acting rationally. On the other hand, whenever I wanted a quiet afternoon, I used to go to Janjevo. I spoke enthusiastically about that village in the Lipljan Municipality to KFOR Commander Reinhardt and his spokesman, Henning. Finally, there is a place where the Albanians, Bosniaks, Serbs, Gorani, and Romani live together, without friction. I was wondering if that was because the closest Serbs lived in the village of Gušterica, several kilometers to the west, or because Jarinje was not on the transit route. Then, I met a priest of the Saint Nicholas Parish in the village, Father Mata (Matej Palić), and an imam (I have forgotten his name, but I went to his house once). I realized that the dialogue between these two men, and their influence on people, overcame potential problems, mostly because of their peace. In a discussion with the KFOR Commander, we reached an agreement not to make a reference to this village as a good example of cohabitation in order to protect it from extremists. It would be enough to talk positively about a certain topic and that could put it into danger (attacks in the Kamenica Municipality are the example for this, because it is assumed to be the result of promoting this place as a place of peace and tolerance)."

After such a response – saying that no one is certain about anything – I asked about his opinion on the role of the Serbian Orthodox Church. Here is what he said:

> "The Serbian Orthodox Church in the northern part of Kosovska Mitrovica has an ambivalent role: on one hand, the role of a victim is the dominant one, bearing in mind that the St. Sava Church has been burnt down, and the cemetery in the southern part of the city has been demolished. But on the other hand, there is a capability to survive, which is symbolized by the new church of St. Dimitrije, whose name this city bears, and who is the patron of the city. The church was built on the rock, which symbolically says that this is the last line of retreat before the New World Order, understood in the Balkan way. The symbol of the rock as Christ, on which the church is built, cannot be found in known interpretations of the location of this marvelous building. However, besides this mostly symbolic role, the Serbian Orthodox Church in the northern part of Kosovo, and even in the northern part of Kosovska Mitrovica, does not have the ability to gather, organize, or lead an articulated program of self-defense and life-improvement. The time when it was the most possible was between 18 and 22 March 2004, during the pogrom of Serbs, after two Albanian boys from the village of Čabra had drowned – and even then only Bishop Artemije was able to gather all the "leaders" and fractions of Serbs in this part of the city and to organize a resistance against potential threats of spreading the crisis to the right bank of the Ibar River. With Biship Artemije gone from the political life of Kosovo Serbs, the role of the Serbian Orthodox Church is over."

Conclusion

There are numerous and almost unthinkable challenges in Kosovo and Metohija. The backbone of the Serbian community is the Serbian Orthodox Church, which has been present there ever since its foundation, and which has built its identity in opposition to Islam. Accepting Christianity as the faith of

[9] Interview with Petar Jenkić in Kosovska Mitrovica, 11 October 2012.

their forefathers, priests and members of the Church are willing to scarify this “earthly kingdom” for the sake of the “heavenly kingdom.” They are willing to take on the role of victims: the role of those who suffer, who endure the hardship of isolation and dependence in a foreign country, simultaneously thinking it to be their own territory.

The overlapping of the religious and national identity, as well as the connections between the Church and the state, makes it difficult to separate religious issues from political ones. The process of establishing interreligious dialogue has a different meaning here. It is the reason why within the Church in Kosovo and Metohija, there is a fraction which advocates absolute dissociation from the Catholic Church and ecumenical tendencies, while the bordering position of the Church in relation to Islam makes the former very conservative (for the sake of preserving identity). It can be expected that a dialogue would be easier outside Kosovo and Metohija.

As for spiritual considerations, the position of a loser of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo and Metogihja paradoxically seems to provide religious strength to resistance, as well as determination in spiritual values and a willingness to rely on God’s power. The spirituality of the monks and pilgrims depends, it appears, mostly on the miracles of healing different diseases in the monasteries, which is attributed to holy remains. Believing in the miraculous power of remains of the saints sends a message about following the tradition. The members of the Serbian Orthodox Church are determined to protect their graves, to not betray the faith of their ancestors, and to not leave the country which is both their home and their tomb. The power of the collective unconscious rises from the Kosovo pledge. The circumstance of being isolated within a hostile environment makes group cohesion stronger, as well as group spirituality, which is admired by those who live outside Kosovo and Metohija; visits and pilgrimages fill them with the sense of blessings in their lives, while, at the same time, they give support to those who stayed to live as a religious minority.

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MODERN RUSSIA IS IN SEARCH OF A SECULAR MODEL OF RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN RELIGIONS AND THE STATE

Valentina Slobozhnikova
Saratov State Law Academy
Saratov, Russia
e-mail: svs@sgap.ru

Abstract:

The purpose of this article is to identify how modern Russia can build good relationships between multiple Russian religions and the state. At present there are many obstacles standing in the way of achieving this goal. The article includes a great many statistics, and discusses political, social, and religious views of the issue.

The working Russian Constitution provides major legal provisions for democratic relationships between religions and the state. The law "On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations" (1997) clarified constitutional provisions. It should not forgotten that Russia is a secular state claiming to respect all religions. No doubt the supremacy of Orthodoxy in Russia after 1721 and the extreme atheism that arose in the Soviet Union after 1917 influenced people's minds greatly. While the countries in Western Europe were moving from religiosity to secularism, Russia was developing the other way around. But while respecting all religions, Russia should not forget to be mindful of extremism. Religious associations themselves are likewise uneasy about the danger presented by certain mystic, neo-pagan, and destructive sects. The author argues that the best compromise between religions and the modern Russian state can only be achieved on the basis of equality and freedom.

Key words: secularism, religion, Orthodoxy, Islam, Buddhism, associations.

The modern Russian state is rather new. It is only a little over 20 years old, having begun in 1993 when the working Russian Constitution was adopted. The state and the statesmanship build up the system, where the state is closely related to the key elements of the statesmanship. But these elements are not the only ones. No doubt that the statesmanship is a more complex phenomenon than the state, simply because the statesmanship has lots of noninstitutionalized elements e.g., secularism and religiosity.

The concept of secularism, as a principle of politics and the state, was first enunciated in the *Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen* in France (1789). Article 10 stated that "No one should be disturbed on account of his opinions, even religious, provided their manifestation does not upset the public order established by law."[1] However, the term "secularism" first appeared in Russia in one of the dictionaries published in 1887. Modern Russian dictionaries define secularism as "a characteristic of a state that is neutral towards all religions, independent from the clergy, and free of any theological concepts."[2]

Beginning in the 17th century, different states began to transform themselves into democracies on the basis of the new, enlightened, and secular ideologies. They lived their lives on the basis of reason, nature, common sense, and the ideal of true, rational knowledge. After studying relationships between European states and religions, one can see that every European country has gone through a number of challenges on the way to secularism.[3] Every country has its own secularism and its own model of relationships between the state and religions. This is why modern classifications of these relationships distinguish up to six types of states, not just two (secular and theocratic).

We know that secularism has not cut religions out of public life; rather, it has changed the nature of their presence in public life. With the advent of

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[1] The Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen (August 1789) URL: http://www.historyguide.org/intellect/declaration.html

[2] See: D. Uzlaner "Transformation of Secularism" URL: http://www.religare.ru/2_60966.html (in Russian).

[3] See: A.M. Salmin "Modern democracies: Establishment and Development". Moscow, 2009 (in Russian).

secularism, religions stopped being institutions related to the state. They stopped being axiomatic and socially obligatory. Religions were also no longer the final authorities in the sphere of morals. This new view provoked ideas about the private, individual, and intimate nature of religious beliefs that exist somewhere in the depths of human hearts. People did not perceive different religions as the source of problems anymore. In the 19–20th centuries they cared more about class and ethnic strife. This was true up to the 1980s, when religious traditions became important again, and people realized that secularism was not as neutral and unproblematic as was once believed.[4] From a religious viewpoint, never before in history have Russians faced such a situation as the one they are facing now. They had a very high level of religiosity in the past. Russia began turning into a multi-ethnic and a multi-religious country in the mid-16th century, but the country remained Orthodox Christian due to the large number of Slavs and the weaker position of other religions. Peter the Great reformed the Russian Orthodox Church in 1721. It was integrated into the state structure and became the state church. Then, when the Bolsheviks came to power in 1917, Russia—and later the Soviet Union—officially became extremely atheistic. Religions became unwelcome in Soviet Russia and the Soviet Union, with the Government viewing them as a kind of anachronism and an "opium of the people." Over the last hundred years, Russia has gone from having an official religion (the Russian Orthodox Church) to endorsing a militant atheism in Soviet times, and finally to the secularism fixed by the Constitution in modern Russia.

Nowadays, laws protecting freedom of conscience and freedom of religion in Russia are numerous, including the Russian Constitution, international laws and treaties, and Russian federal laws and bylaws (decrees of the President, governmental decrees, and other statutory enactments). It is noteworthy that Article 15, Section 4 of the Russian Constitution provides that "the commonly recognized principles and norms of the international law and the international treaties of the Russian Federation shall be a component part of its legal system."[5] Article 15, Section 1 provides that "the Constitution of the Russian Federation shall have supreme legal force and direct effect, and shall be applicable throughout the entire territory of the Russian Federation. Laws and other legal acts adopted by the Russian Federation may not contravene the Constitution of the Russian Federation."

The essence of freedom of conscience and freedom of religion is explained in Article 28 of the Constitution: "everyone shall be guaranteed the right to freedom of conscience, to freedom of religious worship, including the right to profess, individually or jointly with others, any religion, or to profess no religion, to freely choose, possess and disseminate religious or other beliefs, and to act in conformity with them."[6] Article 29 guarantees the right to freedom of thought and speech. The freedom of religion may be exercised by the citizens not only through the free choice of a religion, but also through the establishment of religious associations. Article 30, Section 1 of the Constitution provides that "everyone shall have the right to association, including the right to create trade unions in order to protect one's interests. The freedom of public associations activities shall be guaranteed." Article 14, Section 1 establishes the basic principles of modern Russian statesmanship, especially concerning religious associations. Article 14, Section 1 provides that "the Russian Federation shall be a secular state. No religion may be instituted as state-sponsored or mandatory religion." Article 14, Section 2 provides that "religious associations shall be separated from the state, and shall be equal before the law." These two provisions are crucial for a multi-religious state such as Russia and for Russian religious associations, because they fix the legal framework for relationships between religions and the state.

Article 17, Section 3 of the Constitution provides that "the exercise of the rights and liberties of a human being and citizen may not violate the rights and liberties of other persons." Article 19, Section 2 provides that "the state shall guarantee the equality of rights and liberties regardless of sex, race, nationality, language, origin, property or employment status, residence, attitude to religion, convictions, membership in public associations or any other circumstance. Any restrictions of the rights of citizens on social, racial, national, linguistic or religious grounds shall be forbidden." Article 13, section 5 forbids "the establishment and the activities of pub-

[4] See: D. Uzlaner "Transformation of Secularism" URL: http://www.religare.ru/2_60966.html (in Russian).

[5] See: the Constitution of the Russian Federation URL: http://www.departments.bucknell.edu/russian/const/constit.html

[6] The rights and liberties stipulated by this Article shall not be subject to restriction even in emergency situations (the Constitution of the Russian Federation, Article 56, Section 3).

lic associations whose aims and actions are directed at forcible alteration of the fundamentals of constitutional governance, violation of the integrity of the Russian Federation, undermining of the security of the state, the forming of armed units, or the incitement of social, racial, national and religious strife." Article 29, section 2 provides that "propaganda or campaigning inciting social, racial, national or religious hatred and strife is impermissible. The propaganda of social, racial, national, religious or language superiority is forbidden."

Apart from the Constitution, a number of other laws regulate relationships between religions and the state in Russia. The drafting and adoption of such laws regulating religious practices is challenging, because such laws are extremely significant from a political and social viewpoint. The law "On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations" (1997)[7] was adopted in difficult circumstances. It is the orimary law that regulates religious problems in modern Russia. Since 1997 the law has been amended several times, but these amendments did not involve the major principles of secularism, nor the freedoms of conscience and religion. The law affirms that the Russian Federation is a secular state, and religious associations are separated from the state, following the constitutional provisions. Firstly, the state "does not interfere in the citizen's decision regarding religion and religious affiliation, or in the education of children by parents or guardians, in keeping with their convictions and with regard to the right of the child to freedom of conscience and freedom of religious profession." Secondly, the state "does not require religious associations to perform the functions of agencies of state power, other state agencies, state institutions, and agencies of local administration." Thirdly, the state does not interfere in the activity of religious associations, when they does not violate the federal law "On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations." Fourthly, the state guarantees the secular character of education in state and municipal educational institutions. Thus, from a legal viewpoint, the modern Russian state is considered secular.

The majority of European countries established their secularism and different models of relationships between the state and religions due to social changes. While the countries in Western Europe were moving from religiosity to secularism, Russia was developing in a different way. Modern Russia appeared as a result of the dissolution of the atheistic Soviet Union. Religiosity was alien in the Soviet Union and existed only in people's souls. The project of the working Constitution (1993) was extremely liberal. At that time the citizens themselves proposed a return to the multiplicity of Russian religiosity, desiring freedom of conscience and religion. Nowadays, social and economic changes as well as human migration are affecting Russian religiosity very seriously. There are several trends in the development of modern Russian religiosity.

Research shows that the religious self-determination of Russian people is mostly rooted in their past and ethnic origin. If one asks a Russian person about his or her religious beliefs, he or she will probably speak not about a religion, but about his or her coherent worldview, and his or her political, moral, and cultural orientation. Opinion polls in modern Russia show that about 45% of the respondents consider themselves believers. About 30% of the respondents consider themselves unbelievers (including people who are indifferent to issues of faith and impiety). About 25% of the respondents are doubters.[8] Most people follow traditional Russian religions.[9] The number of Orthodox Christians is increasing. In 1991 one in three Russians considered themselves Orthodox Christians, while in 2010 about three in four Russians claimed that they belonged to the Orthodox Church.[10]

Islam is the second-most common religion in Russia. The number of Muslims in Russia is not changing drastically (4-7%, or 6-9 million people).[11] Scientists note different self-identities among traditional Islamic ethnic groups. For example, in Tatarstan 89% of Tatars are Muslims. Pre-Islamic beliefs still affect the lives of Kabardin, Cherkess, and Adyghe. Only the ethnic groups of Dagestan, Chechens, and Ingush are almost 100% Muslim. Opin-

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[7] The Russian federal law "On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations" URL: http://www2.stetson.edu/~psteeves/relnews/freedomofconscienceeng.html

[8] See: M.P. Mchedlov "Introduction". Faith. Ethnic Groups. Nation. Religious Element of an Ethnic Consciousness. Moscow, 2009 (in Russian).

[9] The new thorough research of the role of religions in the modern Russian society has been done by Moscow sociologists URL: http://www.blagovest-info.ru/index.php?ss=2&s=4&id=9942 (in Russian).

[10] URL: http:// wciom.ru/index.php?id=268&uid=13365 (in Russian).

[11] URL: http://www.blagovest-info.ru/index.php?ss=2&s=4&id=9942; http://wciom.ru/index.php?id=268&uid=13365 (in Russian).

ion polls aimed at discovering the status of Judaism in Russia reveal very interesting results. About 25% of Russian Jews have claimed that they belong to a Christian Church. Jews make up the largest number of atheists in Russia (23%). About 2% of Jews are Buddhists. Only 8% of Jews (about twenty thousand) have claimed that they practice Judaism. On the whole, Buddhists make up about 1% of the Russian people. Experts believe there are about 550,000 Buddhists in Russia.[12]

Different polling methods provide different data concerning practicing believers in Russia, both on the whole and according to different religions. Research shows that 3-4% of Russians observe religious rituals daily. About 2-3% of Russians observe religious rituals weekly. About 3-4% of people practice rituals monthly. About 25-27% of Russians observe religious rituals only on religious holidays. About 24-28% of people practice rituals from time to time. About 32-37% of Russians do not practice any religious rituals. According to different criteria, there are 2-10% (3-15 million) Orthodox Christians in Russia. Local religious associations report that fifty to eighty thousand people consider themselves Old Believers. About sixty thousand to two hundred thousand people have claimed that they are Catholics. More than 1.5 million people are Protestants. About thirty thousand people practice Judaism. Not more than 2.8 million people in Russia are Muslims. Not more than five hundred thousand people have claimed that they are Buddhists. The number of atheists is falling. In 2005, 13% of Russians claimed that they were unbelievers. In 2006, 16% were unbelievers. In 2008 the number of atheists dropped to 11%. In 2009 this number fell to 9%. In 2010, only 8% of Russians considered themselves atheists.[13]

Democratic reforms of the mid-1980s in the Soviet Union and democratic reforms in Russia in the 1990s changed the position of believers. Believers started actively exercising their right to from and join religious associations. Freedom of conscience had never been exercised so actively. Registered religious associations had never before enjoyed such equality before the law. Starting from the 1990s, the number of religious associations began to increase.

Statistics show that during the 1990s, the number of registered religious associations in Russia grew by more than three times. The boom of formation and registration of new religious associations happened around the year 2000. Since 2005, formation and registration of new religious associations has been decreasing. There are about 24,000 religious associations now operating in Russia. The number of people belonging to traditional Russian religions has risen in comparison to the number in 2000.[14] In 2000, 72.53% of all religious associations were traditional ones. The proportion of traditional religious associations had increased by 2012 (75.33%), because believers in traditional religions (mostly followers of Orthodox Christianity and Judaism) had started active formation of religious associations. The proportion of Islamic and Buddhist associations fell a little in 2000-2012, but their numbers increased.

Statistics show that modern Russia is primarily a Christian country. There are religious associations of more than forty Christian denominations. Not all Christian denominations are equally popular. The leading religious association is the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). On the whole, during the last decade the number of ROC associations has grown by 4,026, while the proportion of other Christian denominations and other religions has decreased, including Baptist communities, Salvationist communities, and followers of Krishnaism. But the number of charismatic churches is growing. Proportions of other religions have not changed seriously.[15] On the whole, there are about nineteen thousand Christian associations.

New religious movements (NRMs) have also come to Russia.[16] They are of modern origin and mostly arose in the USA and Western Europe in the 1960s-1970s. NRMs started spreading in Russia due to the work of missionaries in the mid-1980s, but the boom of NRMs happened in the early 1990s. Researchers note that there are currently about

[12] Sociological Studies. 2005. No. 6 (in Russian).

[13] Sociological Studies. 2005. No. 6; R. Silantyev writes about the calculation methods to reveal the number of different religious groups members in Russia URL:http://forum.armkb.com/history-politics/19045-o-metodike-podscheta-chislennosti-osnovnyx-religioznyx-grupp-rossii.html; URL: http://wciom.ru/index.php?id=268&uid=13365 (in Russian).

[14] There are 4 traditional religions in Russia: Russian Orthodoxy, Islam, Buddhism, and Judaism.

[15] URL: http://religion.sova-center.ru/discussions/1BDDB2D/842F9AA; http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b11_11/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d1/02-08.htm (in Russian).

[16] URL: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_religious_movement

500,000-600,000 followers of NRMs in Russia.[17]

Thus, during the period between 1991 and 2014, the religious views of Russians have seriously changed due to the newfound right of freedom of conscience and religion. Russia now has seventy religious denominations which together are followed by millions of people. With this, the scope of religious associations has also changed. The number of religious associations is constantly growing (it is about 24,000 now),[18] and is about four times what it was in 1990. Almost 80% of these associations follow Christian denominations. It should be noted that modern Russia is perceived by the global community as a Christian country. About 85-95 million people consider themselves Christians. Most people consider themselves Orthodox Christians, although this is less about religious practices than it is about cultural identity.

The modern multi-religious structure of Russia is a result of long historic development and democratic reforms. This structure cannot be rigid. Russian religiosity will certainly face a number of challenges which will influence other spheres of life. Religious elements have become a part of the secular social mentality. These elements will affect Russian culture and politics.

Nowadays, the media cover activities of religious associations, religious councils, religious summits, and meetings of religious leaders. Religions are becoming extremely important for Russians. Opinion polls reveal a kind of religious renascence which has changed a principal characteristics of social mentality. Religions have stopped being something private and intimate. They are back in politics and public life. While Russian religiosity is growing, the number of people who are ready to take some radical steps for the sake of this or that religion is growing too. This fact has become one of the major threats for the country.

Common trends show that religious associations are becoming very active in the 21st century. Practically all religious associations are vertically structured and have centralized management. Every religious association is a kind of organizational embodiment of certain religious practices. Such associations unite believers, guide them, and influence their religious and secular views. Nowadays, religious associations are the part of the Russian political system. Scientists note that "the leaders of 'ethnic' religions play the most prominent role in social and political life."[19]

Thus, on the one hand, the modern Russian legal system is secular. On the other hand, people have become very religious. Religious associations are developing and promoting religious practices which often cover not only issues of faith. Consequently, a number of questions have become extremely urgent. How should the state act under these new conditions? Should the basic principles of the state be changed? What might be some prospective changes for the state's development? These questions arise from the secular nature of the Russian state, and they are highly debatable.

These questions are debated at conferences, round table discussions, and workshops. Articles are published in the print media and on-line. People ranging from clergy and religious scholars to human rights activists and politicians take part in these discussions. Opinions about the secularism of the state depend on the views of the participants, and their attitudes toward religions. The starting points for such debates are the secularism of modern Russia that is fixed by the Constitution, fears of the atheistic past, and the desire of religious associations to find their place in the social and political system of Russia. All the participants in these debates can be conventionally divided into two groups.

The first group can be called "religionists." The clergy and believers are very active and forceful in pushing their agendas. Radicals have turned the problem of the secularism of the state into a conflict between secular and religious models of Russian social structures. Radicals consider secularism antireligious or atheistic, and believe that secularism is ineffective. It does not reflect objective reality.[20] Ideological neutrality will die out.

The now-deceased Patriarch Alexius II supported a more deliberate opinion. He believed that the secularism of the state did not contradict the Christian view of the role of the Church in society, but it was important to him how people interpreted the term "secularism." In "the Bases of the Social

[17] See: Religious Studies. Encyclopedic Dictionary. Moscow, 2006; Sociological Studies. 2005. No. 6 (in Russian).

[18] See: Russia in figures and numbers – 2011 URL: http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b11_11/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d1/02-08.htm (in Russian).

[19] See: S.B. Philatov, R.N. Lunkin, "The statistics of Russian Religiosity: the Magic of Numbers and Complex Reality," Sociological Studies. 2005. No. 6 (in Russian).

[20] See: Tagaev A. We should not turn secularism into atheism URL: http://www.regions.ru/news/location01774/2185166/ (in Russian).

Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church," it is said that the principle of the secular state cannot be understood as implying that religion should be radically forced out of all the spheres of the people's life, or that religious associations should be barred from decision-making on socially significant problems and deprived of the right to evaluate the actions of the authorities. This principle presupposes only a certain division of domains between church and state and their non-interference into each other's affairs. Alexius II believed that the secular state could admit the prominent role of this or that religion in the process of spiritual and cultural education of its people. This principle works in Greece and Cyprus, where Orthodoxy is a religion recognized by law, but the states are secular.[21] Russian Orthodox priests think that there is nothing wrong with governmental support of some of the most important religious associations, but religious associations should not perform the functions of public authorities in a secular state.[22] Russian Orthodox communities have initiated debates on whether Russia an Orthodox Christian country, or a secular state. Russian Orthodox Christians take into consideration Russian history and the fact that Russian Orthodoxy is the largest denomination in the country. They believe that Russia is primarily an Orthodox Christian state.

"Religionists" belonging to other religions do not like this approach. For example, Russian Muslims are against of the ideas proposed by the Russian Orthodox Church. A letter from Russian Muslims written in response to a letter by ten academics of the Russian Academy of Sciences protests the "clericalization of the country." The Muslims warn the public about the dangers of returning to the sorts of relationships between religions and the state which existed in Russia during the monarchy.[23]

The second group can be called "secularists." They are mostly scientists and representatives of public authorities. They express worry about the dangerous trend toward clericalization of the state power. They see a kind of withdrawal from the principles of secularism in the field of education. They think that freedom of conscience is not provided equally for everybody. "Secularists" claim that in fact not all religions are equal before the law, and criticize the idealization of the relationship between religions and the state before 1917.

During 2012-2014, the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, spoke about religiosity and secularism many times. In 2013, he said that "We are a secular state, of course, and cannot allow state life and church life to merge, but at the same time, we must avoid too a vulgar and primitive interpretation of what being secular means." He added that as a response to people's "vital need for moral support and spiritual guidance," the Russian Orthodox Church and other traditional religions of Russia "must have all the possibilities for carrying out full and real service in important areas such as supporting families and mothers, raising and educating children, youth policy, resolving the many social problems we still face, and strengthening patriotic spirit in the Armed Forces."[24]

The problems of secularism and religiosity in social and political life provoked intense debates. Scientists have different opinions about secularism in Russia.[25] They interpret secularism in different ways. They try to answer the question: should a secular state be neutral only towards religions, or towards all the worldviews that people might have? The majority of scientists interpret the concept of the secular state as a state that is neutral only towards religions. Different secular states have different models of secularism depending on historical and cultural backgrounds. In any case, they think that the state should not be indifferent to religions in favor of political compromises. The state may not cooperate with any favorite religious associations, even if some people think it would be for the common good. Some people oppose this idea. They believe the state should be neutral towards all worldviews that people might have. Only in this way would it be possible to preserve freedom of conscience and democracy, especially in such a multi-ethic and multi-religious country as Russia. Officials should not interpret secularism the way they like, because by doing that, they oppress political freedom and freedom of opinion. On the whole, we have three main interpretations of secularism. For some people "secular" stands for anti-religious. Some people think "secular" means irreligious. For others this term stands for

[21] See: Patriarch Alexius II. Spiritual Life is Like Daily Land Farming in Your Heart URL: http://www.pravmir.ru/printer_1008.html (in Russian).
[22] See: URL: http://palm.newsru.com/arch/religy/02nov2004/freiheit.html (in Russian).
[23] See: URL: http://www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=news&id=56354&topic=525 (in Russian).
[24] See: URL: http://en.ria.ru/russia/20130202/179180897.html
[25] See: URL: http://portal-credo.ru/site/?act=press&type=list&press_id=380 (in Russian)

neutrality toward all worldviews.

Some legal scholars believe that problems with secularism in modern Russia are provoked not only by religious associations and changes in social mentality, but also by gaps in the law. “There is a legal gap in the Russian Federation between the general characteristics of the state fixed by Article 1 of the Constitution and the principles of the secular state fixed by Article 14.” This gap makes secularism a kind of secondary characteristic of the Russian state. It is a serious problem for Russian law that a number of essential constitutional principles—such as freedom of religious and ideological choice, pluralism, and secularism—are not officially defined. These principles are also considered separate from each other. Religious scholars feel uneasy about the destructive nature of some religious associations. They speak about the problems of governmental control in this sphere. They pay attention to the conflicts between traditional religions and new religious movements. We should also keep in mind the threats that arise from fundamentalist religious doctrines, the need to take some preventive measures, etc.[26]

Debates on the problems of secularism also involve the secular character of education in the state and municipal educational institutions. Religious associations want to influence education in Russia, mostly true in junior, middle, and high schools. Religious education also exists. There are documents proving that the leading religions in modern Russia respect secularism in official education. But religious associations do not accept secular education unconditionally, because they oppose the spread of what they see as anti-religious ideas. Consequently, they oppose the monopoly of materialism. Religious associations also feel uneasy about the danger of any mystic, neo-pagan, and destructive sects which may influence education. Some religious associations also fear anti-Christian, anti-Islamic, and anti-Judaic ideas. Citing their desire for peace, cooperation, and consensus, each religious association tries to monopolize its worldview and its claim on truth. This is quite natural and typical of any religion. It is useless to dispute this right. Disputes between different religions about truth are everlasting. Nobody is right, nobody is wrong. But society needs not only spiritual and moral ideas, but also material things.

The problem of education is only one of the problems debated within the framework of secularism. The correlation between secularism and the right to freedoms of conscience and religion, fixed by the Constitution, is also intensely debated. All the approaches focus on the correlation between secularism and equality of all religious associations. Human values, ideologies, traditionalism and non-traditionalism, pacifism, and military service, all these things are crucial for the concept of secularism.

State secularism is one of the most significant axiological, theoretical, and methodological categories affecting the formation of state policies towards religious issues. Modern Russian state secularism presupposes a certain ideology in the field of laws on religions and religious associations. It should be noted that state secularism is the basis for democracy, because it provides equality of religious associations and freedom of worldviews. A secular state can only be sovereign when issues of the common good are involved. This is especially true for such a multi-ethic and multi-religious country as modern Russia. It is true that we have many questions to debate, and these questions require serious and well-reasoned answers. We think that the word community has the same problems, since the modern situation in the world is often described as the crisis of secularism and the rise of religions.

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THE CONTRIBUTION OF COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS TO COMICS STUDIES

Dušan Stamenković*, Miloš Tasić**
* Department of English, Faculty of Philosophy and Center for Cognitive Sciences
University of Niš, Ćirila i Metodija 2, 18000 Niš, Serbia
e-mail: dusan.stamenkovic@filfak.ni.ac.rs
** Department of Social Sciences, Faculty of Mechanical Engineering
University of Niš, Aleksandra Medvedeva 14, 18000 Niš, Serbia
e-mail: tmilos@masfak.ni.ac.rs

Abstract:
The aim of our paper is to present the ways in which cognitive linguistics has contributed to various developments in the domain of comics studies. After providing introductory remarks, the paper describes the main views found within the works of authors considered to be the precursors of contemporary comics studies, Will Eisner and Scott McCloud, with the intention of providing the basics that will facilitate the reader's understanding of the present issues. The main section of the paper contains the basic tenets of cognitive semantics, including the ideas traced in the works of the authors who have observed various types of comics from the cognitivist viewpoint. This section of the paper presents the research conducted thus far by a number of scientists who have engaged in drawing parallels between cognitivist theories and comics studies, including work on visual and multimodal metaphor and metonymy and the visual language of comics. This is followed by concluding remarks that end the paper.

Key words: comics, cognition, linguistics, conceptual metaphor, visual language.

1. Introduction

Comics studies is a relatively new academic field that deals with comic strips, comic books, and graphic novels. Although comics – as an instance of sequential art which dates back to prehistoric times – precede film and some other forms of visual art, they have long been regarded as nothing more than a popular pastime. As Will Eisner, one of the forefathers of modern comics, duly notices:

> "[F]or reasons having much to do with usage, subject matter and perceived audience, sequential art was for many decades generally ignored as a form worthy of scholarly discussion. While each of the major integral elements, such as design, drawing, caricature and writing, have separately found academic consideration, this unique combination took a long time to find a place in the literary, art and comparative literature curriculums. I believe that the reason for slow critical acceptance sat as much on the shoulders of the practitioner as the critic." (Eisner 1985/2008: xi)

However, things have changed dramatically in recent times, with scientists and researchers from various, even seemingly unrelated, areas of academia contributing to the literature on comics studies. One such field is cognitive linguistics, where several authors have endeavoured to apply the fundamental cognitivist principles and practices to the study of phenomena in comics. This paper is an attempt to provide a concise overview of the work done within the cognitivist framework relating to comics studies.

Section 2 of the paper sheds light on the precursors of contemporary comics studies, Will Eisner and Scott McCloud. It is intended to outline the basics of comics studies to facilitate the reader's understanding of the present issues. Section 3 contains the basic tenets of cognitive semantics, with particular emphasis on the ideas traced in the works of the authors who have observed various types of comics from the cognitivist viewpoint. Conceptual Metaphor Theory and Conceptual Blending Theory, as well as the notion of *embodiment*, will be explained in this section. Most importantly, sub-sections 3.1

and 3.2 of this paper present the research conducted thus far by a number of scientists who have drawn parallels between cognitivist theories and comics studies, including work on visual and multimodal metaphor and metonymy and the visual language of comics, among other things. The paper ends with concluding remarks.

2. The Beginnings of Contemporary Comics Studies

2.1. The Pioneering Work of Will Eisner

Despite rare early ventures into the study of comics as a proper art form (e.g. Kunzle 1973; Seldes 1957; Sheridan 1973), it was not until the first book in Will Eisner's trilogy of instructional books – *Comics and Sequential Art* – was published in 1985 that serious academic research was directed towards examining this medium, which had previously been viewed predominantly as a merely popular phenomenon. What Eisner set out to do was to define comics as a form of reading, an art which possesses and communicates in its own language (a notion further expanded and examined in detail by Neil Cohn, as we will see later on), whose "disciplined application [...] creates the 'grammar' of sequential art" (Eisner 1985/2008: 2). Throughout the three books, the other two being *Graphic Storytelling and Visual Narrative* (1996) and *Expressive Anatomy for Comics and Narrative* (published posthumously with Peter Poplaski in 2008), the famous cartoonist, who spent over eighteen years teaching a course in Sequential Art at the School of Visual Arts in New York, scrutinizes various aspects of the medium, from the earliest instances of its creation by the artist/author to its consumption by the end user, i.e. the reader.

The first book in the series deals primarily with "the unique aesthetics of sequential art as a means of creative expression [...] studied within the framework of its application to comic books and comic strips" (Eisner 1985/2008: xi). Consequently, the author pays attention to how imagery and timing are used in comics to perform their fundamental function of communicating ideas and/or stories, and how the experiential basis of the artist helps her or him to achieve this feat. The largest chapter of the book is dedicated to the 'frame' or 'panel' as an indispensable tool in this creative process, and it shows how it is used to encapsulate the view and act as both a narrative device and a structural support. Even here, when Eisner talks about the function of perspective and how the reader's response is influenced by her or his position as a spectator, a cognitive linguist can easily recognize that the author in fact entertains the notion of 'embodiment,' something which, as mentioned below, plays a crucial role in cognitivist theory. The first book also contains a discussion on using sequential art to tell stories and an examination of expressive anatomy, ideas which were subsequently employed as cornerstones of the next two books in the series. Thus, the second book is concentrated on a basic understanding of narration with graphics, where comics are to some extent compared to film and theatre, which both use graphics and text or dialogue to narrate a story. Finally, the third book in the series elaborates on the chapter on expressive anatomy from the first book, and puts its focus on the mastery of the body grammar of the human figure as one of the most important skills which an artist should possess in order to communicate her or his ideas effectively.

2.2. McCloud's Expansion of Comics Studies

In *Understanding Comics: The Invisible Art*, Scott McCloud (1993/2004) starts from Will Eisner's definition of comics as "sequential art," claiming that a more precise definition of comics would demand "a little aesthetic surgery" that would allow us to separate its form from its content. The art form of comics is viewed as a vessel that can hold a number of ideas or images. The original Eisner definition is expanded to cover "juxtaposed pictorial and other images in deliberate sequence, intended to convey information and/or to produce an aesthetic response in the viewer" (McCloud 1993/2004: 9). After providing a brief history of comics, McCloud analyzes facets of vocabulary and visual iconography used in comics to elaborate the ways in which they communicate meaning. McCloud links comics to the phenomenon of *closure*, i.e. observing the parts but perceiving the whole; comics panels "fracture both time and space, offering a jagged staccato rhythm of unconnected moments" (McCloud 1993/2004: 67). Besides this, McCloud offers an analysis of time frames in comics, claiming that interaction between time and comics is essentially based on sound (word balloons and sound effects) or motion (panel-to-panel closure and motion within panels). A large section of McCloud's study is dedicated to how comics can represent abstract phenomena related to emotions and senses, as well as to how words and pictures interact and get combined to convey information. Like any other form of art, comics follow the path leading from the original ideas and moving through lines of form, idiom, structure, and craft toward a purpose. McCloud concludes that comics are a great balancing act, being both subtractive and additive, and offering a range of possibilities for combining imagery and the written word, all while the language of comics continues to evolve.[1]

3. Cognitive Semantics as a Framework for Comics Studies

This study will present two cognitive strands in the studies of comics, both of which stem from the Chomskyan premise that the nature of language depends on its coding in the minds of speakers. One of them is based on Ray Jackendoff's approach, positioned on the boundary between generative linguistics and cognitive linguistics, whereas the other draws on cognitive linguistics proper and the works of George Lakoff, Mark Johnson, Mark Turner, Gilles Fauconnier, etc. When it comes to studying comics, perhaps the most important facet of Jackendoff's approach (e.g. Jackendoff 1983, 1990, 2002) is the fact that he attempts to link language to other cognitive capacities, especially music (e.g. Jackendoff and Lerdahl 2006). For instance, he proposes that music is not a mere stream of sounds. If one is familiar with the musical "idiom," then she or he understands it by recognizing patterns belonging to its grammar. Therefore, if we claim that music has a grammar, then we open a set of questions resembling those we tend to ask when it comes to language – questions related to the grammar's acquisition, its learned and innate part, its relation to general cognitive capacities, and its mental representations and comprehension. It becomes clear why Jackendoff's approach is valuable in the sphere of comics. If we view comics and visual languages in general as another cognitive capacity, then we can talk about its structure, a grammar that could organize its elements and the kind of meaning they might convey. We could also, in turn, attempt to compare comics to music, language, and other capacities.

When we consider cognitive linguistics proper, we can say that comics studies have so far made good use of *Conceptual Metaphor Theory* (henceforth CMT) and *Conceptual Blending Theory* (henceforth CBT), both of which are closely linked to the *embodied mind thesis* (Lakoff and Johnson 1999). The embodiment hypothesis is based on the idea that all aspects of cognition and the human mind are largely determined by the form and functioning of the human body. CMT (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Lakoff 1993) is one of the main vehicles of cognitive semantics. Perhaps the most fundamental notion in CMT is the notion of *mapping*. This term refers to systematic metaphorical correspondences between closely related ideas. In the CMT system, the features of one domain are said to "map" onto the ontological or structural features of another domain. Other elements of the *source domain* are likewise "mapped" onto elements of the *target domain* (Lakoff 1993; Grady 2007). The constancy with which different languages employ the same metaphors – which often appear to be perceptually based – has led to the idea that the mapping between conceptual domains corresponds to neural mappings in the human brain (Feldman and Narayanan 2004: 385–392). According to CMT, metaphors provide rich evidence about the ways in which some aspects of our lived experience are associated with others, for reasons that reflect basic aspects of perception, thought, and neurological organization. Within cognitive linguistics, the term 'metaphor' is understood to refer to a pattern of conceptual associations, rather than to an individual metaphorical use or a linguistic convention (Grady 2007: 188–189). Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 5) describe the essence of metaphor as "understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another." The conceptual essence of metaphors has gradually led towards studying metaphor in non-linguistic domains, and such studies have been labelled the studies of multimodal metaphor. These are based on the claim that "if researching non-verbal and not-purely-verbal metaphor does not yield robust findings, this jeopardizes the Lakoff-and-Johnsonian presupposition that we think metaphorically" (Forceville and Urios-Aparisi 2009: 4). Finally, CBT (Fauconnier and Turner 2002) offers a view in which elements belonging to different domains and mental spaces get blended together in a subconscious process: the blended space contains not only the elements from both domains, but also vital relations existing between or among them. Blending is an everyday process which is used in basic construals of our reality, no matter how complex it might be. It accounts for a whole variety of human faculties, including language, mathematics, music, visual arts, etc. Blends are very frequent in comics, whereas studying visual blends and their comprehension might reveal some aspects related to comics cognition.

[1] For more recent studies in this direction, consult Bramlett 2012; Dean 2000; Groensteen 2009, 2013; Hague 2014; Heer and Worcester 2009; Kukkonen 2013; McCloud 2006, 2007; Miller 2001; Saraceni 2003; Varnum and Gibbons 2007; Wolk 2008.

3.1. Charles Forceville and Other Authors Examining Comics within a Cognitivist Framework

As every theory strives towards eventually becoming universal, and bearing in mind that the work done within both CMT and CBT was for years concentrated exclusively on verbal or linguistic manifestations of the underlying conceptual phenomena, it should not come as a surprise that a faction of researchers decided to look elsewhere for proof that these theories can truly be applied to all aspects of human life and behaviour (Tasić and Stamenković 2013). The most prominent figure among these is Charles Forceville, who has worked prolifically on pictorial (visual) and multimodal metaphor and metonymy and has produced a number of publications on the topic, beginning with his paper on pictorial metaphor in the works of Rene Magritte and other surrealists (Forceville 1988). This was followed by his research into the presence and use of pictorial metaphor in the field of marketing, which culminated in 1996 with *Pictorial Metaphor in Advertising*. Here, Forceville (1996: 64–65) draws our attention to the four criteria which have to be taken into consideration when attempting to find a satisfying definition for pictorial metaphor:

> "1. For a pictorial representation to be called metaphorical, it is necessary that a 'literal', or conventional reading of the pictorial representation is felt either not to exhaust its meaning potential, or to yield an anomaly which is understood as an intentional violation of the norm rather than as an error. [...]
> 2. Considerable confusion has arisen from the fact that the word 'metaphor' has both been used in the broad sense in which it is more or less equivalent with 'trope', and in a much more narrow sense in which it is used as one trope among many others [...]. Any model of pictorial metaphor should specify whether it claims to cover metaphor in the broad or in the narrow sense. [...] Since this is a task of intimidating proportions, it seems advisable, for the time being, to concentrate on 'pictorial metaphor' in the narrow sense.
> 3. An account of pictorial metaphor should show an awareness that a metaphor has two distinctive terms, one the primary subject or tenor, the other the secondary subject or vehicle, which are usually non-reversible. This entails that the transfer or mapping of features is from secondary subject (on)to primary subject, and not vice versa. The account must furthermore indicate by what mechanisms the identities of primary subject and secondary subject are established.
> 4. For the identification of the two terms of the metaphor, their labelling as primary subject and secondary subject, as well as for the interpretation of the metaphor, it is necessary to take various contextual levels into consideration. These contextual levels are partly text-internal, partly text-external."

With the theoretical foundations laid, Forceville eventually moved to the medium which would prove to be the most fertile ground for researching both pictorial (purely visual) and multimodal (image + text) metaphor. His work on manifestations of conceptual metaphor in comics began with his article on the visual representations of anger in an *Asterix* album (Forceville 2005). Based on the work of Zoltan Kövecses on Idealized Cognitive Models (ICM) of various human emotions (Kövecses 1986, 2000, 2002), particularly on the metaphor ANGER IS THE HEAT OF A FLUID IN A CONTAINER, Forceville shows how anger can be represented in a graphic medium using comics-specific tools that often do not have adequate linguistic counterparts. The ability of the visual medium of comics to emphasize eyes, mouths, hand/arm positions and volume, something which can easily be traced back to Will Eisner's work, makes them particularly good at representing certain manifestations of anger. Forceville points out multiple pictorial signals of anger in the *Asterix* album, including bulging or tightly closed eyes, a wide or tightly closed mouth, a red/pink face, the position of arms or hands, shaking, etc. This is where he also introduces the notion of *pictorial runes* (as taken from Kennedy 1982), which we will return to later. Bart Eerden (2009) elaborates on Forceville's findings, again using the examples from the *Asterix* comics, only this time accompanied by the examples from animated films as well. He divides the signs of anger into two major groups, one being the aforementioned pictorial runes and the other indexical signs, both of which are metonymically motivated as claimed by Forceville in the former paper. He goes on to propose that video games can also be of interest to researchers seeking to find representations of various emotions in new media.

Other emotions have been the subject of research as well. Shinohara and Matsunaka (2009) analyze pictorial metaphors of emotion in Japanese comics, supporting Forceville's argument that many of the metaphors expressed through both the verbal modality and other (non-verbal) modalities seemingly share the same fundamental motivation that lies in the mappings between conceptual domains. Their analysis includes emotions such as anger, happiness, love, anxiety, surprise, and disappointment, showing that conceptual metaphors are shared by verbal and visual modalities, but also that differences can emerge due to the nature of each modality even though basic conceptual mappings are shared by both of them, leading to the conclusion that metaphor is a matter of concept and cognition not limited to language. Abbot and Forceville (2011) also tackle the matter of visual representation of emotions in *manga* by examining the 'loss of hands' as an unusual signal which conveys that a character is emotionally affected or has 'lost control' in *Azumanga Daioh*, a popular Japanese comic. The authors manage to show how non-facial information helps express emotion in manga and demonstrate the way in which the artist uses hand loss to contribute to the characterization of the comics' main actors. As is the case with previous efforts, Abbott and Forceville successfully utilize their findings to support the theorization of emotion in CMT.

Some of the basic tenets of Conceptual Metaphor Theory have also been employed in the examinations of visual metaphors in newspapers and editorial cartoons. Elisabeth El Refaie (2003, 2009) uses examples from political cartoons to explore the "grammar" of visual metaphor. She argues that it is impossible to adequately describe visual metaphors in formal terms only, and that they must be considered visual representations of metaphorical thoughts or concepts, which would lead to a proper cognitive definition of metaphor. She also suggests that "[w]hile language is perhaps more precise in expressing some areas of meaning, other meanings may be shown more easily and more effectively in images rather than in words" (El Refaie 2003: 85). Furthermore, starting from the claim that many metaphors derive from our bodily experience, which makes them easily understood in similar ways by all human beings, El Refaie shows that the interpretation of metaphors is partly dependent upon people's socio-cultural background and the contexts in which the metaphors are used. The results of her research into the ways in which political metaphors in newspaper cartoons are understood by viewers from different backgrounds suggest that "some metaphorical mappings [...], such as those between size and power/status and between movement through space and the passing of time, might be understood more generally and at a more intuitive level than more elaborate structural metaphors" (El Refaie 2009: 190). Bounegru and Forceville (2011) take on the similar task of examining political editorial cartoons that portray the global financial crisis, and show how they rely heavily on pictorial and multimodal metaphors, which themselves are rooted in conceptual metaphors.

Finally, Charles Forceville's work on the aforementioned *pictorial runes* and their presence in comics deserves mentioning. In Forceville's words, "pictorial runes can be described as non-mimetic graphic elements that contribute narratively salient information, [and the e]xamples of pictorial runes are lines behind a running character to indicate speed, a halo of droplets around a character's head to suggest she is emotionally affected, and the wavy lines above a garbage bin to convey its smell" (Forceville 2011: 875). Even though he does not make the distinction at first (Forceville 2005), in his article on pictorial runes in a *Tintin* album, Forceville (2011: 876) distinguishes between pictorial runes and *pictograms* (skulls, lightning, flames, etc.), with the former having no inherent meaning whatsoever, while the latter still carry some meaning with them due to their mimetic character. The author here claims that pictorial runes are, in fact, metonymically motivated Peircian indices, which can thus be linked to the "embodied cognition" view that serves as the basis of the cognitivist approach. A preliminary catalogue of pictorial runes found in the studied comics album is presented, comprising *speed lines*, *movement lines*, *droplets*, *spikes*, *spiral*, and *twirl*, along with several special cases. Forceville concludes his article by proposing that "[p]ictorial runes [...] constitute a rudimentary "language" that is used to (help) visualize non-visible events and experiences understood to take place, or to have taken place, in a static medium" (Forceville 2011: 888). In the next section, we will take a closer look at how Neil Cohn draws on the principles of cognitive linguistics (among other things) in an attempt to constitute a legitimate visual language of comics.

3.2. Neil Cohn's Approach to the Visual Language of Comics

Neil Cohn has authored a number of very influential papers in the field of visual language (e.g. Cohn 2005, 2010, 2011, 2012a), with his approach largely based on the way in which Jackendoff compared languages to other human faculties. Cohn treats structured sequential images as visual language – drawn structures have the ability to constitute a visual language in a similar way in which structured sequential sounds can become a spoken language, and in which structured hand and body motions can constitute a sign language. An analogy in this direction can easily be made: individual manual expressions (which have no grammar) are to sign languages (that use a grammar) what individual drawn images (which again have no grammar) are to visual languages (which all have a grammar). Cohn's intention is "not to force equivalencies between the structures used in verbal and visual forms, [... nor] to make direct mappings between spoken and visual language, but rather to understand how the two systems use analogous functions and units of organization" (Cohn 2012a: §Future Research: "Visual Linguistics"). At the same time, the different areas of visual language studies can follow the major branches of linguistics, these being *graphemics*, *photology* (visual analogues to *phonetics* and *phonology*), *morphology*, *semantics*, and *grammar*, as well as *multimodality* and *visual language acquisition*. His approach to visual languages builds around what he dubs The Principle of Equivalence, which states that we "should expect that the mind/brain treats all expressive capacities in similar ways, given modality-specific constraints" (Cohn 2013: 195). Whereas they operate within a different modality, visual languages have both *meanings* and *grammars*, and share many features with their verbal and sign counterparts. The elements that build a visual language include its graphic structure, morphology, and sequences which are to be decoded, and these elements are organized by means of a navigational structure which directs us in regard to the beginning of a sequence and its progression. These graphic elements lead us to a conceptual structure, with further possibilities for studying event and narrative structures. Neil Cohn's study *The Visual Language of Comics* (2013) offers a comprehensive approach that would account for a variety of visual traditions and the underlying cognitive mechanisms (Stamenković 2014). The book looks at many issues related to the cognitive study of comics, starting from an exploration of visual morphology. Cohn defines the notion of a 'visual lexicon' and analyzes both open-class and closed-class lexical items. When it comes to open-class lexical items, Cohn sees these as having conventionalized schematic features determined by the author. These schematic representations and patterns are combined into larger, novel forms in the same way that sounds are combined into words, and words into sentences. As far as closed-class lexical items are concerned, Cohn divides them into bound morphemes within the process of visual affixation (i.e. carriers such as thought bubbles, speech balloons, and indexical lines, as well as path and deictic lines, impact stars, and upfixes), umlauts, action stars and fight clouds within the process of suppletion, and elements involved in the process of reduplication. Cohn also provides an account of ideas related to sequential image comprehension, panel transitions, linear coherence relationships, promiscuous transitions, and general cognitive scripts and schemas, followed by a proposal of the basic narrative categories, including orienters, establishers, initials, prolongations, peaks and releases. These categories serve as the parts of speech/grammatical functions in Visual Narrative Grammar. He also discusses constituent structure in visual narrative and the possibilities for modification, and analyzes page layouts, variations, comprehension and constraints related to the notion of external compositional structure, embedding structures, descriptive tree structures, and the infinite canvas. Perhaps the most influential part of Cohn's book is the one dealing with Cognition of Visual Language, built on empirical data from the author's doctoral dissertation (Cohn 2012b), and a range of data coming from other related papers. All these studies aimed at discovering what happens in the human brain in the process of decoding visual language. Starting with various attempts to tackle the cognition of graphic morphology, such as motion lines and carriers, the author goes on to discuss our comprehension of narrative grammar – narrative categories, separation of structure and meaning, and constituent structure – with the aid of a series of ERP/EEG and fMRI experiments. The results of these experiments were comparable to those acquired in similar experiments related to spoken languages. For instance, the N400 effect was evoked by violations of meaning, whereas the P600 effect was initiated by violation and/or manipulation of narrative grammar in comics. Cohn explores three different visual languages – the American Visual Language (AVL), the Japanese Visual Language (JVL) and the Central Australian Visual Language (CAVL). For each of them, Cohn provides a description of the graphic structure, morphology and narrative grammar, while highlighting the unique features of each. When dealing with AVL, Cohn differentiates between visual languages and dialects. When exploring JVL, he deals with some elements of visual language transmission and contact. With CAVL, its description is linked to its cultural role, and to static and dynamic signs and compounds in its lexicon. Through this description, Cohn proves that although these different visual languages are composed of different lexicons and grammars, they share the basic underlying principles rooted in our cognition and therefore transcend culture. Cohn's study offers many possibilities for future research. He lists possible directions of further investigations of visual language: conceptual structure and semantics, multimodality, visual language acquisition, linguistic typology, historical linguistics, comparative and contact linguistics, anthropological linguistics, sociolinguistics, computational linguistics, and cognitive neuroscience. Finally, Cohn believes that the "split between the sociocultural object/context ('comics') and the structural/cognitive system ('visual language') is the key to future research of the graphic form in the linguistic sciences," the focus being "not just on 'comics,' but on the system they are written in and how the mind works to create meaning." In this way, the ultimate objects of the study should be "the abstract representations and principles in the human mind that motivate comprehension of various domains" (Cohn 2012a: §Visual Language versus Comics).

4. Conclusions

By presenting a number of studies that employ a cognitivist position in researching comics, we have witnessed its seemingly vast potential for contributing to the further development of comics studies. However, this relationship does not function in a single direction. On the one hand, the application of such an academically accepted framework gives legitimacy to the still young and not fully established field of comics studies, while providing it with novel and interesting ways of examining the works of "the ninth art." On the other hand, the fact that comics are closely related to our cognitive capacities allows us to consider them to be adequate material for proving that cognitivist principles are, indeed, universal, and not merely related to only one channel of expression. Further research in this area will likely expand both of the above disciplines.

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Book reviews

Alexandru Surdu, *Filosofia pentadică. Existența nemijlocită* [*Pentadic Philosophy. The Unmediated Existence*], Editura Academiei Române / Editura Ardealul, Bucureşti / Târgu-Mureş, 2014

Viorel Vizureanu

The third and most recently published volume of the pentalogy offered by Alexandru Surdu, after *The Problem of the Transcendence* (2012) and *The Theory of the Subsistence* (2012), is focused, as the title itself reveals, on the category of Existence.

Among modern philosophy, more relativistic and prone to fragmentation than ever, Alexandru Surdu's approach is quite remarkable for attempting to forcefully reinvigorate systematic and categorial philosophy by revealing a perennial structure of reality (in a wide sense). The five central categories of his systematic and dialectical philosophy are: Transcendence or Subsistence, Existence, Being, Reality, and Real Existence (due to the complexity and particularity of these concepts in Surdu's work, we can only send readers to the author's original texts for definitions of these categories).

In his own pentadic view, "the Beginning is Subsistence, and its outside (*es*-, *ex*-) manifestation is Existence, independent from the other 'components' of the World," i.e. independent from Being, Reality, and Real Existence. Moreover, it is a manifestation "for someone, who is *the man*, but without any other intermediary, which means that it will be Unmediated Existence" (p. 11).

An important aim of this particular volume is to differentiate what the author calls the Theory of Existence from (classic) ontology. But, as Surdu states, "[o]ntology studies an existence, on the one hand, considered to be independent from man; on the other hand, it includes him together with his whole social life, and, what is most difficult to avoid, all the scientific knowledge, more or less accepted, about the structure of different types of physical, chemical, and biological substances that the objects consist of" (p. 11).

The Theory of Existence will bypass for him all this scientific knowledge (very valuable philosophically speaking, but without relevance here), speaking instead of the pure, unmediated manifestations of Subsistence to human senses. We will see then at work an approach which is close to the Hegelian one from *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, but in a different categorical framework and interpretation. It will be thus a return, but not one "in the real time, to the beginning of civilization (phylogenetic, so to speak), and not also to our own childhood (ontogenetic) or that of our fellows, because we suppose that the man in question is a mature one" (12).

Another of the main goals of the work is to highlight the difference between Existence and Being, in order to avoid many misunderstandings present in contemporary philosophy. Surdu makes a helpful appeal to Aristotle, who introduced to philosophy some crucial distinctions, speaking of unmediated existence and our knowledge of it, sensory knowledge (*he aisthetike*) and its relation through the representation (*he phantasia*), as well as noetic knowledge (*he noetike*). Surdu believes that by making these conceptual differentiations, Aristotle made "a first attempt, and a masterful one, (…) to explain the 'transition' from Existence to Being" (p. 12). This means, in the author's words, the transition "from the manifestation of Subsistence as Unmediated Existence, as It *exists*, through the multiplicity of natural bodies (*ta onta*), to the thoughts (*ta noemata*) about them, to their Being (*to einai*)" (p. 12).

In fact, for Alexandru Surdu the Aristotelian approach offers an insurmountable model, because the Stagirite "knew better than anyone, from his world as from ours, what *sensitivity* (*ti esti*) is, as he was the founder of a psychology that in many respects is still valid today, as well as what *thinking* is, as he was also the founder of logic, which as a theory of reason (*logos*) will never be exceeded" (p. 13).

Not counting the foreword and introductory remarks, the volume contains five parts: "Existentialization," "The manifestations of the Unmediated Existence," "The corporality of the Unmediated Existence," "The Whole of the Unmediated Existence," and "The mental psycho-gnosiological mental operations." Let me stress here only that *existentialization*, an original concept of Alexandru Surdu, means for him "the *manifestation* of Subsistence, its *action* on the *five* human sense organs, but also the different *effects* of this action" (p. 53).

In his foreword, the author announces that he is working on the other two parts of his pentadic philosophy dedicated to Reality and Real Existence, which he admits will be the largest ones of his entire system of philosophy. We can only await with great interest the future development and accomplishment of this imposing and original contemporary Romanian systematic philosopher.

Peter R. Costello, *Layers in Husserl's phenomenology: on Meaning and Intersubjectivity* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012), 226 pp.

Maria Dimitrova and Alexander Gungov
University of Sofia
e-mail: agungov@phls.uni-sofia.bg

Since ancient times, two types of philosophical literature have been developing: original works and commentaries. As is clear from the title of this book, it belongs to the second type. Nevertheless, this does not mean it should be disregarded. Just the opposite, as once again we find the original reacquiring its relevance and value from a new commentary.

In the time since Edmund Husserl's works were initially published in the early 20[th] century, his disciples have created a full-fledged philosophical school. This is the phenomenological movement whose influence has spread on a truly global scale. It is good to see that the dissemination of Husserl's ideas has not ceased, but continues on and on. It is evident from our position in South East Europe that Canada, where the book has been published, is one of the countries in which phenomenological topics have been intensively developed. It appears that the Canadian academic atmosphere itself favors discussions on Continental Philosophy and, in particular, Phenomenology.

When a new philosophical perspective is launched, what was the case with Husserl's phenomenology, it cannot be described just as a clash of *pro* and *contra* arguments, because this would imply prior tacit agreement concerning former paradigm benchmarks. Genuine philosophy contests an established paradigm (its most critical function) and offers a new paradigm (which is its constructive work). However, these two functions—the critical and the constructive—are inseparable, and together create an entirely new philosophical vision, a vision which itself requires the creation of a new language in order to articulate it. To understand a new philosophy and new language is not an easy task, and it is even more difficult to adopt the new philosophy situate it within the history of philosophy.

The redefinition of fundamental notions that takes place in a new philosophical system leads to an upheaval of philosophy's different layers, as well as a shift in the links among them; this requires a new reading of all old notions, and of the text as a whole. One who sticks to the previous system of meaning will not be able to recognize the new notions at all. The great difficulty both for philosophical and non-philosophical discourse springs from the fact that a thing can only exist in our speech, thought, and action when it has been *named*, and yet genuinely different philosophies name things in different ways. This is why a newly emerging language requires translation, comparison, explanation, and a return to its origins, lest it remain indecipherable. These concerns should put Peter Castello's new book in demand, since he is trying to meet just such needs. This book demonstrates that interpretation and commentary are not efforts that we can afford to ignore. This genre corresponds to what is called 'research' in the academia.

Castello explains that Husserl's position aims to describe human experience beginning with the fact that the subject not is derivable from the object, nor the object from the subject, but rather that the object and the subject are always united. An even a more significant discovery is that the subject is always *with* other subjects, and that the structure of this relationship, which is called 'intersubjectivety,' essentially impacts the intentionality of consciousness and the truth of objects in the world. Castello introduces his readers to Husserl's terminology with admirable clarity and consistency. The author is guided in his study by the notion of layering. He uses this notion not so much to show the construction of objects of experience as to model the subject's actions. The subject is also multilayered, which causes difficulties in presenting its structure; moreover, it is persists in experience both as a layer and as the wholeness of intersubjectivity. Castello himself aims to prove "that layering occurs for Husserl not despite but *because of* the gaps between layers that either were not fully coincident, or were coincident only while preserving the distinction or conflict between them."[1]

The book offers five chapters. Chapter 1 examines Husserl's evidence of the layering of puzzling objects, layering that can either provoke perceptual hesitation or put one in conflict or in harmony with oneself, affecting one's relationship with others. Chapter 2 explains how Husserl articulates layering in terms of differences and alterities. It concludes that essences are intuitable by means of others with which one is always already paired. Chapter 3 is focused on the transcendental Ego and its embodiment. It would be helpful for the reader referred back to Kant concerning the transcendental subject at this stage. Chapter 4 discusses two conditions of the structural organization of experience: internal time consciousness and the relations of wholes to parts. The subject is simultaneously a whole, a piece, and a moment, and thereby serves as both the initiator and the receiver of layerings. The final chapter underlines Husserl's idea of overlaying-at-a-distance, which influenced later Continental Philosophy. Castello traces it in Maurice Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology and Emmanuel Levinas's ethics, although he does so in a rather cursory manner. Regrettably, this study goes very little beyond an interpretation of Husserl's own words. In addition to discussions of Merleau-Ponty and Levinas, it would have been helpful for Castello to add further comparisons of Husserl's ideas with those introduced by his disciples, such as Martin Heidegger, Alfred Schuz, Gustav Shpet, Jean-Paul Sartre, etc. However, this limitation is also an advantage. Concentrating on Husserl guarantees that Castello can fully explicate Husserl's intellectual fluctuation from the point of view of the unity of the phenomenological method, and of course, as is most important for Castello, he can reconstruct human experience as overlayering.

[1] Peter R. Costello, *Layers in Husserl's phenomenology. On Meaning and Intersubjectivity* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012), 7.