Language: English Pages: 6-21 DOI: https://doi.org/10.5840/bjp20251712 Keywords: emotions, formal and particular objects, enactivism, existentialism, affordances,
embodiment, imperatives Abstract: It is widely agreed that emotions have intentional objects. In fact, they are said to represent both formal objects (e.g., fear represents danger) and particular objects (e.g., one might be afraid of a spider or an exam). But there is little agreement about how emotions represent. The challenge of explaining how emotions represent is deepened on theories that associate emotions with somatic states of some kind (e.g., William James’s view that emotions are feelings of bodily change). Emotions represent things outside the body, but somatic states, such as bodily perceptions, are usually thought to represent bodily things. This puzzle (called here the Somantodox) has been addressed in a variety of ways. A number of proposals are reviewed here: embodied appraisal theory, affordances, Sartre’s existential theory, and enactivism. Building on the strengths and weaknesses of these, a new proposal i s offered called the embodied imperative theory, according to which the body imparts a sense of to-be-doneness. Rather than saying fear represents danger, it would be more perspicuous, on this proposal, to say fear represents an object or situation as something to-be-escaped. This is termed a core-dynamic theme.
Language: English Pages: 22-37 DOI: https://doi.org/10.5840/bjp20251713 Keywords: music; language; semantics; conceptual blending; grounding; representation Abstract: The article introduces the author’s model of contextual constraints on the generation of musical meaning in an effort to suggest how the approach may be of interest to philosophers pursuing the problem of representation. Since the model is based on insights of linguistic semantics, representation is defined as an amodal functionalist construct relating music perception to an extramusical experience, which assumes varying degrees of imagistic and/or referential specificity. The theory proposes six such degrees, or “grounding boxes”: perceptual, cross-modal, affective, conceptual, culturally rich, and personal. In doing so, it turns classical dichotomies in musical semantics into continua, which lead the cognizer from more general to more concrete, more intra- to more extramusical, more formal to more referential, more perceptual to more conceptual, and finally more ineffable to more representational sets of connotations. The system is illustrated with the analysis of the Ming the Merciless leit-motif from the 1980 science-fiction film "Flash Gordon", composed by Freddie Mercury and performed by Queen.
Language: English Pages: 38-53 DOI: ..................... Keywords: biological grounding; decoupled representations; evolution; learning; nervous system Abstract: This paper is concerned with the question of where representations begin, i.e., tries to answer the question of which are the simplest organisms that possess representations. This question is addressed to two types of representations: basic representations, which coordinate sensory input with motor output, and decoupled representations, which collect environmental information without being directly tied to specific behaviors. To answer this question, I will adopt an evolutionary approach by which each kind of representation will be mapped onto different stages of the evolution of the nervous system. More precisely, I will argue that basic representations emerged when a simple neural system appeared, while decoupled representations will be linked to the formation of a central nervous system that enables off-line simulation abilities. Such an evolutionary framework will provide empirical reasons to establish which are the minimal conditions that an organism must fulfill in order to qualify as representational, with respect to both basic and decoupled representations. In other words, I will argue that the biological grounding of both types of representations serves as the demarcation element that helps answer the question of where basic and decoupled representations begin.
Language: English Pages: 54-66 DOI: https://doi.org/10.5840/bjp20251715 Keywords: It is commonly thought that an intentionalist account of perceptual experience
accounts for the representational aspects of experiences better than the alternative, disjunctivist
account. The contrary is argued here. Disjunctivism can account better for the person-level representational contents of experiences, in light of the distinctive features of those contents. Abstract: perceptual content, phenomenal content, na¨ıve realism, disjunctivism, intentionalism
Language: English Pages: 67-79 DOI: https://doi.org/10.5840/bjp20251716 Keywords: representationalism, consciousness, qualia, Rosenthal, non-conscious mentality Abstract: n this paper I discuss Rosenthal’s theory of consciousness. Being in a conscious state, according to his view, consists in having an appropriate higher order mental representation – a higher order thought (HOT) about a lower order non-conscious state. I will explain the key points of his theory and discuss several problems, such as the status of qualia in explaining the phenomenal character of sensory experience, versus the role of the HOT content accompanying such states. A version of this problem also underlies the tension in reconciling Rosenthal’s view that all mental states are intentional, with the view that sensory states are non-intentional, exhibiting qualitative properties. Finally, I raise a dilemma concerning the nature of transitive consciousness attributed to HOTs. If transitive consciousness is factive, and thoughts are not, how can all HOTs constitute transitive awareness?
Language: English Pages: 80-91 DOI: https://doi.org/10.5840/bjp20251717. Keywords: Searle, Ayer, Perception, Sense Data, Object Abstract: .John R. Searle criticized the sense-datum theory of perception, particularly A. J. Ayer’s version of it (Searle, 2015). According to Searle, (i) Ayer subscribes to the view that physical objects are not directly perceived but mind-dependent sense-data (Searle, 2015). Following this, Searle says, (ii) Ayer committed the conclusion of the “Bad Argument”: “any argument that attempts to treat the perceptual experience as an actual or possible object of experience” (Searle, 2015). This paper revisits (i) and (ii). It will show that while (i) and (ii) are compatible with the sense-datum theory in general, it has some reservations when it applies to Ayer’s version of it. Hence, Searle’s refutation of Ayer warrants reconsideration.
Language: English Pages: 92-107 DOI: https://doi.org/10.5840/bjp20251718 Keywords: representation; enactivism; perception; self; literacy Abstract: The paper argues that the fundamental claim of approaches to cognition that are 'representation-eschewing,' such as the enactive one, must have been more intuitively plausible in some cultures where the self is not understood in terms of an inner entity that can feel alienated or separated from the world. Taking cues from ancient literature, the paper demonstrates that even a simple act of perception is understood differently in some ancient cultures. It was more like an activity spread across eyes and objects and not simply an internal event receiving input from the world. This involves understanding oneself as continuous with the rest of existence. Accordingly, there was hardly any need to posit discrete representations inside that stand for objects outside. This suggests that approaches to cognition that are representation-eschewing may appear intuitively implausible in our culture because of certain inveterate but culturally constructed ways of understanding oneself as separate from the world.
